Lectures

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here and start by trying to define and and figure out ways that we can measure or operationalize the object of our study those various forms of violent international conflict particularly or so what is war well it sounds like a simple question but it's actually not defining war is not an easy task and there is no universally agreed-upon definition now there's nothing special in that that's a not uncommon problem in many areas of the social sciences in fact sometimes we can't even agree on the terminology is we're gonna see in more detail in a future lecture on the charter of the United Nations the Charter not only refers to or but it also talks about force talks about armed attack it talks about aggression but it never says how these issues are related to one another or how they are defined in any detail just uses the different terms anyway to give you an idea of the range of definitions we'll consider the following marks and angles right Karl Marx and Friedrich engels in their introduction to the Communist Manifesto they write the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle and what they're saying there is it warfrankly everything else but war is the product of capitalism itself that war will only end when communism replace capitalism in other words when the proletariat the working-class supplants overthrow the bourgeoisie the owners of the means of production in that epic final phase of the dialectical struggle between classes all right marks and angles war is a product of class struggle that's how you have to understand it the German what technically was an ornithologist he was also a Nazi the famous or infamous German or ornithologist and Nazi you again well known Konrad Lorenz he wrote a book called on aggression he argued that his observations of animal behavior some of which of course were challenged by some of his detractors but he argued that observations of animal behavior showed decisively the human nature is innately aggressive and it was this innate aggressiveness that was the cause of war again this is one of the more famous scholars to make this conclusion all be it by no means the only one then there's Margaret Mead some of you might recognize the name she's a famous and somewhat controversial or was I guess I should say she's long been deceased the famous and controversial anthropologist in this case and she also had a definition for what warfare was paraphrasing just slightly here she defined it as a conflict which is organized and socially sanctioned and in which killing is not regarded as murder a conflict which is organized and socially sanctioned and in which killing is not regarded as her she went on to write elsewhere that warfare is not the product of class right so she rejects marks and angels nor was it a biological or natural phenomena so she rejects people like Lawrence rather she believed that warfare was a human invention it was an invention and invention like any other of the inter of the India try that again in English an invention like any other of the inventions in terms of which we order our lives such as rightie marriage cooking our food instead of eating it raw trial by jury burial of the dead and so on and so on and she said it's no different from all those other social practices as something that we as human beings invent it well for me if you can invent it you cannot invent it or in other words if you invent this thing called where you can also invent a society where we don't have we have


general Carl Von Clausewitz the famous Russian Military theorist author of the classic work on war he defined war as quote anact of Force to compel our enemy to do your will an active force to compel our enemy to do our will cause would say the name if if it's her a rat on her on the back your brain he's also famous for his victim war is the continuation of policy by other means or sometimes translated as war is the continuation of politics by other means same guy what else about well now they dung the Chinese Communist Dictator he actually agreed with Clausewitz and wrote that quote or cannot for a single moment be separated from politics the product of politics and then there's the British historian John Keegan very famous British military historian he rejects Clausewitz and not unlike Margaret Mead considers war to be a cultural artifact subject to considerable local variation anyways I could go on I could go on and on it up but you get the idea a lot of different definitions from what waris so in the end what is war well frankly in practice the way many of us in our regular day-to-day lives defined or many other concepts is by using atest made famous by an American Supreme Court justice a guy by the name of Potter Stewart and Potter Stewart is today virtually unknown except for what he said in a 1964 pornography case believe it or not when asked what waspornographic Justice Stewart famously retorted quote I know it when I see it quote and frankly for many of us war had the same characteristic we knew it when we can we know it when we see it unfortunately as social scientists this this I know it when I see it testwell frantically it's only somewhat useful as social scientists we typically want more concrete more measurable definitions of things like so I don't do now is considered a more concrete measurable definition and so on it's not without problems I like it but it's it's not without problem it's not there isn't that are perfect and with this one comes to us from something known as the long-range analysis of war project according to the people with the long-range analysis of war project quotes war is an occurrence of purposive and lethal violence about more social groups pursuing conflicting political goals Global's that result in fatalities with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership well read it one more time a war I guess they don't really need to do that since you can just go back up the tape but whatever I'll re a war is an occurrence of purposive and lethal violence amongst two or more social groups pursuing conflicting political goals that results in fatalities with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership what I like about this definition is andagain there are some others that are simpler but what I like about this particular definition is that it focuses our attention on purposeful use of lethal force and here the idea is to exclude things like you know people thought you'd hear this phrase you know the war on drugs the war on cancer you know think whatever well that's not the kind of war quote unquote that we want to study we want we want to talk about instances of the purposeful use of lethal violence so it excludes activities you know you know where we asha convention use the term war different context excludes those okay lethal violence it's also broad enough to cover a wide range of social groups so we can have wars between clans we can have wars between tribes we can have wars between nation-states we can have wars between civilizations we can have wars between alliances what-have-you so it can cover a range of social groups at the same time because it has a focus on political goals explicitly talks about political goals it also allows us to exclude activities that we might not want to study at least not in this context you know they're they're gaming is engage in warfare but their goals are not political they're their gains are criminal you know soccer hooligans engage engage in violent conflict but again their purpose tends not to be political at least not in the conventional sense of the word so this definition from the long-range analysis of war people again allows us to include you know everything from clans and tribes and ancient states beyond but the same time exclude the criminal purposes of gang warfare and the non political purposes of soccer hooligans at the light finally at the end there it refers to command structures and authoritative leadership the reason it does that is what's trying to do there is to separate this thing called or from random or if you will spontaneous forms of violent activity such as a riot you know a riot can spring up it can be quite deadly it can even have a political purpose but there's no direction to the violence so while we might want to study it in some contexts we don't want to study it when we're studying war is it's a it's a different thing if you will put it over to the side now significantly the long-range analysis of war project mayor may not have noticed this it does not employ a minute yeah a minimum casualty threshold in its analysis in other words if you have purposive and lethal violence amongst two more social groups blah blah and it kills one person or a thousand persons or 10,000 persons or a hundred thousand purpose whatever it can at least in theory still be considered a war there is no minimum number by way of contrast other definitions do employ a minimum casualty threshold for example there's another famous group that again doesn't P Racal studies of war notice the correlates of war project anis whatare the it has one of the best known and most widely used conflict datasets and if you're ever doing research especially if you're doing sort of a statistical analysis you want to you want to be working with the the datasets from the correlates of project anyways it's one of the best known and most widely used conflict datasets but they only count something as aor if it's a violent confrontation arising between sovereign polities have at least half a million citizens and which results in at least a thousand battle connected deaths per year so it has to be two entities that could beStates they could be a state and something that's trying to become astatke you know a separatist movement right to polities of at least half a million or more citizens the results at least a thousand total battle connected deaths here a battle connected is important they're talking about people killed in combat not killed by you know say diseases or famine unleashed by the war direct conflict casualties another famous and not quite as famous as the correlates of war project but another famous one there's the uppsala conflict data program and anyway they split the difference they talk about two kinds of wars for them they're what they call major Wars have those one thousand annual battle related deaths but they talk about minor wars anything that kills twenty five people a year so you have various options the long range thelong range analysis of conflict people should be a long range analysis of warpeople no threshold we have correlates of war high threshold of the thousand and


the uppsala conflict data program within a thousand four major Wars but something kind of in the middle forminor Wars you know the decision to either have or not have a threshold there's an interesting one on the one hand not having a minimum allows for a wider range of data to be collected a lot more cases there's lots of cases that fall in that you know less than a thousand deaths per year range and we might want to include those in our in our analysis we might gain some insights by including them in fact some scholars go so far as to include not just wars that actually kill people but what they refer to as mere wars or crises crisis situations that have the potential for developing into work that they should be included because they would also help us with insights into conflict and conflict generation and opponents of having a threshold note that really if you do have a threshold regardless of what the number is at the end of the day it's a completely arbitrary one correlates of war projecta thousand battle connected deaths per year well why a thousand why not 950 wayne 837 why not 342 you know what's so magical about a thousand other that's a nice round number people tend to like nice round numbers but really other than that the number is more or less arbitrary on the other hand it should be noted that if you don't have a threshold critics would argue that the lack of a threshold risks capturing events that you might not wish to include or which may not be useful for your particular analysis in other words the suggestion is that the dynamics of something like a border skirmish the dynamics of low-intensity violent conflict might be so different from a large-scale conflict that you will you know not learn the right lessons from history if you include them in your data set that in a sense those lower violent events might end up corrupting your analysis you know lumping together things that really aren't the same in other words you might be better off comparing and contrasting World War 1 to World War 2 to the Hundred Years War to the Napoleonic Wars Something like that rather than contrasting World War 2 to things like in 2010 there was a quote-unquote clash I'm gonna call it aclash you can't really call it a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the handful of people are the dynamics of that ethiopia eritrea conflict the same as the dynamics of world war ii maybe but maybe not well here's another one here's it's likelike my famous my favorite quote unquote war 1896 the Anglo zanzibar or look it up if you don't believe you think I'm Making it up it's generally accepted as holding the record for being the history's shortest war lasting for approximately one hour from beginning to end well again the point would be that is an event like the 1896 Anglo zanzibar orare the dynamics of it sufficiently similar to something like world war one or world war two or the Napoleonic Wars To really you know give us insights into war as general in general or are they have such a different nature that they should be counted and treated and studied in a different way finally onthe if you will the other other hand what had yes a threshold on the other hand no on the other other hand there's actually one more problem with using a threshold and that is the argument that battle related deaths is not necessarily a reliable indicator of war and its severity Tanisha Fazal she's the author of one of the essay options for this this term and in that piece Fazal argues that the apparent decline in or at its intensity and we're gonna talk with this issue ourselves later on the course but she basically argues that the apparent decline in is something of aRaaj but it might look like there is less war in the world today because the number of people dying in war is declining but the argument is in this article is that the real reason few people are dying is not because there's less war per se but because of advances in the medical sciences you know things like antibiotics evacuating casualties with helicopters at least for more sophisticated richer nations you know antibiotic II antibiotics casualty evacuation improve sanitation the development of things like helmets and body armor and all this guys that they're saving more victims of and Fazal Notes that this has obvious implications for any any study that uses a statistical threshold again we might not be measuring war the same way in different eras of time well in the end it doesn't really matter in the end the choice to include or not include a threshold is for most of us related to data collection reasons in other words it's usually easier to construct a dataset and to construct a consistent dataset with a higher threshold than if you use a low or non-existent threshold and the reason is quite simple large conflicts with lots of cash fleas those are the ones that are in the news those are the ones that are in the papers those are the ones that you can have access to information smaller ones don't always get much coverage alright let's now turn to the various ways scholars and academics have tried to study war starting with what I call the classical era you know studies scholars have been studying war you know for as long as we've recorded history both in terms of the study you know specific wars and conflicts but but also there's a long history of you know through theoretical work on the issue one of the earliest of these at least one of the earliest to have survived to the present was penned by an ancient Greek scholar by the name of Thucydides Who live back in the 5th century BC his book called history of the Peloponnesian War didn't just tried to recount the events that had occurred in this conflict it was a conflict between two city-states Athens and Sparta but vicinities was not just interested in what happened and went you know conduction such a date and Athenian army went over here and the next day the Spartans came and the day after that they had a big battle and somebody wanted somebody lost whatever that was all very interesting but he wanted to go beyond that vicinities work this is why he's famous even today is the acidity work contained both an analytical and normative component in other words he not only tried to describe events what happened it went but he also analyzed why things happened the way they happened and he also had a normative component where he offered his readers advice on how they ought to react to similar circumstances in the future in other words what should they take from these events what lessons should they learn and so on and so forth so we have these cities we have history of the Peloponnesian War an early example from the classic era another early student of war was the ancient mystic in this case Chinese military theorists by the name of son zhu variously dated somewhere between the 5th and 3rd centuries BC sozu was probably there's some dispute about this whether it's one person or not anyways son zhu was probably the author of one of the best-known texts on military strategy and tactics will be known as the art of war again like vicinities sons ooh he's trying to study politics he study studywar study tactics and strategy what have you but not just to understand what happened but again to learn the lessons of history so there is a normative component to son's OU's work just like there is to vicinities he's got a descriptive element he's got an analytical element and he's also got that normative element where he gives us prescriptions of how to avoid the pitfalls pitfalls rather of the past you know we're going forward so that we don't make the same mistakes that these other guys did back in the day jumping ahead several centuries actually we have them again previously mentioned Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz his famous book on war he wrote this in the aftermath of a conflict between Prussia And Napoleonic France and 1806 what happened is Napoleon's armies rolled into Prussia and obliterated smashed crushed destroyed the Prussian military it was is you might phrase it today from the perspective of the Prussians an epic fail well this defeat by his Prussia in the hands of the armies of Napoleon had confirmed in Klaus with something that he had long been considering naming that war was not an isolated purely military act Klaus was believed that Russia's defeat had been caused by pre-existing political factors in other words the war had been lost before the first shot was fired again war is the continuation of policy or politics whichever by other means he's saying that the political purpose of war can ever be forgotten and it must always be in the forefront of military plans decisions and actions now it should come as no surprise that the classic and there's others I don't have time if you come in so surprised that these classic studies at war tended to be qualitative studies they used data they used information but it tended to be qualitative as opposed to quantitative or the statistical method the reason of course is that the reason they were qualitative studies is that things like more are often very difficult to quantify they're very difficult to generalize they are they have what social scientists refer to as small and the limitation small antmeans number is referring to the number of cases if we wanted to study worldwars how many cases can we really put compare world war one world war two maybe kind of sort of the poetic wars that it pretty much well you know again if you have only a small number cases you can't really necessarily have statistically meaningful data well this brings us to the more recent era in which statistical studies came to the fore now there are still a lot of people who continue to do very good qualitative studies of war that has that British Historian John Keegan you know you know he's a he's a quantitative excuse me he is a qualitative social scientist history to be precise but the 20th century also saw the emergence of quantitative or if you prefer statistical analyses of war this starts between the two world wars in the 20th and 30s with something at least here in political science wetend to refer to as the behavioral listrevelrymay have had that term in another context in another course probably the earliest of these systemic efforts to define and measure war using statistics and quantitative analysis was a large three volume study of war written by Kirkham Sorokin back in 1937 Sorokin he was a sociologist who had fled to the United States after the Bolsheviks to power in what becomes the Soviet Union and he viewed war as a breakdown in social relations and he wanted to understand those breakdowns by looking for patterns now he mostly looked in Europe the context of conflict wars in Europe but he tried to see were there patterns were there are statistically significant patterns in the causes of war the evolution of waris the progress of wars the Andy divorcePat began with a primary focus on Europe He's white he's the fees really the first Sorokin but there are others in 1942 there was again a groundbreaking study of warp warfare written by a guy by the name of Quincy Wright and Quincy Wright's work is called a study of war again for it comes out 1942 right kind of in the middle ish of the Second World War and it's a truly massive massive effort thee the original text was something like 1500 pages long eventually published an abridged unabridged version the short version the Coles Notes Version if you will or 150 pages in length anyways his idea was again muchlike Sorokin it's to try to abolish warby understanding it you know what are the patterns if we understand the patterns if we understand the causal connected relationships maybe we could do something to you know get to the divide so on and so forth another one at about the same time writing also in the 1940s was an English Mathematician that the pacifist guy by the name of Lewis fry Richardson and she's working at more or less the sametime as Quincy right now he dies before his books could be published but he's famous for two things arms and insecurity and a second book statistics of deadly quarrels again both of these books arms and insecurities and his second book statistics of deadly quarrels again are are are trying to use advanced statistical techniques to study war this gets us to the 1960s in the1960s guess who pops up our friends at the correlates of war project the Corliss award project focuses on basically Wars after Napoleon okay so anything Napoleon and earlier is not included but anything after Napoleon and again tries to understand using statistics the impact of things like resources or the formation of alliances or geography or things like polarity you know is the world unipolar bipolar multiple to what degree to those factors lead to war and finally at least as far as this lecture is concerned we have in the nineteen seventies the the up sawthe Uppsala conflict data program people they come along they they were kind of a reaction against the Corliss a war project that they they thought that the correlates of war people because they were usually that high threshold room this he'd out on important things and so they put in their lower threshold one of the downsides however of the Uppsala Dataset is it only goes back to World War two now these there are other datasets out there but these are two of the more informations now the qualitative the classic era studies they suffered from limitations they they couldn't answer all of the questions well surprise surprise guess what quantitative studies like their qualitative cousins also suffer from limitations again if you have done a stats course you probably already know the limits of statistical analysis at least you should yes depends who taught it to you anyway what are the the shocking things about statistical analyses of or aspects of work is to the degree to which they profoundly disagree with one another on almost everything else of a very poor track record when it comes to predictions despite the according here from a literature review despite the immense data collections prestigious journals sophisticated analyses many statistical results change from article to article and specification to specification oragain I'm paraphrasing from another literature review depending on the study you read okay so if you're using stitches if you went you know did some research and you're looking for statistical studies depending on which study you read you might find in that ethnic diversity is in fact associated with conflict or it's not it depends who you read resource extraction is associated with conflict or it's not low levels of democracy is associated with conflict or it's not high levels of inequality is associated with conflict it's not mountainous terrain is associated with conflict or it's not and so on its own and so on and so on in fact there are only a relatively small handful of conclusions that seem to enjoy if not universal agreement then virtually universal agreement in the literature and to be honest most of these are pretty trivial for example it's generally accepted that there is a connection between low average income in a punt in a country and that nations propensity for war so poor countries tend to have more war general agreement on that second countries that experienced war in their past especially there a recent past tend to experience more war in the future there's so much fun the last time they're gonna try it again and third this is somebody's the most trivial of them physically large states tend to experience or one more thing when it comes to quantitative studies even when they seem to demonstrate a statistical link between two variables that demonstrated relationship is often very substantive let me illustrate let's say you do study and when you're done your study and you run your computer it turns out the numbers and you find that some variable we'll call it X variable X Increases the chance of a war happening by 40% oh well that sounds great that sounds like a really important study you know forty percent that sounds really profound well there's one thing the chance of a war starting in any given year in any random country is usually somewhere around 1.8 percent per year as a result raise eNOS baseline by 40 percent because of this risk factor variable X shifts that chance of random country experienced a random from 1 point 8 percent per year all the way up to 2 point 4 percent per year in other words both are very low probabilities we haven't really explained that much finally another limit with quantitative studies is that you can't work best with structural factors things that we can count technology geography economics and so they don't work well with the human element human beings have free will what some people prefer the curb agency but idiosyncratic factors like a personality of key leaders are rarely part of quantitative data sets there are other limits but that's all the time we have for today all right that's enough about the study war next time we're gonna try and focus on efforts to break the cycle of violence so on to then that's all I Have for now bye


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all right welcome back this class we're going to look at how campaigns of non-violence or pacifism as the case maybe might theoretically at least be used in the face of international conflict in other words can we successfully manage conflicts by not fighting back at least not fighting back using violence to attend this lecture is divided into several parts we're going to start by defining some of the key concepts well then look at the history of nonviolence and pacifism including the works of some famous proponents we'll spend a bit of time talking about the mechanics of a campaign of non-violence for passes and others how is it supposed to actually work how's it supposed to bring change how is it supposed to break the cycle of violence and we will of course evaluate the effectiveness of these campaigns by critically evaluating the strengths and weaknesses and we will conclude by focusing on a couple of cases where non-violence was used at least as part of a campaign to reach this specifically international conflict this lecture is a little bit on the longside so I will stop the recording somewhere around the midpoint just to keep the file size manageable fordownloads and and so on all rights nonviolent resistance and pacifism basically nonviolent resistance or pacifism seeks to defuse conflicts or achieve political change without recourse to physical violence now broadly speaking there are are two categories or subcategories if you will of nonviolence I like to call the first group principled proponents of nonviolent resistance here I'm referring to individuals or groups whose actions are typically grounded in a religious or ethical philosophy one that rejects ivas a matter of conscience in other words they engage in non-violence as a matter of principle now for these principled proponents of nonviolent resistance and pacifism war and other forms of violence are never justified not even in self-defense in other words the prohibition is absolute now of course we'll see in a few moments actual practitioners of even principled nonviolence and pacifism even practitioners of principled pacifism such as Mahatma Gandhi who we will be talking about or Bertrand Russell who we will be talking about these principles practitioners typically make minor in some cases even fairly major exceptions or you might want to put it another way don't always live up completely to the idea that they expose nevertheless they at the very least do you aspire to absolute non-violence anyway the second group of nonviolent resisters I like to label strategic proponents of nonviolent resistance or pacifism this second group refers to individuals or groups again it could be either for whom nonviolent strategies are well they're basically dictated by strategic factors in other words they engage in non-violence because other strategies or are are impractical or other strategies have already failed or what have you the the government of Denmark during World War Two which is one of the case studies we're gonna have at the end of the lecture is an example of one of these partial it's at least a partial example of this kind of nonviolent resistance not a perfect one doesn't cover the the whole thing but it's at least a partial example alright let's turn to the history and origins of pacifism pacifism has an ancient pedigree in fact many early pacifist movements were closely associated with some sort of a religious tradition in Jainism for example Jainism it depends on who you ask one of those things is either an offshoot or a reaction to Hinduism anyways Jainism has for more than 2,000 years included at least four it's monks and nuns a prohibition against taking any animal life cattle birds insects and of course people similarly Buddhism which is another offshoot this is like clearly an offshoot of Hinduism also includes a strict prohibition against the employment of violence at least as far as members of its monastic orders are concerned and of course beating in the second century AD there arose within Christianity communities that preach non-violence for members of the clergy but also for laypeople how to be sure none none of these religious traditions completely forceware the use of violence at all times for example within Jainism there were several countries where Jainism embraced much more militant orientation as did Buddhism especially Buddhism practiced outside of India and Christianity accepted the necessity for violence especially especially after Christianity You know became the state religion in the Roman Empire and the other thing to know is that even when the ideals of pacifism prevailed these pacifist movements they you know just you know for example the pacifist within the early Christian Church they tended to constitute a minority even within their own communities their ideas nevertheless have continued to resonate and religion remains a source of inspiration for pacifists today I mean within Christianity you can talk about the Quakers you can talk about the Mennonites for example religion of course is not the only source of these ideas of non-violence some modern pacifist movements take their inspiration from feminism come from socialism some from humanism and soon and so on as an example of a pacifist group inspired by feminism or at least a variant of feminism as well as of socialism so a feminist socialist pacifist group if you will we can point to something known as the women's peace party now the women's peace party was created in the United States in 1915 and during the early phase of the First World War the women's peace party helped to organize something known as the International Congress of women that was organized in The Hague in the neutral country Islands Holland if you prefer this Congress attracted more than eleven hundred representatives from you primarily drew from the twelve neutral countries in Europe but it also drew Delhi it's not just from those twelve neutral European countries but also drew delegates from some at least of the belligerent countries as well which was frankly quite a feat given the nature of the hostilities at the time just as an aside here perhaps surprisingly if you're familiar with the history or not women from Germany and austria-hungary and and even frankly occupied Belgium Had an easier time getting permission from their from the authorities to travel to the heck that did representatives of British women's groups at the same time women's groups in France and Russia were asked to send delegates but they refused to attend citing the desire to support the war effort and here in Canada Canadian Women's We're also cool to the effort there were only two delegates from Canada that went to the Congress and they did so in an unofficial capacity anyway the Congress pushed for neutral countries to undertake negotiations to end the war called for women to be represented equally in the peace process and it called for the Foreign Policies Of all states to be controlled by democratic governments based on universal suffrage and an equal number of male and female representatives this relatively small segment of the wider women's peace and suffrage movement what it tried to do was actually turn traditional images of the nature of men men and women on their head in other words since it was widely believed that time even by many feminists that women by their nature were more Pacific More gentle more peace-loving and and since that were that was the nature of women it was concluded that frankly these were precisely the characteristics that were needed in a world ranked by war in the words of one of the contemporary in the words of a contemporary writer the idea was that there might be found an antidote to warin women's affection and all-embracing pity for helpless children or in other words was seen as the product of men and peace was believed to be the product of woman again as an aside here arguments that claim that women are biologically as opposed to socialized that are biologically predisposed to violence and largely not completely fall out of fashioned in the current era in other words most contemporary feminists would reject this notion of the biological differences between men and women with respected violence anyway now that's an example of a group inspired by socialism and feminism you mean next probably the best-known at least of the modern proponents of non-violence or pacifism is Mahatma Gandhi now in the case of Gandhi should be noted right at the onset the Gandhi's position regarding non-violence did evolve die evolved significantly over the course of his lifetime as a young man living in South Africa Gandhi actually commanded a volunteer Medical Corps that accompany British military units during the Boer War the Second World War technically the Second World War and a later zulu rebellion in other words Gandy Actively participated al-qaeda is a non combatant but he actively participated in British military campaigns later but a decade later after he had returned to India Gandhi again this sounds somewhat incongruous given what you probably know if Gandhi he later supported efforts to recruit Indians to fight alongside the British during the First World War the idea was that by showing that Indians Could defend themselves India would hasten the end of the British Empire British imperialism and finally Gandhi Rather famously wrote one time that quote where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence again not the kind of typical thing you associate with finally with Gandhi where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence however as his thinking grew and evolved Gandhi was increasingly rigorous in his promotion of non-violence even in the face of great controversies hell's be noted that and God he's not alone in this but Gandhi like other many other proponents of non-violent political strategies he disdained the term pacifism he preferred a different terminology to describe his ideas Gandhi For his part developed the term set satyagraha and satyagraha referred to his concept of proactive but peaceful protests civil disobedience and resistance to injustice he rejected thicker passes pacifism because to him the word pacifism connoted passivity andhe was not about passivity he was not about just sitting there and taking it he was in favor of being proactive resisting injustice through civil disobedience and so on and so forth he'll have more to say about Gandhi Later another famous advocate of nonviolence was the British philosopher British philosopher Bertrand Russell now Russell never completely rejected the use of force in any and all circumstances but he did believe the circumstances that truly justified the use of force were extraordinarily rare he went so far as to argue that most claims of self-defense were we're really raised falsely that they weren't legitimate claims of self-defense they were using that as an excuse if you will use violence for him a claim of self-defense to be truly legitimate had to be meaning accordance with international law and be authorized not by the state itself but by some sort of a neutral international Authority in the assigned reading when Russell talks about some of this note that he's writing prior to the creation of the League of Nations but that's the kind of thing a League of Nations United Nations something like that would have to authorize it for it to be illegitimate Russell's beliefs in non-violence led him to actually oppose Britain's Involvement in the first world war an act that resulted in his spending at least portions of the war in a British Prison similarly as we will discuss in a few minutes later in this lecture Russell also strongly opposed the idea of using force against the Nazis in the1930s now he did eventually modify his position but not until 1940 when France Was already defeated and occupied and Britain was under threat of invasion in short he eventually came to believe that extreme and extraordinary threats such as Ants ISM might constitute another exception to his otherwise strong opposition and to the use of violence so how would Bertram strategy of nonviolence work again it's it's discussed in more detail in the assigned reading but Russell basically argues that a policy of nonviolent defense would start with a whole jet have to do you know across the society with a whole generation of citizens being instructed in the principles of nonviolent resistance you do within the schools for example and you have to do in the schools you don't have to sort if you know stay at it because you need your you need to counter the effect of what had happened in previous generations we have people socialized in the principles of war anyways for Brussels once it was completed this socialized citizen citizenry would be resolute would be determined would be schooled in the values and tactics of nonviolent resistance and what would they be taught well they'd be taught they would still be taught things like self-sacrifice you know that's one of the things you learn in warfare you know fighting for your buddy you know throwing yourself on a grenade to save the others in your what have you you know that same spirit of self-sacrifice has to be taught but here the spirit of self-sacrifice would be put to nonviolent use in terms of specific tactic tactics Russell ActRussell asks us to imagine a situation whereby you know he's writing a book Britain Britain is faced with an armed invasion from Imperial Germany now again emphasized he's talking about Imperial Germany he'll first roll era First World War era not-not-not Hitler so it's the Kaiser Not not not Hitler anyways he's you know he would say you know we don't need an army we don't need a navy so what would happen if we are faced with a threat from Imperial Germany well in that case without an army or without a Navy to protect itself it would be a relatively simple thing for Kaiser for the kaiser forces to invade and to conquer England It would be easy it would just land on the shore get off their ships and marchinland but what then well for Russell This is where the British people would come to the floor the British people fully trained in the tactics of nonviolent resistance and with the same discipline and the same purpose found in today's military this public would subsequently refuse to carry out the orders of the kaiser's occupying force they would refuse to follow the instructions of the invaders instead government employees and and regular citizens would endeavour to follow the orders of the now deposed government bureaucrats would refuse to follow the new edicts of the invaders teachers would continue to teach the existing curriculum railway workers would you know not follow the instructions of the Germans custom workers you know so on so people in every walk of life would refused to do what the Germans tell them they would do what they had been told before well and then is that the invaders in this case the Imperial Germans might very well execute some of the ringleaders some of the key resistors in an attempt to intimidate the rest but they could not in Russell's opinion shoot enough people to break the will of a British populace sealed in the values and in the tactics of nonviolence nor he believed could the invading Germans Use such extraordinary means as starvation to ensure compliance he believed that such quote wholesale brutality unquote on the part of the invaders would simply be out of the question they wouldn't do it there would be no honor in it for the German Soldiers and thus they would be reluctant to carry out these measures instead of feeling pride the invading soldiers would feel disgust if ordered to carry out such extreme measures so they wouldn't do it they would resist it themselves yes in the end there would be losses Russell recognises that some people in Britain would die resisting the invaders resisting not violently but he says the numbers the numbers would be far lower than those that were being killed on the battlefields of Europe During the first world war and eventually he argued this resolute Britain would prevail now then I can hear some of you screaming at your computer screens don't worry we will evaluate the potential effectiveness of this kind of campaign later in the lecture I think it's just after the break if memory serves one last note about Bertrand Russell I mentioned how over time he did stepback at least a little bit with respect to the use of violence and he modified his opposition to using violence and argued that under extreme and extraordinary threats such as Ants IS it might well be legitimate to use even violence in self-defense and at the start of the cold war he went further in the late 1940s Russell Russell was a socialist but he was an anti-soviet socialist anyways in in the late 1940s Russell actually proposed that the West Which would have been the United States In particular use what was the nuclear weapons monopoly you know the United States with the only country to have nuclear weapons Russell proposed that the West the u.s.particularly uses nuclear weapons threaten the Soviet Union should the latter continue its aggressive policies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in other words Russell came to believe that soviet-style communism much like National Socialism in Germany was an existential threat to the West that it was the main threat to world peace and thus it represented an exception allowing the use of violence later inlife Russell I think somewhat sheepishly tried to downplay this particular proposal he he later claimed that he was merely advocating that Russia be quote unquote threatened with nuclear weapons as opposed to actually have them used against the the Soviet Union but that's really off the skating the past if you look at his speeches if you look at his writings it's rather unambiguous on this topic he did say yeah use nuclear weapons if necessary to contain and rollback the Soviet Union one other change he made in the aftermath of the Vietnam War he changed his mind again and Vietnam for you that it was actually the United States that was the biggest threat to world peace alright let's do one more a little part of this lecture and then we will take our break let's turn to the mechanics of nonviolent resistance in other words how do supporters of non-violent resistance or pacifism or whatever how do they claim their strategy can excuse me how do they claim that their approach can succeed in bringing political change or to you know manage a conflict well they make several claims first supporters of non-violent resistance or pacifism claim that their approach uses well frankly uses morality as leverage in other words seizes the moral high ground and why is it important why is it important to seize the moral high ground well for one thing it increases the chances that elements in the oppressing side whoever they on the invader side are the government if it's the you know civil disobedience or whatever it increases the chances that elements in the opposition government judges members of the civil service perhaps even members of the securityservice members of the Armed Forces it increases the chances that they will switch sides and support the cause of the nonviolent resistors or at the very least not opposed theme does this elisa pressure and since the suppressors need not fear violent retribution in other words the physical safety of the members of the regime are more or less guaranteed it may be somewhat easier for the oppressive regime itself to compromise by way of contrast when the regime and its supporters feel fear retaliation when they fear death they lose power frankly they may have little recourse but to continue the fight regardless of what this means to them and to those that they are fighting back in 2003 during the early early months of the war in Iraq US Secretary Of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Rumsfeld Popularized the phrase dead-ender's to refer to these sorts of individuals in other words her hands are so bloody they've got nothing to lose there's no other option for the maymays we'll keep fighting well again if they fear for their lives then yeah why should they be compromised why should they surrender why should they give in they may as well at least go down fighting at a practical level seizing the moral high ground is especially desirable as a way for protesters to at least try hopefully to convince soldiers or other members of the security establishment not to fire on them not to cut them down in the streets it's it's not easy to do it's not easy to get to convince soldiers to shoot into crowds whether they are ordered to do so but it is easier relatively speaking it is relatively easier to do when the protesters are unarmed if protesters are armed on the other hand that it's highly likely that the soldiers or the security officials will shoot into the crowds of protesters so again unarmed peaceful protesters maybe shot at but might not armed protesters definitely will be shot at virtually guaranteed of course the authorities are aware of this possibility consequently repressive regimes try to minimize this risk they engage in propaganda of course with their soldiers any doctor nature soldiers they use military discipline they create parallel you know paramilitary forces you know armed militias to defend the regime what have you and in the case of in the case of Communist China in 1989 one of the ways that the Chinese government got soldiers that were willing to essentially is force against the protesters during the kahneman Square uprising was to bring in soldiers from the rural areas the protests were largely a City thing largely an urban thing and the idea wasif you bring up soldiers from the roar areas you won't have the same connection to the protesters and much be much more willing to use violence to crush them which in fact is exactly what happened anyway a second related argument that is made by supporters of nonviolence is that the claim of Nod is to claim rather that nonviolence is a particularly effective strategy for the weak and the powerless the logic is this if you are part of a group that is weak that has relatively if if any power and you try to engage in a violent struggle against a powerful opponent an invader or what-have-you you are almost certainly guaranteed to lose that struggle and more importantly you are virtually guaranteed to pay a prohibitive price in terms of death and suffering on the other hand if members of a weak and relatively powerless groups engage in a nonviolent struggle frankly they still very well may lose but what are your what are your si option readings talks about this they may still lose but there is at least a chance that they won't that a an invader a regime that uses force to crush an unarmed opposition may create a political backfire effect the sign of unarmed protesters being cut down in the streets may actually galvanize the opposition it may SAP the will of the regime or at least the less committed members of the regime those that aren't dead-enders if you will people who may not be comfortable with having so much blood other their hands it may lead to international condemnation may lead to international sanctions and so on and soon right the international community is usually more willing to use political and economic and diplomatic sanctions to support non-violent protesters who are attacked as opposed to two support groups using violence finally in all of these these these are related campaign of nonviolent resistance seek to take advantage of a very specific relationship that exists between rulers and those people that they rule the argument is really quite straightforward the argument basically says that even the most brutal totalitarian regime requires a sizable number of people to carry out its orders consequently if those people can be mobilized non-violently not to carry out the orders of a dictator the dictatorship is duped it's really quite straightforward I have a question for you I know you can't actually answer it that's a rhetorical question how many people did Adolf Hitler kill during the Second World War you thought about it you have an answer you know what the actual answer is the answer is zero enough Hitler killed nobody during the Second World War Now just hold on hold on hold on don't start that email to the DS these are not the mad ramblings of a Holocaust denier rather this statement highlights the reality that Hitler ordered directed authorized the murder of millions but he himself did not do any of the killing with his own hands his millions upon millions of victims were instead killed by his functionaries they were killed by his soldiers they were killed by the security establishment and so on and soon and the idea here is if those elements of society had instead refused to carry out his monstrous orders the regime would have collapsed and millions would have lived that otherwise died nowthis idea that rulers are actually heavily heavily heavily dependent on their followers appears to have first surfaced in the writings of a French Writer a guy by the name of Atia dilipwiki in his book this quarter the last servitude voluntary discourse on voluntary servitude none of what he was frankly something of an anarchist and you felt the humanity was enslaved by its own willingness to follow leader needed like that hidden like leaders of any kind he didn't like Kings he didn't like military leaders he didn't even like elected leaders he didn't like leaders and he felt again as I said that people who followed leaders were essentially enslaving themselves justread a quick quote from lebwa t he whomasters you only has two eyes has but two heads only one body but where do you think he acquired all the eyes with which he spies on you if not from you yourselves how does he have so many hands to strike you if he does not take them from you how has he any power over you except by the means of your strength you sow your crops so that he may ravage them you weaken yourselves in order to make him stronger so that he can reign over me more tightly only be resolved to serve littlemore and you will be free I do not ask you to push him or overturn him but only that you no longer support him and he soshe and you shall try see this three times as you shall see like a great Colossus from which one removes the pedestal he will fall of his own weight and shattered in other words labaki argued that there was no need to fight tyrants only to stop obeying them now for the record la boîte ii was profoundly pessimistic about the prospects of actually having any society do anything about this situation he felt that rulers had too many tricks to maintain their power and that this this relationship whereby we followed rulers who then impose their rule on us because we followed them basically what he's saying this relationship was too deeply entrenched to change he was quite pessimistic he had a roadmap he had a plan but just didn't think it would work alright why don't we take our break now and when we comeback I want to talk about something about the universal applicability of strategies of nonviolence is there such a thing or are there limits are there to where such strategies can work or not work this will be a short break for me it'll be a whatever break it is for you


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okay we're back before the break I Mentioned that there's a question as to whether or not strategies of nonviolent resistance have a universal applicability or whether they only work against certain types of opponents against certain kinds of regimes if you will in other words might a campaign ofnonviolent resistance or pacifism atleast theoretically work no guaranteesof course but at least theoreticallywork against the the German Kaiser oragainst the British Empire but not workagainst a totalitarian regime you knowthe Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia orMao Mao is China or what have you nowRussell Bertrand Russell we talked aboutbefore the break initially believed thatnonviolent resistance was possibleagainst any and all type of regime I washis initial belief but he later had achange of heartconsider the following 1937 now this is1937 we're talking really less than twoyears before the start of the SecondWorld WarBertrand Russell writes a letter to acritic somebody had criticized him andBertrand Russell wrote let her back andhad a bit of a you know exchange andwhat-have-you this is the if you go tothe overhead since the or heads markedone through three it's the dinner withHitler letter in that letter again Iwon't read the whole thing but he saysthat the general argument for path forfor pacifism as I see it is that moreharm is done by fighting than bysubmitting to injustice he goes on tosay I will argue to be concrete but ifthe Germans succeed in sending aninvading army to England we should dobest to treat them as visitors to givethem quarters and invite thecommander-in-chief meeting Hitler todine with the Prime Minister such suchbehavior he writes would completelybaffle them if on the other handwe fight them we may win or we may loseif we lose obviously no good has beendone and if we win we shall inevitablyduring the struggle acquire their badqualities in the world the end will beno better off no better off than if we'dlost now given how history unfolded someof you might wonder how in fact a dinnerwith Hitler would have improved thesituation in England in the aftermath ofthe German invasion but that's whatBertrand Russell was writing in 1937 aspreviously mentioned by 1940 in otherwords a year after the war had begun andshortly after France had been defeatedand occupied Russell did very belatedlychange his mind with respect to the useof force against certain existentialthreats such as Nazi totalitarianism onthe other hand Gandhi very much unlikeRussell went even further Gandhibelieved his strategy of satyagraha haduniversal applicability and he made noexceptionnot even for regimes like Nazi Germanyin his correspondence Gandhi variouslyadvised the people of CzechoslovakiaJews the British he advised all of themnot to use violence to resist even theaggression of Hitler with respect to theJews he said that the quote a single Jewstanding up and refusing to bow toHitlerwell might be enough to melt Hitler'sheart and a week after France andsurrenders he wrote to the British Iwant you to fight Nats ISM without armsyou will invite air Hitler and seniorMussolini to take what they want of thecountries you calltake what they want of the countriesparticularly of the countries you callyour possessions let them takepossession of your beautiful island withyour many beautiful buildings you willgive all of these but neither your soulsnor your minds if he's gentlemen chooseto occupy your homes you will vacatethem if they do not give you freepassage out you will allow yourself manwoman and child to be slaughteredbut you'll refuse to owe allegiance tothem again critics of pacifism criticsof non-violence might ask how employingGandhi's tactics of non-violence how itwould have changed the outcome for thevictims of Nats ISM you know in thecontext of the Holocaust in the contextof German resettlement policies inEastern Europe in the context of Germanoccupation policies that regime itsofficials its soldiers and otherpersonnel showed little hesitation inslaughtering huge numbers of unarmedopponents the same can be said aboutMao's Great Leap Forward Paul Pottsreign of terror and Cambodia Stalin'sGreat Purge unarmed resistors wereslaughtered by the millions in additionthere are some very daunting practicalchallenges facing a non-violentresistant movement especially onechallenging a totalitarian societythere's what social scientists refer toas a collective action problem you'veprobably heard this term beforecollective action problem in other wordsit takes a large percentage of apopulation to make something work butonly a handful to make it fail andthat's true with totalitarian regimes inparticular they have maybe not amajority of the population but there isa sizable number of true believes ortrue believers our fellow travelers orthose dead-enders I mentioned beforeor opportunist so that you know there'sall sorts of people that are willing tocarry out their wishes and this makesthe opportunity costespecially for the first leaders of thenon-violence resistance prohibitivelyexpensive add to this the regime canoften use indoctrination control ofcommunications the use of spies the useof Asians provocateur the employment ofterror and so the there are just so manythings that invaders that regimes canuse to suppress nonviolent protestersespecially if they're willing to useextreme violence which totalitarianregimes tend to be willing to do now fortheir part proponents and non-violencethis is covered in that Ralph Somylecture reading some II argues thatnevertheless there is some evidence thatnonviolent resistance can work againsteven the most brutal even totalitariandictatorship now most of subbiesexamples are not inter state conflict isnot one regime invading in anotherterritory they are nonviolent campaignsagainst your own governments they areintra national not inter national theyalso can occur in very specific and veryspecial circumstances so it's hard tosee how they can be universalized butbasically he says that no regimes likeNazi Germany and fascist Italy in styleof this Russia you know regimes likethis did see acts of non-violent civildisobedience that did bring somepositive change whatever what somebodydoesn't talk about this one but oneexample actually occurs in occupiedFrance during World War two in late 1940early 1941 communist-led trade unionsorganized a series of pre large strikeamongst coal miners in northern Francethis you know nearly a hundred thousandminers down tools these strikes cost theChairman war economy something like halfa million tons of coal and in the endthese strikers did manage to achievesome modest improvements in terms oftheir working conditions another exampleagain this is not one that some he talksabout but another occurs in fascistItaly in 1943 in this case againcommunist agitators lead again somewherearound hundred thousand workers onstrike in and around the city of Turinand these strikes do result in somemodest improvements in 1953 you knowthis is one that some he does touch onvery briefly there were strikes inSoviet labor camps if you can believe itthen again brought some modestimprovements to those interned in thosefacilities and one of the best examplesagain this is more alluded to by assumehe doesn't really go into much detailabout it but it occurs in 1941 whenleaders of Germany's Catholic Churchactively oppose Hitler's euthanasiapolicies and that suggestion is ifnon-violence can work in these kinds ofcontext these kinds of campaigns couldhave been should have been extended toinclude you know whatever opposition tothe Holocaust opposition to world war iiyou know what happened the problemcritics would suggest to these claimsthat you know non-violence can work evenin nazi germany fascists in italy Stalinis Russia is that these extremelyruthless opponents as some he refers tothem well on a closer inspection thehistorical record is it's a little bitmore muddy than might be otherwise suchas I said earlier these cases tend tooccur in exceptional circumstancesthey generally fail to keep many if notmost of their goals and the cases wherethe regime does make concessions ittends to be ruthless regimes but not theextremely ruthless regimes that cave inlet me illustrate with some examplesthink those miners the French minersthey went on strike in again late 1940into the first half of 1941 the date issignificant first half of 1941 becauseat the timeNazi Germany of the Soviet Union were atpeacethe Germans had not launched theirinvasion of Russia and it's an openquestion whether or not the Germanoccupation authorities would haveresponded the same wayin other words made concessions to acommunist-led strike if Germany and theSoviet were already at war theassumption it was probably not but theonly reason that that opposition wasn'tcrushed in the most violatorwas because the Nazis didn't want toupset the Soviets at least not for a fewmore months or take the case of thosestrikes in Turin at that time it'sdifficult to consider fascist Italy tobe an extremely ruthless regime thefascists had suffered a legitimacycrisis late that they had beenmilitarily defeatedin North Africa they had lost an entirearmy fighting beside the Germans inRussia Italy was being hit by an Alliedbombing campaign much of the populationwas experiencing food shortage in shortthere was at the time of these strikesalready a growing realization withinItaly that the war was lost in theregime was doomedand what about that anti euthanasiacampaign well it's difficult to callthis a campaign a success because reallywhat it what happened was the Nazisdidn't really stop their behavior itreally changed their policies withrespect to euthanasia he simply moved itout of the sight of the German publicthey also benefited from some timingagain timing is everythingthe German propaganda minister JosephGoebbels didn't favoured a policy thatdid not you know crush these you knowbishops these Catholic Bishops becausehe believed it was important to havereligious leaders to give the peopleconfidence help maintain the faith ofthe public during the war and hebelieved that because Germany was goingto win the war that there would beplenty of time to crush these guys afterthe war was over as far as the laborcamps those Soviet labor camps thegulags as they're referred to thosestrikes it's again the date issignificant they occurred in the latterpart of 1953 and into 1954 that date issignificant it's shortly after the deathof Stalin Stalin is gone the extremelyruthless leader is God and there was inthe Soviet Union a a bit of a mini thawif you will there were leaders jockeyingfor position to see who was going toreplace Stalin and these these leadersthey created this collective leadershipas sort of a transitional thing as theytried to sort everything out was tryingto consolidate its power and was not aswilling to use all of the means ofterror that Stalin had been until atleast somebody hit consolidate powers adifferent story once Khrushchev comes totake powerand the bottom line here is that there'salmost no examples of successfulnonviolent campaigns in a period whereit's saying Mao or Stalin or for thatmatter a Hitler or someone like SaddamHussein or even saying right nowcontemporary example be the Kim dynastyin North Korea when they're at theheights of their power when they areextremely ruthless regimes as opposed tosay you know in Poland in the in thelatter part of the 1980s just beforecommunism collapses general garras elsekey who was running the country at thetime you know he's he's a comparativemoderate he's not a neo Stalinist butmany scriptures the imagination the samewith Gustav stuff like in Czechoslovakiaagain a comparative moderate not aquote/unquote extremely ruthlessopponent anyways let's evaluate now thestrategies of pacifism and non-violenceparticularly as they manage the specificcategory of international conflict ofcourse that's what we're most interestedin herehow successful are these strategies inmanaging international conflict wellthis is a tricky question because aswe're gonna see in a moment there arenot a lot of cases to talk about so toset the stage let's first talk aboutpull out overhead number fourthus our little context let's start bylooking at the success rate of campaignsof non-violence in a general sensecampaigns of non-violence in bothdomestic and international contexts thisactual first table comes frominformation from thatstep in and chenoweth that's the SAEoption that I mentioned earlier is ifyou look at their statistics relativelyrecent study which actually later turnedinto a book stepping in Chenoweth arestrong advocates of non-violence yesthat nonviolent campaigns are successfulin achieving their goals just a littleover half the time fifty three percentis the number now that includes bothintra and Inter national campaigns ofnon-violence successful just over fiftyfour three percent of the time whereasviolent campaigns are successful onlyabout twenty six percent of the time andterrorist campaigns only succeed aroundseven percent of the time one of theother interesting statistics is thatthey suggest that a campaign against aslightly more democratic opponent inother words not a ruthless or anextremely route ruthless opponent but aslightly more democratic opponent anonviolent campaign works two thirds ofthe times if I present let's sort ofindirect evidence that you knowcampaigns are less successful onopposing that was extremely Ruthruthless once anyway well this wouldseem to bode well for the idea thatnon-violence can work unfortunately thevast majority the vast majority of thecampaigns of non-violence that are inChenoweth's and Stefan's step in andchenoweth study are intra nationalcampaigns they are campaigns ofnon-violence used by citizens againsttheir own government as opposed tointernational conflictby way of contrast there are very fewexamples very few instances where dogviolence was used successfully or thatmatter unsuccessfully used in anycontext in an international campaignthere are some just not very many if youflip to overhead mark number five now ifyou can see you can see I hope youprinted it in color the the instances ingreen are cases where a non-violencecampaign was used against a foreign foein the immediate aftermath the firstworld war in the German rural regionoccupied by France as part of theVersailles peace treaty anyways 1923nonviolent opposition success the Frenchpullout Denmark and Norway which we'regoing to be talking about in a momentpartial successes and then you haveHungary 1956 Czechoslovakia 1960s 68these were cases where both Hungary andCzechoslovakia people there make longstory short tried to get rid of thecommunist regimes the Soviets invadedthere was not an armed opposition andthat aren't that almost exclusivelyunarmed opposition was ruthlesslycrushed destroyed by the Soviets andthose are pretty much the only casesthat we can talk about and they're notreally very many there's not many casesand really only one clear successfurthermore there are relatively fewcases where states as opposed tocommunities within a state orwhat-have-youhave advocated nonviolence as a nationalpolicy in the way Russell advocatesthere's a couple of partial exampleswhich I'm going to conclude this lectureby talking about that would be Norwayand Denmark during World War two solet's talk about Norway and Denmarkduring the Second World Warlet's conclude this lecture byconsidering those two cases and thedegree to which non-violence wasactually employed by the Norwegian andDanish governments during the war andthe degree to which these campaigns weresuccessful let's start with Norwaynonviolent resistance was somewhateffectively employed in Norway afterNazi Germany invaded and occupied thecountry in 1940 after Norway was invadedand its military was there was there wasfighting the Nazis tried to not sufficethere was an not suffocation campaigndirected at for example the Norwegianjudiciary against the Church of Norwaybasically that's the name for theLutheran Church in Norway there was Natsthe Kait an attempted NASA fication ofthe school vacation of the bureaucracythat's vacation of cultural and sportingorganisations and all of these were moreor less successfully resisted byNorwegians employed a series oforganized or in some cases morespontaneous nonviolent campaigns forexample a members of the NorwegianSupreme Court they resigned on mass allof themthe Church of Norway circulated apastoral letter in that pastoral letterit outlined its opposition to variousinitiatives and policies that were beingenacted in Norway by the puppetgovernment that had been installedteachers successfully organized thecampaign to refuse to swear allegianceto the new ideology and and they alsoconvinced their members not to promotethe Nazi ideology in the classroombureaucrats successfully campaigned toconvince their members not to sign aloyalty oath athletes refused toparticipate in national competitionsmusicians somewhat slowly took a littlewhile for the musicians and and otherartists to come around but they toobegan to withdraw from publicperformances they would they wouldn't doanything that might you know push put apositive light on the occupying forceand the people as a whole did thingslike boycott Nazi owned businesses andotherwise it's ostracize Pro Naziofficials and supporters in theirpresence so there was a widespread andin some cases successful campaignnevertheless despite these effortsdespite the successes the campaign ofnon-violence in Norway can only be seenas a partial success yes the Germanswere unable to we were unable toaccomplish the Venessa fication ofNorwegian society but they did manage toaccomplish certainly its primary goalsthe campaign of nonviolent resistance toNazi rule for example enjoyed almost nosuccess amongst Norwegian labour and asa result the Norwegian economy arguablythe most valuable prize of theoccupation that's what the Germanswanteddoorways economic strengths well becauseNorwegian labor was not very good atresisting the Norwegian economycontinued to make important and and forthe most part almost completelyuninterrupted contributions to theGermany's war economy right up until theend the other thing to note is that thisnonviolent occupation campaign playedonly a very limited role in ending theoccupation Norway was liberated but notbecause of the non-violence campaign butbecause the Nazis were defeated withviolence finally the case of Norway hasto be characterized as only a partialexample of the state employingnon-violence because non-violence wasone strategy it arose within the cultureor with any educational and othercommunities but it wasn't the only meansby which Norwegians opposed the Nazisnor was it the official policy of thegovernment there was a government thatcontinued to exist the government inexile and it managed organized my viewmodest but it did manage to organizemilitary forces to continue to fightusing violence from Britain against theNazis for the remainder of the war andthere was also a small resistancemovement within occupied Norway in shortthat's the resistance to excuse meNorwegian resistance to Nazi Germanyincluded both violent and nonviolentelements as for the case of Denmark 82constitutes an example of a partialcampaign of non-violence Denmark wasoccupied in 1940 basically the same timeNorway wasand initially to the Danish governmentwell it tried to preserve itssovereignty by not resisting the Nazisthere wasn't much of a Danish militaryat the time but there was very littleactual fighting but Danish militaryunits that still existed were ordered tosuspend their operations but here'ssomething interestingNazi Germany invades Denmark there issome limited fighting a little bitbecause it's just not many Danish unitsto resist but interestingly thegovernment of Denmark does not formallydeclare war against Germany instead theythe official position is to treat theGerman invasion as a quote peacefuloccupation now because the Danes did notresist the invasion or at least barelyand also because the Nazis consideredthe Danes to be you know racial equalsto the Germans Germany initially allowedthe Danish government and itsbureaucratic structures remain in placenow interestingly it was during thisperiod that the Danes undertook perhapstheir most important act of resistancein the summer of 1943 literally almostliterally every single member ofDenmark's Jewish community was safelyspirited out of the country - sweetmassive effort so there was a successthere was success the nonviolentapproach did give the Danes time toorganize that effort - to rescue itthere their Jewish neighbors butDenmark's policy at least partial policyof nonviolent resistance has to be seenas a failure in other respects again itdidn't result in the liberation ofDenmark like Norway Denmark get regainedits independence only when the Nazismilitarily defeated and again as was thecase with Norway the Danish economyespecially its agricultural sectorcontinued to supply the German wareconomy right up to the end and perhapsmost importantly the Nazis were at leastfor the first part able to control andadminister all of Denmark with just ahandful of troops and bureaucrats totake a large occupation force becausethey work meeting resistance finally toadd to conclude the story of Denmarkthis odds ditch situation wherebyDenmark was invaded but not at waroccupied but nominally sovereign withhis own government of a sort well thatsituation didn't last but by the latterpart 1943 there were escalating tensionsbetween Germany and Danish authoritiesit led to a break in the relationshipthe Danish Navy the few ships of theDanish Navy were scuttled the Danishgovernment ceased the function and therewas a small armed resistance movement avery limited one but it began to fightthe occupiers using violence thus as wasthe case with Norway non-violence wasonly partially except as successful inachieving some goals and it was only apartial strength it wasn't the onlystrategy employed by the government itwas dominant early in the war but becameless dominant as the war progressedanyway that's it for this lecture whenwe come back the next time we're gonnatalk about arms control as a way ofbreaking the cycle of violence spy fornow


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all right welcome back once againtoday's class we're gonna do something alittle bit different we're going topretty briefly look at how quantitativeand qualitative arms control measuresmay or may not be able to serve to breakthe cycle of violence we've been talkingabout quantitative arms control meaningefforts to limit the number of weaponsin existence or the number of weapons incertain locations you know the number ofweapons and qualitative arms controlrefers to efforts to limit thedeployment or the even the developmentof certain types of weapons technologyin their entirety anyways we'll discussthe inherent logic Farms control willlook a little bit at the effectivenessof these measures and some of the thechallenges facing arms control regimesin other words those circumstances thosefactors that either make arms controlmore or less likely to succeed alrightlet's start with the inherent logic ofarms control the question we're going toinvestigate first is as follows is therea connection between the failure of armscontrol in other words things like anarms race if you will is there aconnection between the failure of armscontrol and international conflict andif there is a connection with thelimitation or even elimination ofweapons or types of weapons help tomanage or even prevent internationalconflict well for proponents of armscontrol the answer to both of thesequestions is yes there is a connectionbetween arms races and conflict andthere is a connection between theexistence and the proliferation ofweapons and conflict so where does thisidea come from well remember Lewis fryRichardson I mentioned his name a coupleof lectures ago Richardsonalong with people like Sorokin rememberhim Quincy Wright Imus Richardson wasone of those early early scholars one ofthe very first study war using advancedstatistical techniques and his dataanalysis suggested that there was indeeda relationship between arms racesbetween the failure of arms control andinternational conflict arms races at warthere was a there was a link he arguedduring the early years of the Cold WarRichardson even went so far as to arguethere have been only three great armsraces in history and he's talking aboutin the years prior to the First WorldWar there was an arms race between theBritish and well lately it helped laterby the French the British and the Frenchversus Germany to build dreadknots whatwould they call battleships at that timethat was the first arms race there was amore general arms race between whatbecome the Allied powers the Axis powersin the years immediately prior to theSecond World War and there is a therewas at the time a conventional andnuclear arms race between the Sovietsand the Americans and their respectiveallies anyways Frye believed or aren'tyou'd rather that their mid only threegreat arms races the three I justmentioned he goes on to say the firsttwo of them ended in Wars in 1914 and1939 and the third is ongoing forRichards and the implications werecrystal clear major arms races involvingmajor powers had led to war in the pastand would likely do the same in thecontext of the Cold Warshe was very pessimistic about thechances of avoiding another globalconflictso Richardson was an early advocate ofarms control and he used his statisticalanalysis of conflict to promote thatposition but there is a counter argumentthere's a counter argument to Frye andother advocates of arms control and it'ssummarized by an ancient Roman axiomforgive my horrible Latin see thispassim para bellum which translates ifyou want peace prepare for war in otherwords there's an argument that suggeststhat it's not arms races that lead toconflict it is deterrence you knowbuilding arms to defend defend oneselfthat is the preferred option and franklythere's a certain logic to both sides ofthis argument which side is right wellfry for example turned out to be wrongwith respect to the Cold War the armsrace between the Soviet Union and itsallies in the United States and itsallies well it did produce proxy warsand did produce other forms of indirectconflict but it never resulted in afull-scale direct conflict between thetwo superpowers and even in the case ofworld war ii is more complicated thanfries comments would suggest for whati'll it is true that there was an armsrace between the major powers betweenthe countries that joined the axis thecountries that joined the Allied sidethere was an arms race in the mid tolate 1930showever the crisis that eventually ledto the war actually begins earlierbegins in 1935 when Germany annexedAustria a time when Britain's defensespending is flat and Germany was onlybeginning to rearm in other words theconflict that leads to World War 2begins in a period where there is noarms race the arms race comeslater in other words a reasonable casecould be made that the crisis that leadsto world war 2 begins in the absence ofan arms race be that as it may the factthat FRA was at least partly wrong hewas wrong about the Cold War he was sortof partly wrong about world war ii thatdoes not necessarily mean that theadvocates of deterrence are always rightether in the case of the first world warthere is a general consensus amongsthistorians that the naval arms race thatFRA was talking about between againBritain later joined by France on theone side and Appirio Germany on theother side this raced a bit to builddread-nots was indeed a major factorleading to the eventual outbreak ofhostilities so both sides complained ofsome cases that seemed to bolster theiropinion all right well let's turn now tothe question of the effectiveness ofarms control agreements what can weconclude with respect to theireffectiveness do they prevent or do theylead to war do they work do they notwork what does the historical recordsuggest the broader historical recordwell to put things bluntly a historicalrecord is decidedly mixed when it comesto actual arms control agreements theredefinitely definitely definitely aresome arms control agreements that haveachieved most maybe not all but havecertainly achieved most of their goals afamous example with a little Canadianconnection is the case of the 1817 rushbaguette treaty this treaty signed inthe aftermath of the war of 1812remember Laura Secord all that stuff itwas an agreement a region signed by theUnited States and Britainwas not an independent country yet andeffectively was an arms controlagreement to limit the size and thenumber of ships that Britain and theUnited States would base on the GreatLakes so the number of ships would becapped the size of the ships would becapped and and also the armament themaximum armament that those ships couldcarry would also be capped for those ofyou that are naval historians basicallysaid that each each each of the sidescould keep one ship on Lake Ontario twoships each on the Upper Great Lakes oneship each on Lake Champlainthese ships could be no more than ahundred tons and carry no more than one18 pound candidate an 18 pound cannondoes not refer to the weight of thecannon it refers to the weight of theCannonball that a cannonit was basically watching tario - - andthe Upper Great Lakes in one electionfour ships each in total no more than ahundred tons in terms of their size andweight and only one what was being thede large cannon now it's true that sincethis treaty was initially signed back in1817 has at times been violated factit's been violated by both sides in thelate 1830s there was an increasedBritish naval presence on the GreatLakes in excess of what the treatyallowed this is at the time of somethingknown as the Upper Canada rebellion andjust sort of file this little nuggetaway for later because we're actuallygoing to talk about the Upper Canadarebellion we're going to talk about anattack by British naval forces duringthis period that very much relates tomodern international law specificallyrelated to the use of force the laws ofwar if you will somebody noticed that aCaroline incident so again just sort offile is away anyway the point I'm tryingto make now though is is in in the late1830s it was the British that had extraships if you will on the waters of theGreat Lakes couple decades later it wasthe current of the Americans at the timeof the u.s. Civil War in the 1860s andin the period immediately after the u.s.Civil War there was a very significantbuildup of u.s. naval forces on theGreat Lakes so this treaty was violatedthis treaty wasn't perfect this treatywas not with out imperfections however Ithink it's safe to say that it didsucceed for the most part it did manageto largely if not entirely demilitarizedthe Great Lakesit did to a significant degreecontribute to the reduced tensionsbetween the British and later of courseCanada on the one side and the Americanson the other so although the committeewasn't perfect it was not without itsflaws it was not without its hiccupsalong the way it generally accomplishedwhat it was intended and should be notedthis this Russian baguette treaty is notunique there are other treaties that youcan talk about that have been successfulin achieving most if not all of theirgoals there's something known as the1959 antarctica treaty the antarcticatreaty get amongst other thingsessentially demilitarized antarctica andhelped to cap and prevent overlappingterritorial claims to antarctica fromturning into conflicts here's anotheronethe 1963 limited test ban treaty thelimited test ban treaty was a treatythat sought as its name suggests tolimit the testing of nuclear weapons infact it it it banned them from tests inthe atmosphere or in space orwhat-have-you in fact after the 1963limited test ban treaty was promulgatedput into effect the only way you weresupposed to be able to test nuclearweapons was deep underground and it hasfor the most part succeeded there havenot fact been atmospheric nuclearweapons tests since night I think it's1980 was the last one the last couple ofcountries to test were France and RedChina uh what else though one more the1967 there so we know that's the outerSpace Treaty again promoting thepeaceful use of space thedemilitarization of space and so onagain treaties that for the most parthave succeeded so there is a trackrecord there is a track record ofsuccess at the same time as is often thecase there are other arms controltreaties that have proven to beineffective and in some cases evencounterproductive between the two worldwarsthere was a very persistent effort totry to prevent a naval arms raceremember I mentioned that it's widelyaccepted that the arms race the navalarms race prior to World War One was acontributing factor in the outbreak ofthat conflictso after World War one there was a majorpush to try to limit and prevent anothernaval arms race in 1922 there was a semiknown as the Washington Naval Treaty anda few years later in 1930 there was asuccessor to that original agreementthe London Naval Treaty anyway theWashington Naval Treaty and the LondonNaval Treaty were supposed to reduce thechances of conflict by freezing therelative size of the fleet's of themajor powers in other words it was aformula country X would be allowed thismany battleships countrywide this manycountries C so on this many and therewas a fixed ratio and if one countrybuilt more then the others could buildaids the similar ratio of weaponsdepending on where they fit into thesenegotiations and what it was trying todo what sort of freeze the relative sizeof these navies relative to one anotherbut this effort by trying to sort ofpreserve the state of the status quoended up creating enormous animosity inJapan Japan was this dense shoehorn intothe treatythey resisted if they didn't like itthey weren't very happy but they endedup acquiescing but there was enormousanimosity because from the perspectiveof the Japanese under the ratiosnegotiated Japan was always to belimited to subordinate status amongstthe great powers it wasn't allowed tobuild as many battleships and say forexample the British or the Americansanyway this treated these treaties thethe Washington Naval Treaty and thenaval treaty created so much animositythat they certainly contributed theyplayed a role in the decision of theJapanese to basically attack PearlHarbor and involve themselves in theSecond World War so those two armscontrol treaties certainly did notsucceed and arguably werecounterproductive here's my favoritethe 1972 biological weapons treaty thebio weapons convention rather the 1972biological weapons convention was atreaty that committed the States partyto the agreement which includedprimarily the principles the mostimportant countries were the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union by signingthis arms control agreement they pledgedthey both pledged to eliminate theirbiological weapons stocks they bothpledged to dismantle their biologicalweapons development programs andotherwise refrain from any activitiesthat would allow for the use ofbioweapons in warfare the only thingthat was permitted was research designedto defend against bioweapons you knowresearch into antic anecdotes antidotesand and the like now in the case of theUnited States there was some prettydifficult at least initially some prettysignificant resistance from within theUnited States military hierarchy theydidn't like this propose this was aRichardthe president nixon's idea to push thisahead and there was resistance withinthe military but in the end the militarycame around and made the orders of thePresident and rapidly implemented thepolicy in short the Americans got rid oftheir bio weapons programs they got ridof their bio weapons and so on so forthall Ike retained was as permitted by thetreaty defensive research that's howthat's not how it worked in the SovietUnion in the case of the Soviet Unionthat government maintained a secret andillegal bio weapons development programfor decades decades in fact Sovietcheating that's that's what it wasSoviet cheating in the area ofbioweapons continued all the way to thecollapse of the Soviet Union in the late1980s early 1990snow as we'll discuss in more detail in amoment so the Soviet cheating in thearea of bioweapons it and proved to havelittle effect on the outcome of thecourt it obviously did not enable theSoviets to win the Cold War the thingsmight not have worked out this waySoviet cheating might it wasn't but itmight have been decisive all rightlet's now turn to the question or excuseme from the question of how effective orineffective arms control agreements canbe I want to talk about the relatedquestion of which factors eitherfacilitate or hinder effective armscontrol let's briefly talk about trustand inspections or verification whateveryou want to call it and the answer as towhether or not trust or inspections isnecessary is that well frankly itdepends I should tell you right nowearly in the term you're gonna hear thatanswer a lot there's a lot of thingsthat the answer is it depends you knowit depends on the circumstances itdepends on the context it depends onthemon whatever whatever whatever there area lot of things that don't necessarilyhave clear simple decisive yes/noblack/white up-down left-right answersthere's a lot more ambiguity in theworld and you might otherwise want butthat's just the way it is anyways solet's talk about the role that Trustplays and and or inspections play and asyou'll see well it depends oncircumstances let's talk first about theissue of trust this trust work when itcomes to arms control agreements well itdepends arms control Green is can intheory at least work on the basis ofmutual trust that British u.s. agreementthat rush baguette treaty it's a perfectexample of an arms control agreementthey're relied on trust the two sidespromised not to build more or bigger ormore heavily armed ships than waspermitted in the treaty but under theterms of the treaty there wereabsolutely no mechanisms whatsoever inplace for either side to ensure that theother here to the agreement there are noinspections none the British did nothave the right to visit American navalbases and count ships and vice versathere were no inspections there wasn'teven a reporting mechanism neither sidewas forced to say exactly how many shipshow big they are what size of theweapons that they carry nothing therewas only trust nevertheless the treatysaw earlier although it was violated afew times by both both parties it waslargely effective in preventing an armsrace on the Great Lakes and it waslargely effective in helping to improverelations between the two sides so yescan work of course at the same time thetrack record of trust-based arms controlagreements I let's just say the completerecord does not inspire confidence oneof the main reasons why that 1972biological weapons convention failedwell it was the fact that this regimeworks solely on the basis of trust underthis convention under the terms of thistreaty the Americans were not allowed toinspect by a Soviet bioweaponsfacilities the Soviets were not requiredto give an accounting of theirbiological research programs again theywere allowed to do defensive researchbut in the case of the Soviets what theydid is they use their supposedlydefensive bioweapons research tocontinue to develop new weapons anywaysand so there were there were noinspections there weren't there wasn'teven a reporting requirement and allthis allowed the Soviets to to cheat butnot just sheep but cheat on a trulymassive scale creating some estimatesSoviets may have employed as many as70,000 scientists had a wide variety ofbioweapon development and productionsites sites that endeavor to weaponizethings like smallpox the play anthraxand a whole host of other substancesagain fortunately for the US and theother countries out of the West theviruses and toxins that the Soviets wereworking with the good news was thatweaponize the viruses and toxic toxicsubstancesfrankly it's not easy to do and for themost part these do not make foreffective weapons that's the good newsthe danger one of the dangers is thatyou know if you have say a body if youunleash a biological plague of some kindor toxic cloud of some kind it it ofcourse can harm your enemy but you knowclouds of toxic gases or whatever don'ttend to stay in one place and they havethis unfortunate propensity of not justkilling your enemy but killing eitherunpredict unprotected friendly civiliansfor example if you know if WAAFsacross the frontline back towards yourpeople it can kill them and even ifpeople are especially soldiers areprotected from bio hazards I'm sureyou've all seen you know on TV on thenews or the movies tumbler you knowpeople working in biohazard suits wellthose if you're using bio weapons in anoffensive capacity then your soldiershave to be garbed up in biohazard suitsand those suits are hot and they'rebulky and they degrade the effectivenessof your own troops because if you'regonna move through an area that you'vehit with with a with a toxin or a bioagent or what-have-youyour troops are gonna have to be wearingall this equipment and again dependingon the conditions this can reallysignificantly diminish their militaryeffectiveness so that's the good newsthat fury has already talked about butagain the bottom line is that because itwas based on trust the Soviets were ableto cheat and this again although itdidn't in the end proved to be decisiveit was a potential risk for the Westwell given the stakes involved given thedangers of cheating it is frequently thecase that it is desirable to employ somesort of an inspection regime you knowsome teachers verify there has to besome sort of verification process foreach side not just one but for each sideto confirm that the other that can formI can try it one more time in English toconfirm that the other is living up toits commitments under the arms controlregime now inspections can take avariety of formsobviously ways for each party to theagreement to agree that the other sidecan directly inspect its relevantfacilities there are a number of US andSoviet or I guess now US Russian becausemany of many of these not all but manyof these have carried on to today thereare a number of US Soviet and your endor US Russian arms control agreementsthat work in exactly this way basicallyit allows Americans to travel to certainfacilities in this in Russia to inspectwhat's going on there and it allowsRussians to come to the United States orwhat-have-you where the facility isgoing to be to to inspect theircounterparts so direct bilateral ortrilateral or however main parties arein the treaty inspections is one wayverification can take place sometimesjust because of the sensitivity of theissues at stake the parties to thetreaty might not want to allow the otherside to have direct access to itsfacilities but you still wantverification in those circumstances whatyou might set up is a system whereby youturn to some kind of a third party toconduct the actual inspections this isexactly what's happening in the case ofthe non-proliferation treaty the thereis an entity and an organization knownas the International Atomic EnergyAgency the IAEA which is one of my leastfavorite acronyms just because it justalways wants to trip up I cut anywaysthe IAEA is tasked with inspectingnuclear facilities nuclear researchfacilities development facilities incountries that signed thenon-proliferation treatyso third parties can do this and inaddition to the direct inspections by atthe parties themselves in addition tothe inspections by some sort of a thirdparty there's another optionsometimes inspections are done by theparties themselves but they are doneremotely there's something known as theOpen Skies treaty well there's actuallytwo Open Skies treaty one has to do withcommercial airliners that's not the onewe're talking about today the other OpenSkies treaty which involves nearly threedozen countries basically countries fromwhat used to be the Warsaw Pact and andand and of course NATO and thesecountries have signed this agreementthat allows other countries to flyspecially-equipped reconnaissanceaircraft really anywhere over theterritory of an another party to thetreaty it's basically aconfidence-building mechanism forexample the very very very very veryfirst countries to to sort of sign up onthis or to play sort of a leading roleand is where Canada and Hungaryand so they were the first two tobasically you know exchange these theseefforts they were given the honour oftaking the first flights and what wouldthis would mean is that a one of thesespecially equipped Hungarian aircraftwould be allowed to fly anywhere itwants in Canada taking photos and andundertaking and using a certain againthis not every technology is allowed butcertain technologies are allowed toremotely sense what's going on here inCanada they can fly over anything theywant any military base any facilityanything they want and of course thesame is true Canadians could fly overHungary with with Canadianspecially-equipped aircraft and so onand so on as on this still exists todayin fact therewas a Russian open skies flight here inCanada I want to say it certainly withinthe last years I can't remember the dateoff the top of my head but it wascertainly within the last two years sothese things are still ongoing todayso again not a not an inside thebuilding inspection but still importantenough to give you an idea you knowwhere are the air military airfields howmany hangars how large are there you cansort of estimate how many aircraft mightbe inside and you know maybe it takepictures of a facility or tank unit isbase you know what kinds of tanks arethere how many are there and so on andso on and so on you know so how big ourfacilities where they located what kindof equipment can you see in all thiskind of stuffnow of course in much the same way tothe trust is no guarantee of successinspections are also no guarantee eitherthere was for example we're going totouch on this we talked about economicsanctions actually fairly soonthere was an inspections regime imposedon Iraq after Iraq invaded Kuwait backin the early 1990s the first Gulf War ifyou willnow these inspections did in the endlargely succeed in preventing Iraq fromdeveloping nuclear chemical biologicalweapons okay so they did largely succeedhowever the process also experiencednumerous problems inspectors were kickedout of Iraq on a number of occasions andthe inspections were slow to uncover thescope of Iraq's illicit weapons programsand the effort over its entirety wasbeset by a great deal of uncertainty asto whether or not it was working aactor that played a significant role theresumption of fighting in 2003 in thesecond Gulf War all right well that'sall I wanted to say about arms controlour next topic though is a similar arelated issue something called nonoffensive defense we're going to talkabout that issuethe next time till then bye for now


6

right welcome back in our last class wetalked about arms control as a means ofhopefully mitigating conflict hopefullyhelping nations to break that cycle ofviolence by avoiding arms races and soon and so forth one of the limitationscourse of an arms control agreement isthat it requires both sides if you willto agree to the agreement what happensif they can't agreewhat happens if only one side isinterested in the proposal well in thecase of an arms control agreementnothing and there's another problem youmay recall from your internationalrelations Theory course if you took oneat some point in the past the realistsremember them the realists and they'renot the only ones the realists andothers believe that every effort by onestate to increase its own securityresulted in a corresponding decrease inthe security of its neighbors in otherwords security was conceptualized inzero-sum terms that idea again you mayrecall is known as the security dilemmaagain the danger with the securitydilemma is that one sides efforts tosecure its own safety by building moreweapons or better weapons orwhat-have-you or new kinds of weaponscan grow up the other side to respond inkind by building more weapons or betterweapons or what-have-youagain that's very definition of an armsrace and arms races as we saw last timeor so the argument goes can in turn leadto Wars and other forms of internationalconflict unfortunately as we saw thelast time efforts to control arms racesby participating in arms controlagreements can be undercut if one sidecheats for lack of a better way ofputting it you know one side fulfillsits obligations it becomes at a distinctadvantage to the other side that is notfulfilling its obligations we saw aclassic example this had to do with thebiological weapons convention Sovietcheating massive massive cheatingfortunately did not prove to be decisivebut it could have well given the dangersof cheating in in arms controlagreements scholars have long soughtother means of escaping this securitydilemma that don't involve agreementsand don't involve disarmament throwingyourself at the mercy of your opponentanother way in other words is there away to break the cycle to break thesecurity dilemma by enhancing your ownsecurity without resulting in acorresponding decrease in your neighborswell to answer this question in thislecture we're going to look at varietyof alternative defense posturesespecially something known as a strategyof non-offensive defense a couple ofthings right that's all but that's goingto be the main one now the idea of a nonoffensive defense posture is to allowthe defender your side to build anddeploy more weapons to build and deploybetter weapons as necessary but to do itin such a way that you don't threatenyour neighborsnow proposals to implement a nonoffensive defense posture wereparticularly well we're particularlypronounced during the Cold War in Europeduring the Cold War NATO and the WarsawPactfaced each other with massiveconventional Arsenal's also nuclearcomponent but truly massive conventionalArsenal's and each side worried that ifthe other side started to build moretanks or have more soldiers that it'ssecure do you'd be weakened and so ithad more tanks and more soldiers butturned threaten the other side and so onand so on and so forth well during theCold War there were a number ofproposals put forth for one side or theother ideally both but it doesn't haveto be this is the significant thing itdoesn't have to be both to employ aposture of non offensive defense againthis there was a lot of literature onthis back during the Cold War and it'strue that most of this literature wassort of written in the context of theCold War it could be it is somethingthat could be attempted in any contextbetween two two neighbors India vs.Pakistan could look at these proposalsthey haven't but they could North andSouth Korea could look at such proposalsthey haven't but they could and so onand so on and so forth anyways let'slook at how one example of a nonoffensive defense posture might work nowthe specific example that I'm using forthe purposes of this lecture waspublished Oh way back in the day by TheBulletin of the Atomic Scientists that'sthe assigned reading for this lectureThe Bulletin of the Atomic Scientistssome of you may be familiar with thispublication they're the ones made famousthe Doomsday Clock anyway the one I theone I have here is from the book fromthe Atomic Scientists it was a shortreading had a nice little diagram that'swhy I use it but there were literallydozens and dozens of similar proposalsmade you know over the years now if youlook at the the overhead at the handoutfor this lecture it shows a diagramillustrating how one side can build adefensive structureI can protect it from attack can defendthe nation but does not at the same timepose a threat to its neighbors theexample from this particular articletakes a form of what its proponents calla spider and web or spider in the web defence of posture so it starts with asyou can see there's the the the thingthat's the front here between the twosides that's the border if you will andthis spider and web system begins with awhole series of defensive units that'slittle square blocks if you will theseare typically comprised of local militiaunits they are trained in defensivewarfare they are trained to usedefensive military weapons likeanti-tank weapons and the like and thesethese defensive militia units are theare the web if you will of the spiderweb and their idea is if there's anattack - delay - harassed to wear downany attacking units to the point wheresee this the arrow units the web delaysharasses and where that wears down anyattacking units until the thoserelatively small but highly mobile butvery powerful spider units can arrive todrive back the enemy the web forces alsoserve as communication hubs and so onand so forth some would be a logisticalsupport ammunition fuel and like andwhat have you now the amount ofterritoryeach of these web units would coverwould vary according to the Train butsignificantly there would be a greaterdensity of soldiers to territory deepwithin the friendly nation in otherwords your forces would not beconcentrated along the border they wouldbe deployed in depth right again theiridea is to delay harass and wear downthe attacking units encapsulate them ifyou will in your web but because thisdensity is relatively deep within yourown territory within the territory ofthe friendly nation relatively farremoved from a border they don't pose athreat or as much of a threat to yourneighborthey are militia units they are trainedprimarily for defensive warfare they arenot trained and equipped for offensiveoperations and therefore they would be adisadvantage if they ever try to attackthe other side to have gone the offenseagainst the other side these web unitswould be relatively static that would befine on the defense right you'redefending territory you're trying tohold territory that's fine you don'tneed a lot of mobility you don't needwhat you know offensive capabilities butthey be static they would stay in theone location they would become familiarwith that look at location they wouldknow the ins and outs of the localterritory where the you know the riverfour forts are where you know maybewhich-which forested areas can betraversed with vehicles which cannot youknow all of those kinds of things andthen be able to use that advantage thatknowledge to their advantage but only onthe defense and only in their sort ofhome territory but they would not andthis is the key they would not in and ofthemselves pose a threat to the neighbornor would those mobile spider unitsthose relatively small offensive unitsthat would come in after the web hasdone its job they would ideally bestrong enough to drive the aggressorback to their starting point back to thefrontier but they are relatively smalland therefore would pose less of anoffensive threat to the neighbor so thewhole idea here is to create a systemthat allows you to protect yourselfabsorb an enemy attackrepel that enemy attack but at the sametime not pose a threat to your neighbornow in a perfect world both sides ofthis conflict frontier where this thisor a similar defense oriented posturebut here's the beauty at least accordingto proponents of these systems is thatthey can work unilaterally as well in asense it doesn't matter what the otherguys do if the other side builds adefensive oriented militaryestablishment that's fine they don'tthreaten us if they build an offensiveoriented military establishment it won'tthreaten us either because we can defendagainst it it doesn't matter what theydo we can defend ourselves and at thesame time by not threatening ourneighbor maybe we can break the cycle ofviolence maybe they will adopt a similarproposal or at the very least they willbe deterred from attacking us now as Imentioned these were proposals that weremade during the Cold War there were anumber of them where there were allsorts of publications ready - all sortsof different ideas and what-have-youthey were never implemented during theCold War during the Cold War neither tothe Warsaw Pact nor NATO ever adoptedalternative defense postures so thesepostures these ways of deterring withoutthreatening are if you will abstractideas I can't point to any specificexamples of them being implemented so Ican't tell you whether they do or do notwork we only have the theory not thepracticenow having said this while it is truethat during the Cold Warneither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO everimplemented a non offensive defenseposture he decided however I can't pointto some cases of a close cousin if youwill of non offensive defense that wasin fact implemented in a couple ofcountries in fact during the Cold Warthis close cousin of non offensivedefense is something known as a strategyof territorial defense and it wasactually implemented in it small but asignificant you know not a small numberof countries did it but they were notinsignificant players in in the Cold Warso how does a territorial defensestrategy work well in some ways againit's similar to the idea of nonoffensive defense a carrot orioledefense approach involves the dispersalof the defensive capabilities of yourmilitary throughout the country it's notjust at the front here it is everywhereevery town every city every factoryevery industrial complex every airportso on and so on and so on every mountainpass the major river crossing whateveryou get the idea the idea is to turn allof these locations into a defensivestrong point the whole idea of astrategy of territorial defense is tomake an invasion of your countryprohibitively expensive for an attackerbut there's more territorial defensestrategies differ from at least most nonoffensive defense strategies in the waythey largely are almost entirely rely onmilitias and other paramilitaryformations which because they havelimited offensive capabilities poserelatively little threat to the neighborand again they at least minimize thesecurity dilemma this is not a perfectmetaphor it's not a perfect analogy butI kind of it kind of should think ofterritorial defense as it's sort of likethe spider and web defense without thespiders and instead of being sort of onthe front here but in depth here it isspread out throughout the entirety ofyour own friendly territory again Ithink a couple of case studies here willillustrate the two case studies I'm justgoing to touch on them for a couple ofminutes here or both for the Cold Warnew Europe of communist nationscommunist Romania which was also part ofthe Warsaw Pact and communist Yugoslaviawhich was not part of the Warsaw Pact incommunist military doctrine thesestrategies of territory defense aresometimes referred to as people's war orsometimes you see the term popular warbut it means the same thing in bothcommunist Romania and communistYugoslavia the conventional militarycomponent of the National Armed Forceswas was was relatively small and notonly was it small it tended to begrossly underfunded and grossly underequip the conventional military of ofRomania and Yugoslavia were not much ofa threat to anyone but they were bothsupplemented in both case of Romania andin Yugoslavia by very very large militiaand paramilitary units illustrate withwith the case of Romania in 1989 this isjust this is actually the year thecommunism collapsed in Romania therewere about 180,000 very poorly equippedand poorly trained troops in the regularmilitary sounds like a lot but theyworked very good they weren't wellequipped that weren't well trained theywere supplemented by some 20,000militarized border guard units some20,000 troops in the security servicesand a quarter of a million troops in thelocal militia which in the case ofRomania was called the patriotic guardin other words almost 300,000 militiaand paramilitary units and these weredispersed throughout the country and theidea is to arm as many citizen soldiersas possible to defend the country youknow again concentrating them on largeindustrial operations or you know keytransportation centers or again mostlytowns in cities and that kind of thingand if an aggressor were to ever attackremain you know that aggressor would befaced with the task of having to youknow wear down and attack all of thesetroops defending their locality aHerculean task to say the least and atthe same time these troops would bevirtually incapable of offensiveoperations they didn't have the trainingthey didn't have the equipment theydidn't have the logistical support theycould have the doctrine to engage inoffensive operations now you might bewondering why did Romania and Yugoslaviaadopt a stewof territorial defense were they tryingto solve the security dilemma with theirneighbors well actually the answer is nothere were other factors that drovethese decisions some we're strategic isthe more political both Romania andYugoslavia adopted these approaches dudethe fact that they feared that any warthat they would be involved in would bea war against a far stronger opponentnamely the Soviet Union both countriesfurthermore were realistic inunderstanding that they could not expectmuch in the way of outside assistance ifthey were to be attacked by the SovietUnion consequently they were more orless on their own and they thought theonly way to defend themselves was returnevery you know major center every keyindustrial location every you know mayancomplex every whatever into this youknow these defensive nodules and make itprohibitively expensive for an invaderin this case likely the soviet union toattack them now some of you might be atleast somewhat familiar with the ColdWar might realize that Romania wasactually part of the Warsaw Pact it wasactually an ally believe it or not itwas actually an ally of the Soviet Unionbut although Romania and Yugoslavia andthe Soviet II were all communistsin the case of Romania and Yugoslaviathey feared an attack by the SovietUnion in the case of Romania it wasbecause there were very very verysignificant political differencesbetween the communist government ofRomania which was sort of ultra-orthodoxcommunists if you will and they rejectedthe more reformist I guess I will callit a relatively speaking communist modelof Nikita Khrushchevbut make a long story short 1956Khrushchev essentially denounced thecrimes of Stalin as part of his owneffort to consolidate power and thatangered a lot of other communists whowere still essentially stala this andthis was the case in Romania he said nowe still believe in that modelyou guys are revisionist and we rejectyou as there was a lot of tension in thecase of Yugoslavia although it was alsocommunist Tito was the leader ofYugoslavia Josip Broz Tito Tito was hisnom de guerre is his it is a is a what'sthe word the big area is actually theword but is alias that's the word I waslooking for and although he was acommunist he never got on with Stalin hedidn't get on with Khrushchev heating iton with any of the other communists hewanted to be in charge of his owndestiny if you will and so again in thecase of both Romania and Yugoslavia theyfeared an invasion by the Soviet Unionbut at the same time because they werecommunists they couldn't really expectto be rescued by NATO and in the case ofRomania even if NATO unlikely but evenif NATO had wanted to rescue theRomanians it was just impossible becauseRomania is is and was deep in the heartof Eastern Europe it was not adjacent toany NATO country and so help would beextraordinarily unlikely to ever arriveRomania in addition preferred aterritorial defense approach fordomestic political reasons again I needto digress for just a moment there is atradition within Marxism goes all theway back to Marxin orthodox Marxist theory one of thegreatest fears believed to be one of thegreatest threats to the power of theworkers is the so-called man onhorseback in other words a generalriding in on a white horse at the headof a column of soldiers to overthrow theworkers because they wouldn't ride ahorse anymore but it's still called theban on horseback in other words inorthodox Marxist theory a militarycounter-revolution was a great fear andin this vein the Romanian communistfeared a military coup d'etat and sothey thought the best way to minimizethe size and the power of the regulararmed forces without howevercompromising their nation's defensewould be to create these territorialdefense suits these militias andparamilitary units and spread themthroughout the country so if any generalin the Romanian army tried to seizepower he would fail because all theseworkers militias would be armed would betrained would be ready to defend theregime one other thing in the case ofboth Romania and Yugoslavia thesecountries adopted territorial defensepostures at least in part for economicreasons they're cheaper there are a lotcheaper it's a lot cheaper to havemilitia units with limited they onlyrequire enough training to defendthemselves they only require enoughequipment to defend them size enoughweapons to defend themselves they don'trequire you know the ability totransport oil and food and ammunitionover large distances right they don'tneed to be mobile I don't need you knowtry as many trucks and all that kind ofstuff they don't need tanks which areexpensed which you need for offensiveoperations they're much cheaper to haveany tank guns and so on and so forthand in the case of both Romania andYugoslavia building a conventionalmilitary to defend the state was justbeyond their means defending themselveswith relatively low-tech militiaformations was within their means theguy they got bigger bang for the buck ifyou will all right let me just sort ofwrap up this lecture by going over a fewcritiques of non offensive defensestrategies whether we're talking about aspider and web type of system or asystem of territorial the fans or whathave you there are some weaknesses thereare some limits there are some at leastpossible challenges associated with themall right one problem with attempts tobreak the security dilemma by shiftingfrom an offensive posture to a defensiveposture by employing defensive weaponsinstead of offensive weapons is thatit's to be perfectly honest oftendifficult to determine whether aparticular weapons system or even aparticular strategy is in fact offensiveor defensive it's hard to tell there's agreat line from a Spanish diplomat apacifist and an anti Franco activist sohe was you know writing in the 40sname is Salvador I was trouble this lastname but dari Yaga I think is how yousay it anyways he's got this great linehe's purported to have said quote aweapon is either offensive or defensiveaccording to which and you're looking atand that's so true history would seem tosupport this contention it's often verydifficult in practice to separateweapons and weapon systems and doctrineand approaches into offensive anddefensive categories just look at thetank during the Second World War duringWorld War two the tank represented theheart of the German blitzkrieg basicallyLightning Wars what blitzkrieg standsfor so early in the war the tank was anoffensive weapon it allowed the Germansto run run Ram shot over much of Europeas an offensive weapon it was a keyoffensive weapon but as the warprogressed it also turned out that thetank was the principal way to defendoneself against the same enemy tanks inother words tanks were a key offensiveweapon but tanks were also a key way todefend yourself against other tanks andthen there's naval warfare historicallythere's been very little if anything todifferentiate between an offensive or adefensive weapon in the vast majority ofcases of naval warfare a weapon canreadily play either role and even thingslike fortifications which you know areimmobileeven a fortification can have a quoteunquote offensive character if theyallow an aggressor to rapidlyconsolidate territory that they seizedfrom another state in other words ifit's if it's relatively easy to builddefensive works you can quickly takesome character build defensivefortifications and prevent your neighborfor reclaiming his territory and this istrue of all sorts of other weaponssystems modern anti-tank weaponsanti-aircraft weapons and similarso-called defensive systems can ifproperly deployed serve as usefully inan offensive context preventing enemycounter-attacks and help you need toconsolidate territory but there's asecond problem with any form ofalternative defense especially if onlyone side a debt adopts the strategy andit's basically this if there's a warbetween the two states one with adefensive an auto offensive defensestrategy and the other employing someother type of approach guess where thewar is going to be fought correct on theterritory of the side employing the dogoffensive defense strategy in otherwords imagine if today I'll pick thesouth asiaimagine if pakistan because it you knowit feels it can't keep up I can'tcompete with India imagine if Pakistanwere to adopt a strategy ofnon-offensive defense in its cut in itsyou know contested relationship withIndia if there was ever a war betweenIndia and Pakistan that war would befought on Pakistani territory not Indianterritorythus India would be relatively immuneand Pakistan would likely suffer muchmuch more from the ensuing devastationand no defenders of non-offensivedefense postures counter argue thatwhile this may be true that a war willbe fought primarily on the territory ofthe defender they argue that this pricehypothetical price is small compared tothe alternative an expensive arms racethe possibility of a major conflict thatmight indicate some india-pakistanescalate into a nuclear conflict and toconclude this lecture there is one otherpractical concern associated with a nonoffensive defense posture because thedefender because the side that adoptsthis non offensive defense posturebecause they have only a limited abilityto take the fight to the attacker rightbecause its forces are relatively staticand immobile that they can defendthemselves good enough but they can'tengage much in the way of offensiveoperations well if that is true then anattacker if that attacker is patientcould potentially reduce your defensesin a piecemeal matter so for exampleimagine it was the Cold War and theSoviet Union for whatever reason decidesthey've had enough with the regime inRomania and they decide that forcesnecessary to take care of that regimebecause Romania is not going to get anyhelp there on the road the Soviets don'thave to conquer the whole country in aday they can take their time they canconsolidate small little bits take onecity today move on to another towntomorrow move over here to thisindustrial complex the way the weekafter and slowly but surely grind thedefenders into nothingness that's thereal that's another real danger with astrategy or with a posture of notoffensive defense anyway that's it forthis topic a relatively short one nexttime it's a little bit more lengthytopic where we're going to deal withmediation as a way of breaking the cycleof violence anyway that's it for nowI will be back shortly


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all right welcome back in this lecturewe continue with efforts to break thecycle of violence in this case by theuse of diplomacy we will briefly discusssomething known as the provision of goodoffices we'll talk a little bit aboutfacilitation and there are a coupleother diplomatic initiatives that we'lltouch on but mostly today we are goingto focus on mediation so after the briefintroduction we will define mediation wewill look at some of the techniques thatmediators use and in that context wewill spend some time discussing what isperhaps the most famous case of at leastin the context of internationalrelations the most famous case ofmediation that being u.s. PresidentJimmy Carter's efforts to mediate theegyptian-israeli conflict a mediationeffort that produced the the 1979 CampDavid Accords all right well let's startby situating conciliation arbitrationmediation all of these other thingslet's start by situating this in awithin a larger context to do that weneed to start with the charter of theUnited Nations so if you go to the firstoverhead there are some excerpts fromthe UN Charter and under terms ofcharter peaceful dispute resolution isone of the main it's actually one of themain reasons behind the creation of theUN if you look at article 1 section 1 akey purpose of the UN is to bring aboutby peaceful means emphasize peacefulneeds and in conformity with theprinciples of justice and internationallaw adjustment or settlement ofinternational disputes peaceful meansarticle 2 section 3 goes on to say allmembers shall shall shall not optionalshall settle their international disputeagain peaceful means in such a mannerthat international peace and securityand justice are not endangered all rightso what then are the specific legal anddiplomatic processes if you will thatparties can use to peacefully resolvetheir disputes well again we can look tothe Charter for inspiration if you scandown down to article 33 section oneagain just three a part of it theparties tawny dispute shall not anoptionshall first of all seek a solution bynegotiation inquiry mediationconciliation arbitration judicialsettlement resort to regional agenciesor Arrangements or other againemphasizing peaceful means of their owndevice of their own choice maker nowclearly this list of methods andtechniques is not intended to beexhaustive if you if you read that lastphrase says or other peaceful meansright so that the things that it liststheir mediation conciliation arbitrationthose aren't the only ones that arepermitted those aren't the only onesthat are encouraged others are possibleas well so the list is not exhaustive inaddition it should be noted that thisarticle in Norway prioritizes thevarious methods you know it does notrank them in terms of importance orpreference it doesn't say first try agoshe ation then try conciliation then trymediation then tried to just socialsettlement whatever it doesn't itdoesn't say that it leaves all of theoptions open so there are multiplemethods and they are commonly employedsometimes in tandem sometimes insequence sometimes in isolation itwhatever depends on the situation nowone of the most obvious means for twoparties to try to resolve the dispute isby gaugingdiplomacy in other words directnegotiations that's what that's thefirst one mentioned in article 33 to dothis parties to dispute can do thingslike undertake regular diplomaticexchanges or they can engage in moreformal actions such as lodgingdiplomatic protests or what-have-youthere's all there's all sorts of sort ofconventional diplomatic directnegotiating activities but it should benoted that diplomacy while it is Maneriwidely practiced and it is franklyfrequently successful it is not howeverwithout problems because directdiplomacy involves only parties who havea stake in the dispute you know there'sno disinterested third parties involvedbecause direct diplomacy only involvesparties who have a stake in the disputethe issues under dispute are not alwaysaddressed objectively right each sidemight tend to spin the facts in such away as to put its own best case forwardin addition if we have direct diplomacythere may be imbalances in power thatcan affect the ability of the weakerside typically it's the weaker side tomake its case so these factors amongstmany many many others can prevent thesides from reaching an agreement but asI said before despite these and otherlimitations diplomatic efforts toresolve disputes are in fact frequentlyemployed and frequently successful nowwhere is that first option directdiplomacy only involves the partystudents to the dispute the remainingoptions we will be covering in thislecture do introduce third parties tothe process third parties are eitherindividuals or groups or organizationsor what have you that are obviously notdirectly involved in the dispute butthey are however trusted by the twosides tohelped them work together to find anagreement or a settlement to theirdispute so let's talk a minute about thetypes of third parties and their varyingroles there are different types of thirdparties and different third parties aremore effective in certain circumstancesthan in others what do I mean by thatwell Jimmy Carter he continued to leadinternational mediation efforts evenafter he was no longer president of theUnited States he was acting if you willas a as an individual and sometimes thatwas actually at that ages in fact Carterwrites that he not in the assignedreading but he talks about how at timeshe talks about how he feels at his placeoutside of official Washington he was aformer president being a formerpresident allowed him greater freedomthan individuals who might be stillconnected to a government basically he'stalking about it's often the caseespecially in things like say a civilwar or a rebellion or something of thatnature that there is a lot of resistancesay that say there's a government with aseparatist movement that government doesnot want to have things easy for therebels it doesn't want the separatiststo gain power it doesn't want them tohave legitimacy and so on and so forthand as a result they would resiststrongly having a foreign government saya President of the United States talkingto those rebels that he they would beseen to be at gaining legitimacy by evenjust talking to a u.s. president wellJimmy Carter as a former president isnot limited in that same way he can talkto rebels without instilling upon themofficial Washington legitimacy if youwillas a private citizen a biet one withimportant and influential contactsCarter does not face the samelimitations he can meet with whomever hewants because it does not convey anofficial stamp of you as a US stamp ofapproval or acceptance so types of thirdparties sometimes an unofficial thirdparty a non-governmental third partywhat-have-you sometimes that's the wayto know but other times an officialthird party a government connected thirdparty may be more effective sometimesthe prestige the influence and theresources that the leader or agovernment official can bring to asituation might help to move thingsalong this will see later on the lecturethis was the case when President Carterwas mediating the dispute between Israeland Egypt he had the power and influenceand the resources and the prestige andall of those things that helped to movethat process alonghe had resources available to him thathe would not have had if he wasn't thepresident of the United States all rightlet's talk a little bit more about thirdparties by talking about their impacthow does the introduction of a thirdparty affectthe underlying dispute the underlyingdynamics well the short answer is thatthe mere presence of a third party isit's almost certain to have some sort ofeffect on the dispute however thisimpact need not necessarily be apositive one on the plus side theintervention of the third party willoften at least momentarily divert anymomentum towards further escalation twosides are squabbling together maybethey've even been shooting at each otherthe third party steps init may be the case hopefully that willcause the two sides to if you will pauseprevent them from further escalatingtheir dispute while the mediator playshis or her role might give them somebreathing space some time to reflect andhopefully then ultimately move towards asettlement however that's not always thecaseinterventions by third parties can beill-timed in fact sometimes they disruptthe momentum that already exists movingthe two sides towards a settlement bythemselves sometimes the presence of athird party is presented by the twosides they resent having Outsidersinterfere in what they see as their owninternal affairs it's a common enoughpsychological reaction among humanbeings probably all have had that happenat some point or note right you feelsomebody sticking their nose in yourbusiness well in those circumstances thedisputants need to perceive thecontributions of the third partyoutweighing the negative impact thatintroducing a third party may have inshort the simple intervention of thethird party into a dispute is not alwaysa positive - though it's not alwaysnegative either what's the answer itdepends the mediation effort needs to becarefully timed needs to be carefullyemployed by a skilled and hopefullyexperienced mediator if it's to improvethe situation and not worsen it alrightso what exactly can a third party do tohelp manage a conflict let's consider avariety of strategies and techniques forstart with good offices or efforts tofacilitate negotiations all right now weshould I should know at this point herethat although in this lecture I'm goingto treat good offices and facilitationas separate albeit closely relatedpractices I have seen in in writings andtextbooks or whatever scholars whoactually don't differentiate between thetwo consider the one thing they are veryclosely related but again I'm treatingthem as separate Kanade I think thereare at least some distinctions worthnoting all right so what is good officeslet's start with good offices basicallyin when when a third party is extendingthat are good offices what they do ispass messages pass correspondence passproposals propose solutions ideaswhatever between the two disputesdisputants who might not otherwise havemuch in the way of communication witheach other that's it basically in thecase of good offices the third party isnot in any way participating in theactual negotiations they might encouragethe two sides to keep talking but theyare themselves are not engaging in thenegotiations they are helping to getmessages back and forth now in the caseof facilitation again for those of uswho treat it as a separate category thethird party goes one step beyond simplyrelaying messages back and forth in thecase of facilitation they do that theyrelay messages as neededbut they also provide a variety ofservices designed to move the stalksforward for example in the case offacilitation the third party mightprovide a neutral location for the talksmight provide you know translators mightprovide security you know all of thiskinds of stuff for the toxins but againin the case of facilitation the thirdparty does not participate in the actualnegotiations they just help get thingsset up so for good offices andfacilitation the third party is notinvolved in the talks themselves is notcontributing to the talks is not makingsuggestions is not offering enticementsthreatening punishments it's not doingany of that it's just trying to get thetwo sides to be able to solve theproblem themselves either in the case ofgood offices providing communication inthe case of facilitation providingcommunication a secure locationtranslators and all that kind of stuffnow since World War two the provision ofgood offices and also facilitation hasbeen particularly closely associatedwith the Secretary General of the UnitedNations now that's interesting becausein some ways and there have beenscholars who have raised this point theactual legitimacy of thesecretary-general to participate or toengage in either good offices orfacilitation is it's an open questionand basically this debate centers ondifferent understandings of the role ofthe secretary in general if you go backto overhead number oneif you go back and you look at how thesecretary-general is described in the UNCharter well if you look at article 97the secretary-general says right herethe last line he okay they're writingback into the 40s Cotton's cut him someslack he shall be the quote chiefadministrative officer of theorganizationhe's bureaucrat nothing more nothingless there are no diplomatic functionswhatsoever mentioned in the text of theCharter the role the secretary-generalis to be the chief administrativeofficer make sure that the bills getpaid in the building that the cleaningstaff does their thing that the securitypeople at the UN headquarters do theirthing that the translators arewell-trained and all the paper getsfiled properly and moved around on andthat the chairs if they need to bereupholstered get reupholstered andoffices get assigned and there's an HRdepartment all of that kind of stuff theSecretary General is the chiefadministrative officer that's ithowever a contrary view is based on asomewhat generous interpretation ofarticle 99 according to article 99 thesecretary-general may bring to theattention of the Security Council anymatter which in is again slack may bringto the attention of the Security Councilany matter in which in his opinion maythreaten the maintenance ofinternational peace and security maybring to the attention of the SecurityCouncil any matter well to that end ithas been argued that because thesecurity excuse me the Secretary Generalhas this job to bring things to theattention of the Security Councilthis the secretary-general alsotherefore has the right to if you willeducate himself again I'll say he justbecause lady about the particulars ofany dispute right if you're gonna bringsomething to the attention of theSecurity Council you should you shouldyou know have information to bring theSecurity Council and if you're bringinginformation then presumably you shoulddo that by engaging in discussions andother diplomatic efforts involving thedisputes now this distinction betweenarticle 97 which says that the SecretaryGeneral is the chief administrativeofficer and article 99 that suggeststhat there is a larger role for thesecretary in general in a sense thisdistinction between these two articlesof the Charter is kind of moot it's it'sit's it's it's not really all thatrelevant because what's happened isregardless of what the Charter says okayso even if you are a literalist and youtake the Charter to say that theSecretary General is the chiefadministrative officer period in asentence it doesn't matter becauseSecretary General's have engaged in thatbroader diplomatic function and therehas been widespread acceptance by theinternational community of this enhancedrole for the secretary-general so in asense it doesn't matter what the Charteractually says the Secretary General hasplayed the role of providing goodoffices has facilitated negotiations andso on and so forth alright that's goodoffices and facilitation what else isout therewell there's conciliation conciliationrepresents a yet another method forpeacefully resolving disputes byinvolving a third partyin this case the third party is anactive part of the negotiations not justconveying messages not just getting theroom ready actually part of thenegotiations what happens withconciliation is you have the two sidescome they come they talk to theconciliator and the conciliator listensto the two sides and then proposespossible solutionsnow these proposed solutions arecompletely nod binding the conciliatordoes not have the power is not supposedto impose a solution on the two sidesbut the conciliator can proposesolutions to the two sides and the hopeis and then if the conciliator is youknow fair and wise and insightful thatthe conciliator will find fair and justsolutions to put to the two sides youknow ideas that they may have missedthat they hadn't considered before ormaybe considered and rejected tooquickly or what-have-you the conciliatorwill will suggest things to this besidespossible ways to end the violence to endthe fighting or whatever it is andhopefully help the parties move to thesettlement of their differences nowconciliation has some strengthsabsolutely has some strengths despitethe fact that the that the only thingthat the conciliator does is you knowpropose solutions well what are thosestrengths number one its conciliationespecially if it's well-timed may againat least temporarily prevent furtherescalation of the dispute right if thetwo sides arewilling to listen to a conciliator thatmight well mean that they're willing tosort of pause the hostilities or atleast pause and prevent furtherescalation of the his hostilities numbertwo the fact that the conciliatorsproposals are non-binding can be anadvantage it may make the parties morewilling to participate they don't inother words they don't feel trapped bythe process you know the conciliator cansuggest something you can take it orleave ityou still have your sovereignty youstill have your freedom of action and ifthere's an idea that's really good andyou want to take it then you will butyou don't you know obligation a thirdadvantage is that by bringing aconciliator into the discussions at thevery least it puts a fresh set of eyeson the issues at stake as we're going tosee more detail later on we talk aboutmediation and sometimes the two partiesare so oh they're so emotionally wrappedup in the whatever it is you know theycan't see the forest for the treesand in the case of a conciliator maybehaving been conciliator bringing thatconciliator into the mix will you knowwhat a fresh set of eyes new perspectivethink outside the box whatever you wantto call it to the situation on thedownside conciliation tends to work bestwhen the two sides are willing and eagerto settle in other words when they wantto resolve their differencesunfortunately many many disputes do notexhibit this characteristicall right let's move to arbitration andadjudication in the case of arbitrationin the case of adjudication typicallythere are we're talking about some kindof a either a court or a tribunal orsome sort of similar entity that holdshearings and then issues bindingdecisions resolving a dispute at theinternational level arbitration andadjudication is frequently undertaken bythings like the permanent Court ofArbitration and the International Courtof Justice and I'm not really going totalk about arbitration and adjudicationanymore now because we have a wholeactually we have two three three unitson the topic later on in the term butjust sort of file that away for laterthat arbitration adjudication are yetanother way that a third party cancontribute to the peaceful resolution ofthe dispute so that's it for for thoseones next there's something known as thefact-finding Commission a fact-findingCommission as its name implies afact-finding Commission it is designedto research an issue and then reportback to the international communitynow fact-finding missions involvingthird parties that are states you knowthird party state fact-findingcommissions are relatively rare at theinternational level most internationalfact-finding missions are not undertakenby individual states but are insteadconducted by international organizationslike the UN or its specialized agenciesor alternatively if it's not aninternational organization undertakingthe fact-finding mission thefact-finding mission is conducted bysome kind of an NGO some kind of anon-governmental organization you knowsomething like Amnesty International hasbeen known to do this the Red Cross hasdefinitely been known to do this whathave you but now there are some examplesof fact-finding commissions undertakenby a state or in this case two statesthere was a fact-finding Commission inthe late 1980s early 1990s that involvedthe governments of the United States andChile and this fact-finding missioninvestigated the murder in 1976 of aChilean dissident as well as in anAmerican activists by Chileanintelligence agencies in Washington youknow they're trying to find out who isresponsible who is to blamebla bla bla this kind of stuff and soChile and the United States combined tocreate this fact-finding mission toinvestigate these two murders again muchmore common our fact-finding missionsinvolving international organizationsthe League of Nations undertook a numberof investigations during the interwaryears and after World War two it was theUnited Nations that has periodicallyundertaken submission such missions oneof the earliest and actually a missionthat was in many ways in many ways veryvery close to the first form ofpeacekeeping which we'll also be talkingabout later in the term was somethingknown as unscopedunscoped stands for the UN SpecialCommittee on the Balkans again it is avery very very close antecedent to UNobserver missions it's not considered apeacekeeping mission it's not a formalpeacekeeping missionbut it's very similar to thepeacekeeping missions that shortlythereafter emerged anyways I'm Scott wascreated back in 1947 by the GeneralAssembly of the United it's not aproduct of the Security Council it's aproduct of the General Assembly andbasically what it did is it involved thesending of a small number of militaryobservers to Greece it's late 1940sWorld War two is just over and in Greeceat this time there was a guerrillauprising by communists and thesecommunist guerrilla forces wereoperating in Greece and they were beingsupplied however not from within Greecebut by the countries immediately to thenorth of Greece by communist Yugoslaviain particular anyway the government ofGreece which was trying to consolidateits its its power didn't like communistYugoslavia and and other communiststates supplying weapons andwhat-have-you to these guerrillas and sothat a they tried to raise this issue offoreign interference with theinternational community they appealed tothe UN to investigate to send thefact-finding mission which is exactlywhat the General Assembly did they setup this UN Special Committee on theBalkansan ad hoc arrangement designed tomonitor the northern frontier of Greeceits border with Bulgaria Albania andyuccas Lobby again most of the weaponswere coming from up Yugoslavia but therewere also some coming from the Bulgarianand the Communists Albanians as wellunstop well for these observers weresent there they were to patrol in thearea of the border and if they sawanything they would report back anyviolations of the Greek frontier to theinternational communityfinally and kept as I've mentionedbefore it's not just internationalorganizations that undertakefact-finding mission missions these arealso conducted by variousnon-governmental organizationsinternational community the Red Crossagain this is this is one of theirlittle scene little disgust but behindyou know crucially important thingsthe ICRC the international community forthe Red Cross investigates again muchamongst other thing the treatment ofprisoners of war that's what they knewthey undertake fact-finding missions tosee how prisoners of war are beingtreated but again the Red Cross is notthe only end you go to do such thingAmnesty International does this kind ofstuffHuman Rights Watch does this kind ofstuff and so on and so on and so on nowthings it's interesting about the wayNGOs undertake fact-finding missions isthey they they take a variety ofdifferent routes now they're trying toaccomplish them other things they'retrying to find the facts a but they theytake different routes to accomplishtheir goals in the case of the ICRC inthe case of the Red Cross in order tomaintain access to prisoners in order tomaximize the in their impact the RedCross when it's investigating thetreatment of POWs its activities arestrictly confidentialin fact the ICRC only discusses thetreatment of POWs are other detainedpersons with the detainee power it doesnot publicize its findings to the restof the international community and sortof what it's trying to do here is notturn the treatment of POWs into apolitical football to be kicked aroundif if they go to well you know Canadahas talked about this later on Canadahas during the word Afghanistan detainedindividualsthey were detained for very long but intheory they were detained for a periodof time I guess it's possible that theICRC would come to Canada say hey wewant to see how you're treating thesepeople and they would investigate andthen they would talk to Canada and sayyou know hey we think maybe you couldhave fixed things by doing this youcould do things a little better by doingthat we noticed this one problem overhere this other thing is okay butthere's another thing over hereneeds a little or that kind of thing butit does it in a confidential fashion soas to not turn this issue of POWs againinto a political issueso it the ICRC the Red Cross does notpublicize its findings on the other handgroups like Amnesty International groupslike Human Rights Watch or whatever theyin fact do very much tend to publicizetheir results for example in 2012 humanHuman Rights Watch did it sent afact-finding mission to investigate theimpact of NATO's bombing in Libya thisis the we're gonna talk about this alsolater on in the course this is the theintervention this is the intervention inthe case of Libya government of MuammarQaddafi at sea we're when we talk abouthumanitarian interventions later in theterm we're talking about this caseanywaysHuman Rights Watch sent a fact-findingmission to you know investigate NATO'sbombing campaign and they eventuallypublicized the results and their reportwas generally positive with respect tothe impact of NATO's bombing and saidthat yesgenerally speaking NATO was quitecareful in its efforts to try andminimize civilian casualties and thelike but it also asked theto investigate eight bombings that hittargets in residential areas bombingsthat resulted in the deaths of anestimated 72 individuals according toHuman Rights Watch and they asked NATOto say listen look into these cases didyou take all the steps necessary tominimize your casualties hopefully youdid but casualties are still apossibility but did you do all the rightsteps to try to prevent casualtiesplease investigate these further in thecase of war in Libya excuse metechnically not a war the interventionin Libya these eight incidents thatHuman Rights Watch said needed furtherinvestigation to put that into contextthe NATO forces employed against theLibyan government through some 10,000sorties dropped more than 7,700 bombsand it was only eight of these bombingsthat Human Rights Watch said gee wethink maybe things could have beenbetter can you please do a furtherinvestigation one of the otherinteresting things about this HumanRights Watch investigation is they alsoaccused the Libyan government of tryingto inflate casualty numbers by actuallywherever there be a bombing especiallyin an urban area what they would do isthis is what they accused the Libyangovernment of doing of bringing in youknow medicine vials baby bottleschildren toys whoever and mixing them into the debris for media effect basicallyto try and score propaganda points sothey accused the Libyan government oftrying to I guess make things worse thanthey were all right let's now take aquick break and when we come back Ican't we are going to finally get to thespecific topic of mediationso bye for now


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all right we're back again mediation mediations yet another form of conflict resolution involves a third party but unlike things like good offices and facilitation where the third party essentially plays a passive role right they convey messages that they otherwise seek to create conditions conducive for toxins in the case of mediation the third party is not just active but extremely active in the negotiations what I wanted to know is look at some strategies and techniques of mediation with special reference to the 1979 Camp David Accords Camp David course saw US President Jimmy Carter attempt to mediate a dispute between Egypt and Israel it brought together Carter along with its Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Bagon the three of them got together with some aides and they tried to hammer out a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt it's 1979 these countries had technically being in a state of war since the late 1940s anyway they’re called the Camp David Accords because the location for these talks for this mediation effort was the Camp David presidential retreat it's one of the locations that presidents tend to go to depends on the president of course don’t have other preferred locations but it’s sort of like their way to get away from it all it's a Camp David it’s actually the name Camp David actually it was a presidential retreat going all the way back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt but it was it was rechristened re Christian's rechristened Camp David by President Eisenhower named it after one of his grandkids so it's actually named after the grand of President Eisenhower that's where it gets its name from and we've can't David still around but it is still a presidential retreat I don't think the current president use sit nearly as much as his predecessors but what have you anyways 1979 President Carter invites so that at bank in to Camp David to see if they can hammer something out something some sort of a deal on peace in the Middle Eastwell let be that way as it may what I most want to talk about are the specific mediation techniques most of these examples were used by Carter to move the negotiations forward so what are the specific techniques open to mediators like Carter again as much as possible I will illustrate with examples from Camp David well basically there are three categories of actions that a third party can employ in a mediation effort  the three things are as fall you'll have to write these down now I'm going to go over each of them separately and they're subsections separately but basically number one to try and alter the physical or social structure of the dispute I'll explain that in the board second try and alter the issue structure of a dispute and or three try to take action to increase the party's motivation so those are the three things that start first altering the physical or social structure of a dispute what the heck does that mean well to illustrate this technique I want to talk about direct versus indirect communication or what is sometimes referred to as controlled communication this is the first subheading under altering the physical or social structure of a dispute direct versus indirect or controlled something you'll see in the literature controlled communication now I in live classes I ask this is a rhetorical question all the time of stepwell not a rhetorical questions as a trick question of students all the time Mike in my live question classes it's whenever I ask a question the like the obvious answer it's always wrong and in this case you know I ask students they say really you know I guess the first thing you need to do when you're having a mediation effort is to get the is to get the two sides to talk to one another right seems to make sense the answer is no it doesn't always make sense at first blush one might assume that the first thing you want to do when the third party is intervening in a dispute is to increase the direct communication between the two sides get them to talk out their differences as it were but that's not always the best strategy sometimes it is but definitely not always when a dispute is particularly intractable when a disputes particularly hit when the emotions are high I mean the two sides talked to one another might just provide them with the opportunity to attack one another words it might make a bad situation worse in such a situation where the two sides really aren't ready at least not yet to talk to one another the third party mediator may decide to work with the two sides separately again this is sometimes referred to in the literature as controlled communication and this is what President Carter did for the majority of the time at Camp David he met separately with Egyptian President Sadat he met separately with Israeli Prime Mini Storage he met separately with them bounced off ideas re-laid proposals and counter proposals and other forms of information beginning sadat for the most part didn’t talk to one another they weren't brought in the same room together now at one point Carter felt that enough progress has been made that he thought he could bring the two sides together but it didn't go wellbeing and so that they were not and never would become pals to say the least and bringing them together in the same room was making things worse the face-to-face meetings involving bag Anand Sadat did not go well and Carter Quickly reverted back to indirect or controlled communication all right well that’s one of the techniques that can be used to alter the physical and and/or social structure of a dispute how the sides communicate with one another what else does this talk about well there’s this issue of what's known as site openness not site as in scenes cite as an SI the basically here we're talking about the question of does the mediator conduct the talks behind closed doors soyou have a closed site or in front of the public eye an open site with the media and what-have-you this one’s actually fairly straightforward it’s almost always better for third-party mediators to conduct talks behind closed doors not for malevolent reasons not to pull a fast one on anyone but because having the talks out of the public’s eye allows for greater openness amongst the parties when people negotiate publicly they tend to be less flexible because they're worried about how they will look in front of their own supporters they don't want to look weak but want to look like they're fighting for their side they don't want to look like they're making concessions and so they won't want to do that in front of the public but if the media is not in the room there is much more likely to be flexibility frankly from both sides because neither of them as I said is afraid of looking weak no there is an exception greater openness having the media involved having a public interaction if you will can be an advantage later in a negotiation when the parties get very close to a settlement the reason is that once things go public once the negotiations are seen by the public that progress is being made it kind of sets things in concrete for the two sides that it prevents backsliding basically it prevents efforts by the sides to sabotage the talks in other words if you're getting close to an agreement you bring everybody in front of the cameras you explain listen we haven't solved everything but this is how far we’ve gotten and we're both pretty happy with-it well then neither side can say wow you know we never really got that close they were trying to stick us in the back and all this guy stuff and that's why we want no because you've already gone on the record that you said we got very close these are the things we solved and on and so forth it prevents again backsliding you know if you're closet an agreement you know you'd be breaking your word if you if you know if you later changed your mind and what have you so sight Omen openness preference for a closed site most of the time but sometimes near the end it helps to have the media involved at least partly involved to see some of things that are happening all right that’s site openness what about the question of site you well site neutrality refers to the advantages that are gained by picking certain locations the whole talks particularly do you hold the talks at a neutral site chosen by the third party that’s usually preferred okay this is another fairly straightforward it’s usually preferred that the talks be held at a neutral location usually the third party’s location right President Carter’s the mediator the talks are held in the u’s at Camp David a neutral site and one of the reasons why a neutral site one that the third party the mediator picks is that if the mediators picking the site if they are the ones that have controlled the site they canine a sense take charge of access and all those other things like that whole question of openness or not opening you know whether the media is it or not right if it's your site as the mediator you control all of those things there is of course an exception there’s always an exception sometimes instead of neutral site it's actually advantageous to hold the talks in allocation controlled by one of the parties the weaker of the two sometimes the mediator and the stronger side travel to a site pick by the weaker side and the reason that it's done is to if you will counter the perception of disadvantage that the weaker site might have anyway you know they might say you know everyone is ganging up on us we're out of our element we're being cornered here and in a sense by giving them kind of home court advantage if you will the familiarity of home court but maybe they'll be willing to more will to listen than they otherwise would have been all right well how else can you alter the how else can you alter the physical and social structure of a dispute well by the use of time limits a mediator can sometimes move the disputants forward by imposing a time limit on the talks it's kind of like your SETdeadline right nothing gets done without a deadline I don't know I wouldn't hesitate to guess but I agree anyway I suspect that by the time this lecture is being listened to most of you have yet to begin your summer research assignment some of you probably haven't even read the assignment don't even know what it is but there's a deadline coming up you're gonna have to get that paper written IN courage you sooner rather than later to get started if you haven't if you are one of those people but you know the deadline is what you know focuses the mind well the same thing is true of mediation effort time limits can focus the mind of the two sides tell them that yes we have to start getting things together we have to start getting things resolved or this whole effort is going to fail in the case of President Carter In the Camp David Accords that's exactly what the president did President Carter Eventually impose a deadline on the talks he said to Sadat he said to Bay And he said guys I'm president of the freakin United States I think this is a direct quote I'm no it's not I'm President of the United States I have a country to run I can't be here it up you know up at Camp David talking to you guys forever so he gave them a deadline he says you know if we're not done by you know with such-and-such a date that's it it's over I'm going back to work in Washington you guys can go back to killing each other if you want anyways in the case of Camp David the deadlines helped wasn't the only factor but it helped to push bagging and sadyk towards an agreement i should note however that's a strategy of imposing a time limit is not always successful if the time limit is too short the parties may not have enough time to work through all the complex issues before them that's why you need a skilled and hopefully experienced mediator for important high-pressure talks like this somebody who knows yes we do need a time limit what's a realistic time limit to get these people moving forward alright altering the fiscal and social structure of the dispute the fifth technique is to add what I call additional resources to the process whatI mean by this is sometimes a third party can encourage progress by offering incentives to the two sides in the case of Camp David the u.s. eventually offered both Israel and Egypt billions with a be billions of dollars of economic and military aid if they would show some flexibility towards one another it was an incentive it was a reward for for for flexibility again changing the dynamic by rewarding those who played along and punishing if you will intransigence now obviously not all mediators have these kinds of you know physical resources at their disposal not every mediator can offer billions of dollars to get the sides to agree to settlement but sometimes instead of physical resources like tons and tons of money and ADAC weapons whatever sometimes a meteor can offer something else sometimes they can offer a symbolic or a political incentives President Carter again remember President Carter Used continue to engage in mediation efforts after he was out of office after he had left politics most of these were in the Horn of Africa region so what did he bring to the talks well he brought his prestige you know he's a former president he brought his reputation as an effective mediator to these mediation efforts again some of which were at least partly successful no but what he's doing here is you know he's you know saying to the G sighs hey listen you know I'm a former president I'm not just some random guy I'm a former president I've done this effectively I've done a good job I've I've solved some other problems you want me here I'm the best I'm gonna bring the media to focus on your issues I'm gonna bring the world's attention and together we're gonna solve this problem like that's that's the kind of thing a former president can bring again it you know it should be obvious but I need to note that incentives whether they're physical or symbolic they're not guaranteed to work every time but they're at least effective some of the time all right let's move to the second class of strategies that a mediator being polite to further the possibility of success here we're talking about modifying the issue structure are modifying the issue structure the first one the Sprint role that amediator can play in this context is Believe It or Not issue identification meteor can play a role in helping the two sides identify the actual issues at stake in the conflict this sounds bizarre what do you mean identify the issues don't they know what they're fighting about well you know maybe maybe not or maybe not completely sound surprising but the issues at stake might not always be clear to one or both of the two sides sometimes there is misperception I thought they wanted this sometimes there's misunderstanding oh I Thought they had said this other thing was going on or this is probably the one that happens the most often there are heightened emotions the prevent thesides from really understanding not just what they want but what the other side wants you know sometimes sometimes we'reI mean you know people even the heads of government even whatever you know they aren't still that they are people and people sometimes we are clouded by anger and fear and all sorts of other emotions it happens with sometimes we're just angry and we're not even sure anymore why we're angry or just angry at another person or whatever I think the same thing can happen here we're talking human beings well sometimes the mediator can help the sides identify exactly what it is that's at stake how the two sides each feel about those issues and that can be an important first step towards a successful negotiation alright how else can the issue structure be modified by a mediator well the second subheading for this section is called issue packaging and sequence this one's again fairly straightforward so all I need to do make a couple of observations in terms of issue packaging and sequencing it is usually easier to negotiate multi try that again multiple issues simultaneously as opposed to sequentially and why is it better to negotiate multiple issues is because it allows trade-offs as thetalks progress in other words if you're negotiating for five or six things all at once one site might say you know what I really don't care about issue number three I'll make a concession on number three but I want you to make a concession on number two I want you to give me some phone number to write so if you've got all these things going on at once those kinds of trade-offshore-trading if you will are are more likely to to be possible but of course it's not always possible to negotiate everything at once sometimes the number of issues is so great there are so many things at stake that it's necessary to adopt a more sequential negotiating strategy why don't we deal with this first thing here and then we'll try about this other thing and then we'll do that and then we'll do this other thing you know sometimes it's just that's just the way works again this is where that skilled and experienced mediator comes in the skilled and experienced mediator knows you know we can't juggle this many balls all at once you have to narrow things down a little bit whatever if you are going to adopt a sequential approach again experience suggests at least most of the time that you start with the easiest issues first the idea here is to build momentum towards an agreement in other words initial settlements become something like a confidence-building measure and also the easy solving the easy problems might suggest a model or pattern for subsequent agreements on more contentious issues anyways I'm Gonna revisit this issue of momentum when we get to the final section alright in terms of issues structure the third subheading has to do with new issues and alternatives now in some ways at least this would be my opinion I think the greatest contribution a third-party mediator can make to successful negotiations well maybe not the one of the greatest contributions is by introducing new issues to the discussion or alternative solutions and this is if it's not number one it's right up there on the list it's near the top now by new issues I'm talking about so one of the things that mediators will sometimes try to do is get the two sides to work on a joint project that will benefit both sides to the dispute what you're trying to do is get the two sides to work together on something not necessarily directly tied to their immediate dispute and the idea is to try to teach them that they can actually work that they can actually cooperate with one another now this is a totally in some ways I Will be the first to concede a totally hokey example but nevertheless one that I think had some effect and it's from Camp David During the Camp David negotiations when everybody first arrived there is of course you know some media there and of course the official White House Photographer is there and what-have-you and a number of pictures were taken you know President Carter welcoming Menachem Begin Camp David shaking hands with Anwar as to that and there were a couple of photos of the three of them together standing you know we're ready to do business and negotiate this peace agreement or what have you well anyways President Carter got some of those for laughs print it and he went around tooth Sadat and begin and he got them to off the photos by telling them that these photos were for his daughter Amy Carter and they did that there were these pictures of you know Carter and Sadat and Baig and then they were all autographed or whatever and the pictures were given to Amy Carter it was a small thing but there was simple ism in it think about what he was getting them you he was getting these longtime enemies these longtime foes to sign something together in much the same way they would have a signing ceremony for the Camp David Accords again it's a small almost you know it's microscopically small given the stakes involved but it was just this little thing a little way forCarter to get bagging and Sadat to work together just a little thing not enough didn't did change the course of the Middle East but it didn't hurt again showed the two leaders that they could work together as far as if the new alternatives again this is this is the one that probably has you know 99% of the time of a much bigger impact one of the things that a mediator can sometimes do is break up large complicated all-encompassing issues into numerous small issues thus instead of trying to solve everything in one go the mediator is helping to show the two sides the way forward in waysare you know akin to thinking outside the box all right section number three here angry increasing the motivation of the two sides now there are times when a mediator is powerful enough to push the two sides to solve their differences that's rarely the case more importantly the best settlements are those that are favored by the two sides not imposed upon the two sides so having said this how can a mediator motivate the two sides to reach some sort of an agreement again there are some subsections to this section as well first I want to talk about the loss of face often again we're talking about real human beings here often in the heat of an escalating conflict the leaders involved in dispute develop a distorted sense of the nature of the conflict in particularly the two leaders or the leadership factions come to over emphasized the need to appear unyielding and unmoving to their opponents they don't want to show signs of weakness right this is also related to their own supporters they don't appear weak to their own supporters but they also don't want to appear weak to the other side they fear probably quite rightly if they look weak they will be forced to concede more than they might otherwise have to so as a result because neither side wants to appear weak never neither wants to lose face they will often resist making concessions even of the most trivial nature again because they fear they will lose face so how can a mediator getaround this well sometimes what a mediator will dois take on their own self take upon themselves the burden of pushing for certain concessions from one side or both sides as the case may be and what the third party is trying to do is deflect responsibility for any compromise on to themselves as opposed to the opposing sides in other words if all youse Carter is the example of President Carter could say to begin listen I would like you to make this concession and begging says okay you've convinced me I will do it for you prime minister bagan is not appearing weak to the egyptians he is not appearing weak to his own followers he is making a concession to help the president if you will solve the issue then of course the president does the same thing with President Sadat he says hey I want you to make this concession for me because I'm asking for it and again presidents said I can say sure I will make this one concession but I will do it for you I'm Not gonna do it for begging I'm not gonna do because I don't weaken to BagonI don't look weak to my own people but I'll do it for you so the the parties they might wish to be intransigent they may in fact be intransigent but because this was not extracted by their opponent because it was extract this concession was extracted by the mediator they can make it without losing face without looking weak to the other side or for that matter to throw people all right well what else can a mediator do trust building trust and there are a number of things a mediator can do a common enough one is to talk to the two sides and try to show the two sides things where they are already in agreement or where they have similar interests and what have you know III I can't recall whether President Carter did this specifically or not but I know that certainly a lot of mediators will do things like you know get everyone to talk about their family right we all have family of some kind and you know just you know good human face on things oh yeah really you know oh you have grandkids I have grandkids or whatever another thing that mediators can do to try to build trust is to ask both sides to make one irrevocable concession to the other side is a sign of good faith so let's say there are like say 20issues that need to be negotiated 20 that's a lot the mediator can go to the one side and say I know there are 20 things that you're we're disagreeing about I want you to give the other guys one I don't care you pick one whatever it is pick one I'll probably pick a relatively unimportant one doesn't matter make a concession just make a concession and it goes to the other side does the same thing make a concession 2015 all right you've accomplished two things here first you've actually resolved two issues a gave up something to be issue solved B gave up something to a issue solved now there's only 18 things less left to solve but you've also built a little trust between the two sides again you showed them that they can work with the other guys confidence building again trust third the third subheading for this section has to do with the issue of irrationality again I've mentioned a couple times it's not uncommon for the parties to a dispute to experience you know what are essentially irrational fear feelings anger frustration resentment um well if the mediators especially if the mediator is meeting privately with the two sides right remember that control communications thing sometimes if the mediator can allow the two sides to you know know people still use the word venting it anymore I don't know that's what we used to call it back in the day you know to express their anger to express their feeder to express their resentment whatever did essentially get it off their chest you know it's a very cathartic effect but it's done in a private context it's done in a way that doesn't anger the other side I mean the last thing you want to hear you know I'm You know I'm sure the last thing Menachem Begin wanted to hear was Anwar Sadat saying oh that Hagen is such and such a such and such a such and such I Won't swear because this is being recorded and you know it's one thing to wear in a class it's another thing to wear with I'm being recorded anyways you don't want that to happen because of president Sadat is swearing about all the evil of terrible things he thinks about pinaka Bagan how did I can make Menachem Begin feel he's gonna feel pretty angry and if this situation is reversed those Sadat will feel angry but if Sadat vents to Carter and bagonvents to Carter both begging so that I get that off of their chest at least a little bit without making the situation worsens as the cathartic effect according to some practitioners in these kinds of situations one of the assets one of the really great assets that a mediator can have is a sense of humor right a little bit of humor a little bit of humor done in an appropriate way and you know sometimes be used to defuse those irrational feelings the anger the frustration the resentment so good a little bit of humor judiciously applied by an experienced mediator who knows when it's appropriate to make a little joke and when it's not appropriate to make a little joke might just help all right fourth subheading for this section is momentum I sort of alluded a little bit before about in it when we talked about momentum motivation rather well one of the things that a mediator can try to do is is try to prevent the two sides from feeling that little is being resolved at the truck but the stalks are dragging on that's nothing is being accomplished by building momentum now this example I'm Going to talk about is not from Camp David it's actually an earlier sort of a foundational it was sort of all part of the long same process but occurs a little bit earlier the current occurs prior to the election of President Carter the US Secretary of State a guy named Henry Kissinger engaged in a series of what was known as shuttle diplomacy basically we get on a plane and he would go to Egypt and he would get on another plane and he would go to Riyadh Saudi Arabia then he would go back to Washington anyway get on a plane and he would go through Tel Aviv it israel and he would go back to the US and then he would go up anyways basically he's going back and forth back and forth back and forth and and and and and traveling between all of these foreign capitals talking to people and what he was trying to do by these talks Kissinger was build momentum again this was early stage this is well before herCamp David but it's sort of like a first step if you will and what he was trying to do was build a little bit of momentum towards an agreement by the way was described as you know feeding feeding the participants a steady diet of of small agreements again they wouldn't accomplish much they weren't solving the big questions but what Kissinger managed to accomplish was to get some sort of foundational stuff out of the way some basic stuff out of the way some first steps out of the way again the big questions were still there the big questions are solved or most many of them are solved at Camp David but what what Kissinger tried to do and what a mediator can try to do is you know show the two sides that you're not stuck that you are moving forward by again that's why you start with the easier things give them the steady diet of agreements so that eventually you get to the end of the list hopefully all right a final note on the issue of mediation before we conclude tonight's this afternoon this morning's lecture whichever the case maybe from when you listen to me I talked alot about Camp David and the Camp David Accords were at least a partial success but I think we must be careful not to over estivate mediations prospects for success mediation like frankly like none of nothing I am going to talk this term is a panacea nothing solves every problem the mediation is no different there are limits to what medication can accomplish even though in the case of something like Camp David scholars who study this topic sometimes note that there is a very big difference between settling a conflict and resolving a conflict what do they mean by that well I'll illustrate with Camp David many aspects of the conflict between Egypt And Israel were settled the peace treaty reduced the prospects of another large-scale war between Israel and Egypt It saw the return of a significant amount of territory Sinai Peninsula to Egypt it settled a lot of things things but at the same time the broader underlying conflict between Israel and the Palestinians between Israel and its other Arab neighbors Syria and so on and so forth they remained unresolved there was no resolution in other words how dowe judge Camp David was this was it a successor was it not well be honest history has yet to decide the answer to that question I can't say this much on a purely personal basis Camp David cannot be seen as a success for any of the majors the major individuals involved two years after Camp David Sadat was assassinated by hardline elements that objected to the peace agreement in Israel Bagon he is he was essentially shunted aside by his own party eventually withdrew from politics and even President Carter who invested an enormous amount of his time and his prestige into the Camp David Accords He lost the 1980 election throttle Reagan now mostly us is on domestic political and economic issues but it shows that the time invested the effort invested in Camp David was not enough to help secure his reelection as a final note should also be noted that under certain circumstances I think a reasonable case can be made that mediation can arguably make things worse and I think one of the prime examples where mediation is seen at least in some quarters to have made things worse is the case of Rwanda now we're talking a lot more about Rwanda in a futurelecture I just have a few words to say about it now in the case of Rwanda the international community pressured the two sides in particular pressured the Hutu government the Habyarimana Government to participate in the mediation process in some cases by withholding or at least threatening to withhold essential economic aid but what had happened then the international community did manage to convince Habyarimana to something what was known as the Arusha Accords But when Habyarimana was pushed into signing this peace agreement he was agreeing to a deal that threatened the each the interests of powerful elements in his own government extremists if you will and these extremists reacted violently they killed how they are Amata arguably it's a little dispute as to who killed it or not but they certainly reacted violently by unleashing a genocide in Rwanda now the genocide might have occurred anyway soas perhaps not certain that mediation made things worse but it is nevertheless an interesting question as to what might have happened in Rwanda If the mediation hadn't occurred or if it hadn't been imposed on the two sides at the time that it was imposed in other words if other roots had been explored instead of a more or less compelled mediation effort but again I'll have more to say about Rwanda in a futurelecture that's it for this one for this unit next time when we comeback we have two units on political and economic sanctions alright bye for now I'll be back soon

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alright welcome back again today we start a new section and in this new section we will be looking at the way different countries use political and especially economic section so we're going to mostly talk about economic actions to manage international conflict with respect to economic sanctions we will consider at least in general terms what they are whether they work why they don't work as well as might be hoped or expected and how they might be made to work better we'll also briefly consider the use of aid and trade incentives as an alternative to economic sanctions so-called strategies of constructive engagement alright let's start with some definitions in the most general terms economic sanctions represent an effort to cause a target a target state to change its policies by by punishing its economy the idea is that the policymakers in the target state will prefer to change course rather than to continue to suffer from the economic sanctions political sanctions are basically the same except instead of economic punishments they use diplomatic punishments to pressure astate to change its way anyways political and economic sanctions can take a wide variety of forms I'm not going to cover all but just it lists a few examples if for example Canada Wanted to pressure a foreign country canit is unhappy with something that that country is doing whatever it is doesn't matter what could Canada do in terms of sanctions well Canada could either delay or frankly even suspend aid destined to that target state Canada could prevent the target state from importing Canadian Goods or perhaps just certain categories of goods we won't let them buy canadian weapons or military supplies or some people excuse me something like that what else could Canada to Canada could refuse to allow either all goods orcertain goods produced in the targetstate from being exported to Canada Simply won't let Canadians buy their goods anymore Canada could also freeze or even seize the assets held by the target government or by key individuals you know government leaders or their close associates or if it's not the government itself if it's not government figures it could be the seizing or freezing of assets of corporations doing business in that targeted state again in this case course the assets would have to be held in Canada another common practice is to ban or otherwise limit commercial air traffic between Canada And the target state another increasingly popular choice is to impose travel ban on specific individuals within the targeted regime right key leaders or their key supporters might be barred from traveling to or through Canada Canada might recall its ambassador or otherwise limit diplomatic interactions with the target State That's another way to express your dissatisfaction Canada could either curtail or or suspend entirely cultural or sporting exchanges things like that and there's a whole list of options the next question of course is why are sanctions imposed instead of the selection of some other option wellagain there are a wide variety of reasons why the international community might choose to impose a political and economic sanction instead of something else number one sanctions are and as we will see when we talk about our case study in the next unit sanctions are somewhat inaccurately considered to be less deadly hit and or less destructive than for example military strength sanction airstrikes will all out war what-have-you again somewhat inaccurate not always more deadly but sometimes it can be quite deadly quite destructive second in somecase the offense committed by the target frankly might not warrant the use of physical violence in other words they've done something they're quite upset about but our vital national interests are not at stake or domestic or for that matter world public opinion may demand anon-military solution to this particular situation so something not quite serious enough to you know go to war go to war over third military options well truth be told they have their limits military options do not work in every case military sanctions may be costly in lives and in money especially if the target is powerful you know you might prefer an alternative short of war rather than using force against a powerful state if Canada is upset with China think you know a military option is less desirable and you know imposing economic sanctions on on China it should be noted of course as my next point here that economic sanctions are not always an alternative to war sometimes they represent frankly an intermediate step in the process to lead into war so it's not an either-or proposition you can try economic sanctions if they work great if they don't work they're part of the pressure campaign that leads you to using violence in some cases finally in the absence of any other workable alternatives sometimes governments impose political and economic sanctions for all intents and purposes to satisfy public opinion to show the people at home that they are doing something or least appearing to do something about a problem so let's say a country X has you know crackdown against peaceful protesters and there's a lot of human rights abuses or whatever in Canada is unhappy but Canada doesn't really have much in the way of effectivelevers and they're certainly not going to go over go to war over it so the government instead of looking powerless and impotent will impose sanctions even though they might not work because again it's it's at least appearing to do something it's an important lesson in politics that it's always the case I'm Not quite that cynical but at least sometimes appearing to do something is as important or even more important than actually doing something all right let's turn to the pervasiveness of economic sanctions during the Cold War the United Nations imposed comprehensive economic sanctions only twenties by comprehends that I'm talking about you know you know virtually cutting off the economy of the target state there are only two times that this happened during the entirety of the Cold War one instance was suckokay excuse me sanctions imposed onRhodesia and the second sanctions apply to apartheid South Africa Rhodesia Curses known as the Bob way and again this is South Africa prior to Nelson Mandela and all of that now since the Cold War ended the number of UN sponsored sanctions regimes has risen actually quite dramatically in fact the1990s the decade sort of at the at the end of the Cold War the decades immediately after the Cold War So many new sanctions regimes were created by the human that scholars of the United Nations after I think I've Got a book a couple of articles who refer to the 1990s as the sanctions decade they were such a widely employed tool and the imposition of UNauthorized sanctions continues to this day at the moment as of as of this lecture there are about a dozen most of the Member States there are a couple of non-state actors or their agents their leaders if you will that are subject to sanctions regimes well that's UN sanctions what about individual countries well when it comes to individual countries the United States is by far the country most likely to impose sanctions on another state in the world today and it's been like that for some time it's I have to laugh I Have to laugh at one point back in 19981998 more than half of the world's population lives in the state that was subject to some very some degree of US economic sanctions now this obviously included both China in India China Because of a political crackdown inbecause of nuclear weapons testing but those two countries plus all the other US sanctions against covered half the world's population in addition the United States regularly imposes what are often referred to as quote secondary sanctions secondary sanctions are a kind of smart sanction and they're placed on individuals and groups or whatever that do business with the target country as opposed to the target country itself so for example as part of its effort to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions the United States at various points they sold a number of foreign banks banks in Europe banks in Asia Whatever that they have a choice to make that it can either do business with Iran Or they can do business in the United States they won't be permitted to do both and most of these financial institutions preferred to do business in the United States and therefore they suspended their interactions with Iranian other words here the target is a ramp but instead of targeting Iranians or Iranian corporations or Iranian Introduced or whatever it's targeting those that are doing business with Iran So hitting Iran indirectly again secondary sanctions and what about Canada what about Canada's sanctions regimes first thing to note is that Canada does participate in those UN and authorized sanctions as I mentioned earlier so Canada is an active supporter of the existing UN sanctions regimes but that's not all the candidate does Canada Also has its own individual sanctions that it is placed against a handful of countries over the years for example at the moment there are Canadian sanctions either Canadian alone or sometimes Canada does this in conjunction with some of its allies whatever but Canada Has imposed these are non UN sanctions Canada has imposed non UN sanctions against Belarus against my and Mar Burma If you prefer and also Russia in addition Canada like many other countries also restricts certain technological exports from certain countries in other words not every country can buy Canadian military equipment not every country is allowed to buy a Canadian made nuclear reactor one of those can do reactors excuse me there's a lot of chemical and biological technology that is also subject to various export controls and limitations so these restrictions can be seen at least indirectly or they are at least obliquely a form of economic sanction as well another thing to note about a case of Canada and I find that students are always a little amused by this it should be noted that not only has Canada Imposed political and economic sanctions at various times but Canada has also been the target of political and economic sanctions from time to time there aren't many examples but there are more than a few back in the early 1970s Canada along with the United States Britain Japan and a whole bunch of other countries were the target of OPEC oil sanctions basically OPEC refused to sell oil to Canada and a whole bunch of its allies and the reason OPEC did this wasit was trying to prevent these countries from supporting Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War the sanctions this oil embargo and The Associated Arab surprise attack against Israel were ultimately unsuccessful but it was an effort to pressure Canada and and it was pretty comprehensive well that effort to use sanctions against Canada was largely unsuccessful but my next example from the late 1970s specifically 1979 in 1979 the mere threat of an Arab oil embargo of Canada Provoked Canada's prime minister at the time to reverse a promise to move Canada's Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem that was a controversial promise at the time in much the same as the u.s.administration's recent move of its embassy to Jerusalem was controversial I Guess I would say is even more controversial back in 1979 anyways the Prime Minister Joe Clark had made this promise during an election campaign andagain a whole series of Arab nations in this case sort of a subset of the OPEC nations threatened to impose sanctions on Canada including oil sanctions but also other trade sanctions on Canada if the decision wasn't reversed and in the end the sanctions were at least contributed to the reversal of this policy I wouldn't say it was the only reason the government back down there were other factors at play including the fact that the Clark government had a minority you did not have the majority of parliament and there was opposition in Parliament to the decision there was also some domestic political opposition so there are a whole bunch of factors at play but I think it's safe to say that the threatened Arab oil embargo and trade embargo did at least contribute to the reversal of the decision well those aren't the only cases I can point to more recently in 2014 Russia imposed retaliatory political and economic sanctions against Canada what had happened was Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government had imposed sanctions on Russia following the latter's well basically they were up to all sorts of trouble in what is the Ukraine they had seized the area noticed the Crimea and they were supporting pro-russian rebels in the eastern part of the Ukraine so Canada imposed export ban wave right scuse me the the Canadians imposed a bunch of sanctions and in retaliation the Russians impose countervailing sanctions a variety of Canadian foodstuffs Canadian produced meat fish fruits and vegetables were banned from import into Russia Russia said no we're not going to buy your your meatfish your fruits and vegetables for a year corporate abusers Canadian pork producers suffered the biggest losses in addition a Canadian satellite manufacturer saw the launch of one of its satellites it was supposed to be launched on a Russian rocket while that was canceled and in addition 13 Canadians some politicians some journalists some pro-ukrainian activists received open-ended travel bans they were told they could no longer travel tour through Russia one of the individual who was banned in 2014 was a woman by the name of Chris Schifrin Lindh was a journalist and an outspoken critic of the Putin regime in 2014 she was a journalist in 2015 she was elected for the House of Commons and today she is Canada's foreign minister but Freeland Is still banned from traveling to Russia Even today even though she is Canada's Foreign minister these Russian counter sanctions it should also be noted we're not just the impact of them was not distributed evenly here in Canada andand and that's really often the goal of sanctions it's not so much to hurt the economy overall but to hurt certain sectors really really really hard in the hope that they will those the the leaders of those sectors affected will will try to pressure their own government to change its way of course the fact that governments typically do not compensate businesses that are targeted this way it only makes the situation worse anyways the last example I have is just from last year to 2018 last year Saudi Arabia imposed political and economic sanctions on Canada what had happened was the Minister of Foreign Affairs are the aforementioned Christian Freeland had criticized Saudi Arabia for certain human rights failings and so theSaurus expelled Canada's ambassador they ordered Saudi citizens to withdraw from Canadian universities and they froze all new business and investment transactions significantly however Canada did not suspend its purchase of armored vehicles from the london-based General Dynamics Land Systems Factory like that sale that purchased by the Saudis had had already drawn a lot of controversy in Canada Because the Saudis seem to be using some of these vehicles in ways that were troubling from a human rights perspective but the Saudi is one of those vehicles so they were not included in the economic sanctions alright as I Mentioned earlier there was a dramatic increase in the number of UNauthorized sanctions after the cold war this increase in frequency is not it should be noted the only change to have taken place in the last couple of decades not only has the frequency goes up but the reasons why the UN imposes sanctions has also changed it used to be the case the main reason you would impose a sanction was because there was either a threat or a breach of the peace you know broadly defined the sanctions on Rhodesia and South Africa were because those two countries were seen as a threat to the peace because of their policies but in the post-cold war era sanctions have also been employed to promote better governments governancetry that again better governance sanctions were imposed in the case of Haiti to pressure Haitians to restore a democratically elected government sanctions have been used to try and slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons Iran and North Korea Are examples their sanctions have been used economic sanctions have been used to try and deal with terrorism al-qaeda for example was the target of sanctions excuse me and sanctions have also been used in other contexts to promote human rights to stop groups from using childsoldiers to stop the abduction and thesexual exploitation of girls and womenthere's a number of conflict zones in Africa where this has been particularly troubling and sanctions were used against various factions and rebel groups and what-have-you to try and get them to stop these practices the types of sanctions have also changed in the period since the end of the Cold War If initially the UNauthorized there is basically two kinds of sanctions sanctions were either very narrowly focused an arms embargo get cut off arms and that was it or they were broad-based they were comprehensive sanctions that cut off everything there is sort of halfway those options of course for being a possibility but today you're much more likely to see what is sometimes called smart sanctions what are sometimes called targeted sanctions and what have you in other words instead of trying to hammer the entire economy you try to put economic pressure on specific individuals key members of the governing structure at the target state that sort of thing freehand assets travel bans what happened in recent years the US has also made another change has also changed the way it administers its sanctions when you end against the first and you know organize and administer sanctions now very little experience very little administrative experience and how to actually handle and process these policies and as a result attended today thanks in the early years again this is why that stringent sanctions decade even in particular the UN had sanctions placed on a whole host of different countries in other actors and it would create what they would they call the sanctions committee to oversee those sanctions it was an oversight body but the UN made a serious mistake what it used to do was create a brand new sanctions committee for every sanctions policy in other words these oversight were created on an ad-hoc basis you know go to were exactly alike their meetings were held in camera and it was held behind closed doors and most notably there was almost literally no communication between the individual sanctions committee well this was a big problem because it would admit was every time of these sanctions Khomeini was struck to monitor to oversee a sanctions regime it had to start from scratch it couldn't learn the lessons I couldn't learn on the best practices of its predecessors there was no communication a new group of people was you know basically employed to oversee the new policy but they didn't work with the ones that had before so they didn't learn oh these guys think they tried this one thing and it hadn't worked and this is why see if you want to do so you have to try this none of that none of that best practices none of that corporate knowledge it canwill was being transferred to these new sanctions communities the lack of transparency also that it was very difficult for outsiders to ascertain whether or not the sanctions were actually working as intended or for that matter whether they were having unintended consequences you know parties disproportionately hurt a weak and the poor would have all of those things now towards the end of the sanctions decade things do at least begin to change there are some tentative steps taken to try and coordinate the activities of these various sanctions committees there has also been sort of a an effort to improve the administration of these sanctions through the work of various NGOs academics and interested in national governments in in 1998 there were a whole series of meetings and conferences held with the aim of improving the way sanctions were employed these focused discussions they would have you know people were in theory you know academics or whatever people who were actually on the ground you know practitioners they would get together and they were they were trying to find you know better ways of many things one of the issues that they've tried to work on is improving financial sanctions travel and arms embargoes and suburbs ease and frankly some of the recommendations from these meetings has at least begun what's to completely but has begun to shape the debate over sanctions within the UN Security Council but I have to say not to shake a bit there remain sticking points Security Council especially the the so-called p5 has been badly divided on a number of issues they have debated on even basic things such as you know let's say the UN passed the resolution to impose sanctions okay fair enough well one of the things that's often hotly contested is whether or not the sanctions should be open-ended or have definite termination date in other words should a sanctions regime continued until the Security Council explicitly ends it or should it end unless the Security Council explicitly extends another thing that comes up again they keep making with these sanctions committees well how do they work how does their internal how do their internal operations operate in other words will they make a decision if their decisions have to do their decisions have to have the unanimous consent of all the members of the committee or should there be some kind of a majority wins threshold where those kinds of issues bedevil the security council all of the time allrightlet's now turn to the question of the effectiveness of economic sanctions when it comes to economic sanctions the effectiveness of economic sanctions in ahistorical record is well a charitable way of putting it is to say that the historical record is fixed a more accurate way of putting it with ant you suggest that the record is generally poor but there is some debate about just how poor the historical record really is and the reason why there's so much debate about just how poor the historical record is has a lot to do with which cases are included and which are not obviously and how you define success in other words these methodological questions impact the answer you get may judge the success of sanctions there have been some important studies that are frequently discussed in the literature one was conducted by something known as the Institute for International Economics Although the study is generally known after its principal authors hoffbauer shot and Eliot anyways Hoffmeyer shot and Eliot looked at 115 cases of economic sanctions between 1914 World War 1 and 1890 basically the end of the Cold War so they looked at 115 cases of economic sanctions in that period and they argued that sanctions were successful in causing the desired changed in the target state 34 percent of the times not great certainly not a complete and utter disaster but certainly not great but Huff Powershot and Elliott and their work has been criticized especially by studies that are more critical in terms of defining what it means to be successful another how much change does the target state have to actually undertake to for the sanctions to be considered a success some of these other studies some of these critical studies find that economic sanctions are only successful about five percent of the time it's pretty divisible rateI should note I should I want to conclude this section by saying that no matter how poor the track record of economic sanctions really is weather like Hofbauer shot and Elliott it's about a third of the time or whether it's like some of these other studies it's really you know one in twenty regardless of how linked the track record is it's undeniable that economic sanctions have had some very notable successes one of the successes frequently discussed in the literature is that of South Africa as I mentioned earlier so thank shion's were opposed in South Africa because of its apartheid policies in the 1980s and while sanctions were definitely definitely definitely definitely definitely not only factor to lead to the end of apartheid again there are all those people remember Nelson Mandela I think he had a role sanctions were by no means the only factor at play but it is generally accepted some dispute but it's generally accepted the economic sanctions at least contributed positively to ending apartheid and bringing black majority rule to that country so they can work they have worked they might not work a lot but they work at least enough that there are sometimes worth trying again all right whether you're an optimist or whether you're a pessimist it's clear that economic sanctions definitely definitely definitely do not work all of the time they certainly don't work even a majority of the time again the most optimistic view in the literature suggests they work one time in three so why is it that economic sanctions don't work more often why is it that they have maybe a five percent success rate why is it that they only have a thirty four percent you get roughly one in three success rate well there are a number of factors at play and to conclude this lecture we're going to look at those factors as well as that alternative to economic sanctions alright these done number one why economic sanctions don't work as often as we might hope or as practitioners by hope I call it therally effect now I hardly a better term the term I've picked up from the literature the rally effect sanctions even harsh sanctions often fail because the people in the targeted state instead of pressuring the government to change its ways they rally around the government thing sanctions produce a heightened sense of nationalism a willingness to bear any burden or what have you and there are a number of examples where this case Cuba Is actually an excellent example of this phenomena after the Communists came to power in Cuba the United States and posts pretty comprehensive economic sanctions against that that that country sanctions that are for most part still in place today but the people of Cuba need the sanctions as illegitimate and they rallied they supported their government they said yeah we know things are tough but we believe in the government in other words the sanctions to a significant degree degree you seem to have strengthened the communist regime not hurt it and then there's the case of India and Pakistan in in both India and Pakistan in the late nineteen nineties economic sanctions some pretty significant economic sanctions were imposed on this two country because they began testing nuclear weapons so there's an African sanctions to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons but these sanctions failed to stop the testing and in both countries both India And Pakistan in the late 1990s there were widespread public demonstrations in support of nuclear weapons testing despite the threat and the later actual implementation of sanctions basically the people were marching in the streets saying that they would bear any burden for their country to get you can weapons so here the sanctions not have the desired effect in fact had an opposite effect alright a second reason why sanctions don't work as well as you might hope they work is well because they seem to have a naive expectation of change the mechanism whereby sanctions are expected to bring change again it's naive here's how sanctions are supposed to work right a government a government does something say it's the evil dictate the evil dictator of märklin dia that's what I'm going to call my country if I Ever take power the evil dictator ofmärklin dia is abusing human rights he's a monster he's an evil dictator and so severe and broadly-based sanctions are imposed on Markland with these sanctions hurt the people of markland eeeh and so they try to pressure the dictator emperor mark the first to change policies if that doesn't work the people are expected to rise up and maybe even overthrow bark the first that's asking an awful lot of the local population don't you think if I am a ruthless a dictator as I claim to be I'mgonna shake those people down on thestreets I'm going to arrest them in thenight throw them in my prisons in otherwords I'm gonna crush them under mythumb for daring to challenge myleadershipyet these are precisely the kinds ofstates that are most often subject tosanctions in other words those that aremost immune to public opinion however itis expressed this is not just a farcicalhypothetical example using mark thefirst and the country of mark lania thisis exactly what happened in Iraq underSaddam Hussein sanctions were imposed onthe government of Iraq the people theShiites in the north the curt's orexcuse me the Shiites and South theKurds in the north rose up to try to getrid of the regime and they were crushedthey suffered devastating casualtiesespecially in the south but that's howsanctions are expected to bring changethird there's also a collective actionproblem a collective action problem it'sa term political scientists use todescribe a situation that requiresas many many many many states orwhatever to make something work but onlytakes one or two states to undermine ifyou go to the overhead overhead numberone that's an example or that's a maprather that shows Iraq and Iraq wassubject to pretty significant sanctionsfor well over a decade it was supposedto be cut off from the global economyand as far as its southern border wasconcerned outlined the thick red linethe sanctions were effective very littletrade occurred over a rack's border withSaudi Arabia or with Kuwait its borderwith Iran to the east not quite aseffectively sealed off but still prettyrigorously sealed off but in the norththe border with Turkey was much moreporousgoods got in good Scott out money got inmoney got out gonna talk more about thenorthern border in the next lecture andthe real problem was especially on thewestern end of Iraq the border withSyria at the border with Lebanon Lebanonthe border with Syria the border withJordan were very very very porous andthis undermined the effectiveness of thesanctions in other words it didn'tmatter that the majority of of Iraq'sneighbors the majority of theinternational community the Europeansthe United States Canada you know mostof the world it didn't matter that mostof the world was putting sanctions onIraq cutting Iraq off from trade itdidn't really matter that most countrieswere doing it because those efforts weremade undermined primarily by theJordanian and Syrian governments and toa lesser degree by the Turksit only took those three states SyriaJordan and Turkey to weaken thesanctions regime so why these statesresist implementing economic sanctionsin other words why did Jordan why didSyria why did Turkey why did they sortof undercut the sanctions well there's awhole host of reasons for thissome countries refuse to participate insanctions regime unless sanctionsregimes unless they are authorized bythe Security Council it is a perfectexample India will not participate inany economic sanctions regime unlessthose sanctions are authorized by the UNso it doesn't matter what country doesif it doesn't do something that gets theattention Security Council India won'tparticipate now of course the problemwith that approach is that the divisionsof the Security Council mean that a lotof deserving cases won't see Indiansanctions because the Security Councilcan't get agreement so for example in2014 when the Russians invaded andoccupied and basically seized the Crimeathere were no economic sanctions andwe're going UN economic sanctionsimposed on Russia because Russia is onthe Security Council and guess whatRussia would veto any such effort so thebest you can hope for will be countrieslike Canada taking their own individualdecisions but that meant that India nomatter what Russia did in the Crimea oran eastern Ukraine or whatever it wasnot going to participate so that's onereason why at other times countriesdon't play ball countries don'tparticipate in sanctions regimes becausethey or at least officials in theirgovernment are personally profiting fromthe illegal tradeone of the best examples in recentdecades of this phenomena was thenations in the neighborhood of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo therewas a civil war in the Congo and a lotof the fighting was fueled by theillegal export of diamonds that youprobably heard the term blood diamondslost for this comes from and thisillegal diamond trade was supposed to bestopped by congos neighbors but some ofthose neighboring governmentsparticularly for example the governmentin Liberia turned a blind eye to thesmuggling in return for a share of theprofits in other words they were bribedthe cut of the action to allow thediamonds to flow to world marketsthere's a third reason why countrieswill still trade with a country undersanctions and that is because theythemselves are the indirect victims ofsanctions policies again we talked aboutthis in the case of Iraq one of thereasons why the Jordanians continued totrade with Iraq why the Turks continueto allow trade to occur is because theirown citizens Jordanians and Turks werehurt by the sanctions so if thesanctions have been fully implemented itwouldn't just meant the Iraqis thatwould been hurt it would have beenTurkish traitors and traitors and sothere's I'll have more to say about thatlater all rightanyways that's the collective-actionproblem the fourth reason why sanctionsdon't work as well as might be hope isbecause of something called the reboundeffect and this is when sanctionsKirt the sanctioning country as much orin some cases even more than the targetwell that's the case as you can imaginethere's not a lot of enthusiasm for theimposition of sanctions one of the bestone of the all-time best examples ofthis phenomenagoes back to the late 1970s in 1979 theSoviet military basically in intervenedin civil conflict in Afghanistan soSaudi troops and occupy much ofAfghanistan and the Americans decidethat they're going to impose sanctionson the Soviet Union for its involvementin Afghanistan they refuse to go to theOlympics which were in Moscow in 1980but more importantly for our purposesthe Americans say you know what theSoviet Union is is having a difficultygrowing enough food to feed its peopleit's important massive amounts of grainin fact it's imported massive amounts ofAmerican grain so what the US governmentdecided to do was to prohibit the saleof American grain to the Soviet Unionthe hope was that if the Soviets beganto run out of food they would have tochange their way they would have to pulltheir troops out of Afghanistan andthat's exactly what didn't happenthe Soviets did not pull their troopsout of Afghanistan you know what theydid they bought their grain elsewherethey bought grain from the Australiansthey brought the hay pot grain fromArgentina and embarrassed to have to saythey bought grain from Canada in otherwords other countries sold to the SovietUnion the grain that they would haveotherwise had to buy from the US so whowas hurt by the US grain embargo of theSoviet Union was it the Sovietsno they got their grain from ArgentinaCanada and whatit wasn't the Soviets that were hurtwere the Canadians and Australians andthere are Canadians and a few otherswere they hurt no they were they wereselling their grain at good pricescouldn't sell it fast enough you knowwho was hurt American farmers Americangrain farmers saw their total exportsales dropped significantly and it took18 years that's almost two decades forAmerican farmers to regain the share ofthe global export trade that they hadhad in 1979 American farmers sufferedfrom the embargo not the Soviet Unionalright last two factors in terms ofimpacting the effectiveness of sanctionsthere are some target specific factorsnow there is something about the targetthere's something about the state thatyou want to punish there's justsomething about it that makes itdifficult to impose sanctions sanctionswork when the target is highly dependenton an export especially a commodity thatis not an essential good something thatthe world can do without that's notalways the case if you export anagricultural product something that hasgrown in many many many many countriesthe international community can imposesanctions and say we're not gonna buyyour goods because we get them elsewhereso things aren't going to are are goingto work in this case but that's theexception there are a number of statesthat are dependent on an exportand that export is something that theworld economy is desperate to acquiresomething like oil something is highlydesirable it's an essential commodityit's not luxury good like bananas orcoffee or cocoa and so if the target isexporting something that the world wantsand needs it's going to be much harderto impose sanctions as opposed to thecase of a country that exports somethingthat they could the poor likes butdoesn't consider essential in otherwords no matter how badly the Saudisbehave the international community isnot going to say oh yeah you know youexport whatever it is I think it's 15 to20 percent of the world's oil yeah we'renot gonna buy your oil anymore and we'regonna spend you know five dollars ameter at the gas tank because of itthat's just not going to happena country like Saudi Arabia is in manyways immune from the imposition of mostsanctions but a small West Africancountry exporting cocoa completelydifferent story and of course in asimilar vein it's not so much the natureof the export in question that's thefactor but so some countries are just ina position where they can survivevirtually any sanction that theireconomy is so large it's so strong thatsanctions just aren't going to work theu.s. is in that situation China is inthat situation Russia is pretty much inthat sation situation there are a wholebunch of countries that really it wouldbe it's almost hard to imagine thesituation where enough of the rest ofthe world would impose severe enoughsanctions to cause that country tochangefinally some countries take activemeasures to protect themselves from theimposition of sanctionsagain as well relatively recentlyperfect examples so in 2012 thepresident of Venezuela Hugo Chavez he'sdead now the crisis have been as wellinvolves his successor anyway KimoChavez was still alive in 2012 and hewas going to run for office in electionsthat were almost certainly going to berigged and if he had one with riggedelections the world community probablywould have composed some sanctionsagainst his governmentwell preemptively in the months leadingup to that 2012 presidential electionthe Venezuelans ordered their centralbank to repatriate a hundred and sixtytons of gold from u.s. european andcanadian banks in other words theybrought back to Venezuela a hundred andsixty tons of gold so that no foreigngovernment in Canada in Europe in theUnited States could seize those assetsfinally reason number six law eightsections don't work as well as you mighthope that's because sanctions especiallythose broad-based those really harshcomprehensive sanctions the impact ofthose sanctions is not spread evenlyacross the target country the burdenfalls heaviest not on the politicalleadership not on the evil dictator buton the weak on the poor in the countrywhen the poor are hurt this can weakenthe resolve of the internationalcommunity to stick with the rebbesanctions this is certainly whathappened in the case of Iraq which againwe'll be talking about the next unitwell given all these problems is there away that sanctions can be made moreeffective well the UN has studied thisissue and the number of proposals havebeen put forth one of the most importantnot going to go through all of them butone of the most importantrecommendations is for the internationalcommunity to shift to smarter sanctionsexcuse me instead of comprehensivesanctions freezing financial assets ofgovernment officials imposing travelbans and all that kind of stuffyou know smarter sanctions don't hurtall the people hurt the leadership sosmart targeted sanctions the model verymuch follows international efforts tocontrol drug money laundering the assetsof drug lords are often targeted in thisway there is of course a problem thereis an open question as to whether or notsmart sanctions targeting sanctions arereally all that much more effective thanthe traditional sanctions method or evenfor that matter whether they'reeffective at all I mean imagine thatyou're a brutal dictator are you likelyto alter your policies simply becauseyour offshore bank accounts have beenseized assuming that the internationalany people fine up those accounts areyou likely to change your ways and whatabout travel bans I mean some dictatorsNorth Korea's KimJonah is a perfect example already hetravels so rarely but it's unclear howhe would be affected by a travel banfrankly even if your assets are seizedyou're a young dictator what are yougonna do cry over spilt milk no you'regonna just squeeze your people a littleharder to replenish your losses wellthis brings us to the conclusion of thelecture is there alternative given allthe problems associated with economicsanctions given their poor success rategive the fact that we're not sure earlydays whether targeted or smart sanctionsare gonna work any better is there analternative and for some scholars theanswer is yes the alternative issomething known as a strategy ofconstructive engagement but anyways astrategy of constructive engagements isdirectly the opposite of an economicsanction instead of punishing a countryfor its misbehavior you try to entice itto and good by offering trade andinvestment rewards now there areadvantages to choosing a strategy ofconstructive engagement one is thatthey're ongoing there are continuousincentive to your opponent you knowconsider the opposite let's say you'regoing to impose a sanction on a countrysaying that as well I'll just use Imentioned so Canada says yes Venezuelaif you don't smarten up we're going tocut your trade by 20% okay then as welldoesn't change so Canada says okay we'regonna cut your trade by 80% then as wellit doesn't trade and then Canada sayswe're gonna cut your trade by a hundredpercent Venezuela doesn't changeand then Canada says we're we're gonnawe're gonna wet we're gonna cut yourtrait by 120% we can't do that you canonly cut it you can only get it down tozeroyou know once you've gone from full tozero there's there's nothing else youcan cut there is no more damage if youwill that you can do once you get tozero trade there's nothing left but in asense it is different you can offerincentive to date tomorrow the next daythe next week the next week after thatthe next month or the next year you cancontinue to offer incentivescontinuously another is suppose anadvantage of constructive engagement isthat it's more humane it doesn't rely onpunishing the weakest members of thetarget society again that's where thebird typically falls in order to bringthe desired change and then there's oneother advantage constructive engagementsince economic sanctions don't see worthperhaps it's worth trying somethinganything else maybe it won't work but atleast for trotting something in terms ofdisadvantages of course constructiveengagement has been criticized again forbeing naive but in a different wayhere the criticism is that constructiveengagement seems to reward bad behaviorin the international system and I thinkwell frankly a lot of critics have saidthat this is exactly what's happened in the case of North Korea whenever thingsget tight the North Koreans rattle theirsabers they create a crisis nobody wantsa war with North Korea especially notnow that they have the weapons and sothey have in the past been offeredincentives again it beginning in tochange their ways they don't it's notsignificantly enter they create incrisis a new reason for economic rewardsand what-have-you they've played thatgame with their neighbors on multipleoccasionsthe North Korea is also an example of afailure of constructive engagement theconstructive engagement strategy thatwas first used in North Korea that early1990s was intended to stop the NorthKoreans from developing nuclear weaponsguess what it did work Durov Korea hasnuclear weapons that's probably the mostfamous most notorious failure ofconstructive engagement anyways when wecome back next time we're going to lookat economic sanctions and the case ofIraq so bye for nowthat's it for today

10

all right welcome back in our last unit we were looking at economic sanctions in general terms in this unit we're going to look at economic sanctions through the lens of a specific case study that being the sanctions imposed on Iraq after that nations invasion of Kuwait back in the early 1990s this case study is being used to illustrate what can go right and and more importantly what can go wrong when economic sanctions are imposed so a little background about the conflict then we'll talk about the sanctions regime and all the troubles that it experienced all right background august2nd 1990 Iraqi military units under the command of President Saddam Hussein invade and occupy the neighboring country of Kuwait doesn't take them very long within 48 hours the Iraqi forces are victorious the small Kuwaiti army is either destroyed or forced to flee most of it flees to Saudi Arabia and Hussein declare as a henceforth Kuwait would be considered to be an integral part of Iraq literally declares it to be Iraq's19th province international reaction to these events is however Swift and dramatic the United States immediately rushes military forces to Saudi Arabia to prevent any further advances by the Iraqi army Operation Desert Shield at the time there was considerable concern that Kuwait was only the first step in Iraq’s offensive endeavors anyway the u.s. rushes forces and virtually theentire international community rejectsthe legitimacy ofexclaims to Kuwait this is also manifestin a Security Council actually in aseries of Security Council resolutionschapter 7 resolution without more tospeak about chapter 7 in a future unit aseries of chat oven resolutions thatunambiguously authorized member statesto quote use all necessary means unquoteto undo the Iraqi invasion whatever ittakesall necessary means now initially theinternational community attempts to usediplomacy and economic sanctions toforce the Iraqis out of Kuwaitto that end iraqi oil exports are bannedand iraq is prohibited from an importingalmost anything there are a smalllimited number of you know certain foodsmedicines are allowed in but reallyalmost nothing else is allowed into thecountry and these sanctions these toughcomprehensive sanctions are intended toforce the iraqi government to eitherwithdraw from Kuwait or make thesituation in Iraq so miserable that itwould lead to the overthrow of SaddamHusseinthis goes on for several months and/orthe following months the internationalcommunity debates the effectiveness ofthe sanctions as well as the question ofhow long the sanction should be allowedto work before other options such as theuse of military force are considered byOctober US President George HW Bush it'sthe W it's HW Bush concludes thatsanctions would probably be not worksimply orders a further military buildupin Saudi Arabia by late December the CIAis estimating that more than 90 percentof Iraqi imports and 97 percent of itsexports are being blocked but the CIAneverabsolutely no signs that Iraq is willingto leave Kuwait voluntarily or thatinternal dissent is growing with no signthat diplomacy or economic sanctions areworking military options come to thefore and on January 16th aircraft from aus-led coalition began to bombard Iraqand Iraqi military installationsthis is Operation Desert Storm a fewweeks later in February the ground phaseof the war begins and the Iraqi forcesthere they're routed they are quicklydriven from Kuwait in what's known asthe hundred hour war because it lastsguess whata hundred hours well with Iraqi militaryforces completely routed and pushed outof Kuwait the US and the other coalitionpartners partners decide have to decidewhat to do and they decide to declare aceasefire an armistice if you will theywill stop fighting they will stopbombing Iraq they will stop destroyingIraqi military installations andequipment and killing troops and all ofthis kind of stuff but in return Iraqhad us to agree to a long list ofdemands rack is forced to agree todismantle its nuclear chemical andbiological weapons programsDirac's ballistic missile program isalso declared illegal during the warIraq had been firing ballistic missilesinto Israel in the hope of draggingIsrael into the war with the idea thatif Israel is fighting against Iraq thatmight rally Arab support to the Iraqicause anywaynuclear chemical and biological weaponshave to be gone ballistic missiles GodIraq is also forced to return to Kuwaitindividuals or unfortunately in manycases the bodies of individuals who hadbeen abducted and murdered by the Iraqiforces during the occupation Iraq isforced to pay reparations to Kuwait aswell as to certain other nationsaffected by the war they are required toallow international inspectors tomonitor Iraq's compliance with thedisarmament regime and so on and so onthere there are other conditions thatcome on later their no-fly zones createdin northern and southern Iraq to protectthe Kurds in the north and the Shiitesin the south they rise up against SaddamHussein but they are defeated or atleast the more defeated more of theSouth with a stalemate in the northanyways no-fly zones and a whole laundrylist were of of conditions of posts inother words Iraq has to fulfill thislist of conditions to keep the ceasefirethe armistice in place to put pressureon the Iraqis to make sure that theyfulfill this not only is there a threatof resumption of hostilities butcomprehensive economic sanctionssanctions that had been begun after theinitial invasion of Kuwait are continuedand in some cases even strengthened allthis is done with the approval of theSecurity Council but as we will seethere are wide spread problems withthese post or sanctions the regime theIraqi regime goes to considerablelengths to circumvent the sanctions andthis raises all sorts of questions as towhat else is the regime doing if it'scheating on the sanctions is itanything else is it cheating withrespect to its nuclear chemicalbiological weapons for example well thisbrings us to the most recent phase ofthe conflict faced with what it saw wasthe failure of the sanctions to keep theterms of the 1991 armistice in place in2003 the Bush administration and now I'mtalking about the George W Bushadministration moves to use armed forceagainst Iraq called spod Kent and othermembers of the international communityto provide mostly political and in somecases limited military support but inany case this culminates in the secondphase of the Gulf or the us-led invasionof Iraq in 2003 so basically we havethis you have Iraq's invasion in 1990Iraq is ejected from Kuwait in 1991there is a ceasefire that lasts morethan a decade and then the war if youwill resume in 2003 and that pretty muchgets us to the present Iraq is defeatedSaddam Hussein is deposed and somethingof a civil war breaks out in Iraq whichhas continued to this point in any casewhat we're interested in today though isthe sanctions the decade-longwell more than decade-long sanctionsthat were imposed on Iraq after theinitial invasion and then after thefirst ceasefireI want to talk about are the differentways in which these very very strictvery tough comprehensive sanctions weresubvert 'add by the Iraqi government solet's talk about all the ways thesanctions were undermined the ways thatprevented the Iraqi regime fromcomplying with that long list releasedfully complying with that long list ofrequirements so what went wrong in whatways was the sanction or sanctionsregime diverted well first there waswidespread smuggling of goods out ofIraq for example in the North in thearea of the border between Iraq andTurkey some estimates suggest as many as500 tanker trucks full of oil illegallycrossed the border from Iraq into Turkeyevery day now this smuggled oil was thatsoul into the global oil market and theprofits from those sales were controlledby the regime that's not what wassupposed to happen they were notsupposed to have access to oil revenuesbut here they were smuggling oil everyday they would sell the oil and this isthis is how Craven how Craven the regimewas not only did it profit from the saleof the oil but it even taxed thesmugglers for the privilege of engagingin this activityhow else were the sanctions underminedlater when Iraq was Allah was allowed tolegally sell some oil under thissomething known as the oil-for-foodprogram what you're going to get tolater the Iraqis were allowed to legallysell some of their oil but what happenedwas an oil tanker would arrive in anIraqi port picking up legal oil and thenhow convenient the ships were topped upwith additional unregistered oil thisoil both the unauthorized as well as thelegal oil would then be sold again intothe world markets and it's estimatedthat the illegal oil was generating andgenerating approximately a billion and ahalf dollars of profit to the regimeevery year legal and illegal oil alsoflowed through pipelines headed intoJordan Jordan at the time was almostcompletely dependent on Iraqi oil forits energy it had almost no othersources of energy and and so some oilhad been allowed to be exported throughJordan but only some and what washappening with surplus oil additionaloil illegal oil was also flowing throughthese same pipelines and again theproblem was that all of the profits fromthese illegal oil exports were directlycontrolled by the regime and the use towhich this money was put was unclear itwas unknown at the time whether themoney was merely being diverted into thepersonal fortunes of the Iraqileadership or was it being used topurchase illegal military equipmentnobody was sure well what else wentwrong what not only was oil exported outof Iraq smuggled outside Iraq every daybut there was widespread schmuckof goods into Iraq according to UNofficials of every 200 trucks enteringIraq from Turkey every dayit was estimated only one out of those200 trucks was carrying goods actuallyapproved by the UN's under the terms ofthe sanctions regime so what was in theother 199 trucks it was unknownwas it goods for the elites was itmilitary equipment was it equipment forchemical weapons was unknown so why wereTurkey and Syria and Jordan inparticular participating in thesubversion of these sanctions well thesewere issues that discussed in the lastunit in some cases police border guardsand even government officials in thosecountries were bribed to look the otherway to allow the goods to flow at othertimes local and even nationalgovernments turned a blind eye to theseactivities because they sought tobenefit their own local economieswhich were tied to the Iraq economywhich had bought in so low goods withIraq prior to the war in other wordsthey're trying to minimize theunintended impacts on third partiesagain before the war Jordan inparticular was especially dependent ontrade with Iraq that was pretty much itand so if Jordan joined the sanctionsregime if Jordan shut its border withIraq there was very little else in theway of foreign economic trade for theJordaniansand in some cases even the UN in theUnited States chose not to make too biga deal about these efforts to subvertthe sanctions because they didn't wishto upset key regional allies turkey andto a lesser extent Jordan are importantUS allies in the region and it wasfeared that if too much pressure was puton Turkey too much pressure was put onJordan to make them comply with thesanctions regime but that would hurt therelationship between the United Statesand Turkey or the relationship betweenthe United States and Jordan well thereare other problems of course despite thesmuggling despite the fact that the UNallowed certain goods to be legallyimported into Iraq over time it becameclear that the Iraqi people the Iraqipopulation was suffering from shortagesof food and medicine particularly incentral and southern Iraq not so much inthe north the Kurdish region it largelyescapes these negative impacts forreasons that I'll explain later in thelecture anyways but in the south and inthe central regions of the country thepopulation suffers enormous ly andconsequently there are numerous calls toend the sanctionsthe Iraqi government claims certainforeign governments support the claimand certain non-governmentalorganizations and individuals supportthe claim but the sanctions should beended because it's the Iraqi people thatare suffering inordinately people arestarving dying for poor medical care andso on and so forththat Iraq is suffering from shortages ofgoods that Iraq has not been able torebuild its infrastructure after the warended because of course a lot ofconstruction materials and equipment arenot allowed into the country you knowwater sewage treatment plants arefailing or working and adequately theelectrical grid is damaged roads bridgeswhat-have-you remain in disrepair againall of this causing untold misery anddeath for Iraqis how serious is thisimpact by some estimates several tens ofthousands of children it you know it'salways the weakest children the sick andthe elderly who suffer the most and it'syou know by some estimates several tensof thousands died during this periodsome estimates are actually higher someargue it's not tens of thousands someestimates suggest it's in the hundredsof thousands the Iraqi government forits part gives the figure of 1.7 milliondeaths from the sanctions now there's abig problem here in determining just howserious the impact of the sanctionsreally is because the it's impossible toknow because the data upon which to basethese estimates comes from the Iraqiregime itself they are hardly adisinterested party in these debates sothey were publishing figures about youknow so many people died from thishospital this week and here is a burialover here and and you know undoubtedlyundoubtedly some of those numbers weretrue but some of those numbers were alsoundoubtedly padded by the Iraqigovernmentto make the impact of the sanctions lookworse to try to curry you no sympathyfrom the international community in anyevent regardless of what the number isit is it is serious it is serious justhow serious though is a matter ofconsiderable contention regardless ofhow serious the sanctions are in termsof their impact on the Iraqi populationeventually what happens in an effort tocorrect some of these problems anddeficiencies something called theoil-for-food program is establishedyou'll notice spelt with two M's enemyit's for some unknown reason it's theBritish spelling of the word program inUN documents anyway negotiations arebegun to create a mechanism this is whatwell for food is a mechanism to if youwill humanize the sanctions sort ofremove the more destructive componentsof them and so and so forthbut it doesn't happen right away in factit takes five years five years for thenegotiations to set up this oil-for-foodprogram to come to fruition the policydoesn't go into effect until 1996 andthe main reason why the policy takes solong negotiate is because the Iraqigovernment is firm in its refusal toagree to this new program unless itretains control over the actual deliveryof food and medicine in Iraq they wouldallow the UN to establish monitors inthe country but only a small number inin this case 300 monitors would beallowed to visit Iraq to make sure thateverything was workingin the words of the regime it was amatter of sovereignty right the Iraqiregime was not going to let foreignersdistribute food medicine in theircountry they were gonna be the ones thatdistributed food medicine to their ownpeople it's a question of sovereigntybut as we'll see in a few moments thisdemand also was hugely advantageous forthe regime in any event over thisfive-year period while the negotiationsare under way guess what the Iraqipeople continued to bear the brunt ofthe sanctions and short in taking such ahard line on this question of fooddistribution and medical distributionyou know the Iraqi regime was leveragingthe suffering of its own people topressure the international community tomake concessions concessions that theyeventually made to allow the regime tocontrol the distribution of food andmedicine and thus as we'll seemanipulate aspects of the programalright so how was the oil-for-foodprogram supposed to work if you take outthe overhead mark number one and sort offollow along basically the system wasdesigned to work like thisfirst the Iraqi regime would continue tobe under sanctions but the governmentwould henceforth be allowed to sell aspecified amount of oil on tointernational markets so that's step aoil is produced in Iraq loaded onto aship or whatever mostly ships and andsold on the world market butthe money generated by these oil saleswas not supposed to come into the handsof the Iraqi government because againthe idea is the international communitydid not walk the Iraqi regime profitingfrom these oil sales because they didn'tknow what that money would be used forwould it be used to enrich theleadership probably would it be used tobuy and smuggle in weaponsperhaps so instead of the money fromthese oil sales going to the Iraqigovernment the money the profits fromthese oil sales would be transferred toa UN agency known as the office for theIraq program oil-for-food the directorthe executive director a guy by the nameof Benon Sevanhe was a Cypriot diplomat put in chargeof this agency so what would the officeof the Iraq program for food do with themoneytwo things one-third of the revenuesgenerated by these Iraqi oil sales wouldgo to a Compensation Commission thatwould pay claims arising from theinitial war so for example if you are aKuwaitiwho suffered a loss of either propertyor perhaps one of your family memberswas killed or something like that youcould put in a claim a little bit ofmoney also went for administration butmost of it was intended to go for claimsfor those who had suffered damages fromthe initial war that was one third ofthe revenue the other two-thirds of therevenue would be used by this UN officeof the Iraq program oil-for-food that'sa horribly awkward name I hope you'reusing some kind of a ahaacronym or a short form for for the restof this lectureanyways two-thirds of the revenue wouldbe used to buy food and medicine onworld markets Iraqis needs some cornyet they would buy corn they would needsome penicillinthey would buy penicillin whatever ithappened to be on world markets and thatmoney would go to the producers of thosegrains and food medicines andwhat-have-you and then and then as thefinal step the food and medicine wouldbe shipped for distribution in Iraq inthe north in the Kurdish area of Iraqthat food and medicine would bedistributed by the UN the again the Iraqthe the Iraqi Kurds had risen up againstSaddam Hussein they had been I guesssort of semi successful as a bit of astalemate but they've been sort of semisuccessful not in achieving theirindependence which was their goal butthey had largely sort of gained degreeof autonomy over the north and thus theUN was in a position to distribute thefood in the Kurdish regions in the northdifferent story in central and southernIraq there as you can see from thelittle diagram it was the government ofIraq that distributed that food andmedicine basically the way to think ofoil for food is that it was supposed toagain humanize the sanctions on Iraqmake it so that the people weren'tsuffering keep the regime from buildingits weapons pressure the regime to liveup to all of its commitments as part ofthe ceasefire but not hurt the peoplemake sure that they were getting foodand medicine and what-have-you but inthe end like the sanctions in generalthe oil food program was heavily abusedand failed to accomplish not all butmany of its goalin fact instead of pressuring SaddamHussein's regime the program to asignificant degree by the way it wasdesigned unintended consequence ofactually helping Saddam Hussein stay inpower I guess technically that was theunintended effect the perspective of theinternational community it was clearlythe intended consequence of the SaddamHussein regime anyways how did all ofthis happen how did this relief programend up helping Saddam Hussein stay inpower alright well here's how that allworked when the oil-for-food program wasa net iraq was allowed in stages tosignificantly increase its legal oilexports in fact by 2000 Iraq was legallyexporting oil worth approximately twiceas much as the value of the oil that hadbeen exporting in the years prior to thewar I I should enter a note of cautionto any figures with respect to Iraq'soil production prior to the first GulfWar because that those numbers were astate secret but estimates suggest butyou know from people in the oil industrythere are a number of organizations thattrack oil production and so on sales onthe world market yes best estimates seemto suggest that in the five years beforethe war of the Iraqi regime wasaveraging something like ten billiondollars and the figure for 2000 which isa known number was just approximately ata twenty billion years so again bestestimates suggest that by 2000 it wasnow selling twice as much or the valueat least twice because prices have goneup the value of the Iraqi oillegally exported was approximately twiceas much as what had been generated priorto the war and even though a third of itexcuse me even though one-third of thisincreased revenue remember is beingdiverted to that UN Commission theCompensation Commission write this it'sstill left enough money or should haveleft enough money to make sure therewere sufficient funds for food and cleanwater and medicine for the Iraqipopulation if the regime had so desiredbut of course this is not what happenedthe regime chose a different course ofaction there were flaws in the basicstructure of the oil-for-food programand a lot of it a lot of it relates backto that issue of sovereigntyquote-unquote that we talked about amoment ago the insistence by the Iraqiregime that it and it alone wouldcontrol the distribution of food andmedicine within its border yet it wasn'table to do so in the north but the Iraqigovernment was able to insist upon thatin central and southern Iraq with only300 UN monitors allowed in to check upon it this was a big problem because theIraqi regime controlled the distributionof food control the distribution ofmedicines and so and so forthit could skew that distribution forpolitical advantage in other words theregime could reward it suppose byproviding them with food and medicinewhile simultaneously punishing eitherreal or suspected opponents of theregime by either delaying aid deliveriesor denying aid altogether so if you werea member of a community that was loyalto the regime guess what you got yourfood you got your medicine if you were asuspect a member of a suspect communitysay for example a Shiitethe sows chances are you did not getyour food and medicine or at least notas much as you might require what elsedid this system of Iraqi control I'llallowwell the arrangement also gave the Iraqiregime the opportunity to apply whatwere really illegal surcharges to itscontracts with foreign suppliers aftersales service charges somewhere calledinland transportation fees others werecalled but basically if you look tooverhead number two this explains thisin a little bit more detail again theoil-for-food agency there in the middleis buying food and medicine worldmarkets the grain is and shippedwhatever I use the example grain isshipped to Iraq where the governmentcharges again illegal fees those feesgenerate revenue they generate profitsthat are being controlled by the Iraqigovernment every contract is generatingmoney for the Iraqi government againthat's not the way it was supposed tohappen but the producers of the foodsand medicines in this case I use theexample grain they don't care becausethey're not the ones paying for it thosefees are being paid by the office forthe oil-for-food programthe food medicine producers are making aprofit the Iraqi government is alsomaking if you will a profit on thesetransactions amongst the companiesboasts amongst amongst the most notablefirms allegedly participating I have tosay allegedly as because there have beena lot of allegations that not very manyconvictions was the Australian WheatBoard Australian wheat was being sold toIraq these illegal fees theseadministrative fees these after servicefees these inland transportation feeswhat-have-you were being paid as part ofthese contracts the Australian WheatBoard still made profits but so to theIraqi regime sometimes I think theydidn't even bother with specioussurcharges sometimes the contracts werejust written in such a way that theygrossly inflated the prices charged andwhat would happen is that would increasethe profits for the producer of thatfood or medicine but then the supplierthe supplier would be asked to illegallykickback some of those profits to theIraqi government but even this wasn'tthe end of the problem sometimes thegoods that had been purchased throughthe oil-for-food program were shipped toIraqthen not distributed to the Iraqi peopleas intended at all what was happeningexcuse me remember all those truckscrossing the border into Turkey everyday well this is a to use a specificexample so if you've ever looked at a ifyou ever got a prescription forsomething if you ever look at the bottomof the packaging you'll see typically onthe bottom you'll see embossed rightinto the bottom of the packaging is aserial number basically it's you knowthe lot numbers tells you when that'sexpired when it was produced and youknow what all this guy's it's a seriesof numbers on the packaging of medicinewell what was happening was drugcompanies were finding that lots ofmedicine that were sold to this to theIraqis it's part of this oil-for-foodprogram we're showing up in pharmaciesthroughout in particular the Middle Eastyou know so what would happen is salesperson for a pharmaceutical companywould go to you know a pharmacy Lebanonwas a was a significant consumer ofthese these medicines so a pharmacysales rep would go to a pharmacy andthey would say hey do you need anywhatever aspirin will just say aspirinfor the sake of argument and thepharmacists say no no we got plenty ofaspirin we're good we're good we're goodlook good look at our shelves here wegot all the aspirin we need right out ofthe sales replicas really not selling itas the stuff expired and so don't looklook at the numbers here it's all goodit's not expired and they would look atthe numbers and they would check againsttheir records and they would find thatthose bottles of in this case an aspirinhad originally been sold to Iraq as partof the oil-for-food program so what washappening is the medicine would beshipped to Iraq perhaps even with thoseadministrative fees charge it would thenbe smuggled out of Iraq to Lebanon whereit would be sold on the black market andthe profits guess who controls theprofits again yes the Iraqi regimethe other thing the Iraqi government wasthough to do was to stockpile some ofthe medicines in particular toartificially create or I guesstechnically maintained shortages in thecountry and then what they would doinstead of distributing the medicine tosatisfy the need is they would sellthese medicines to the domestic blackmarket again generate a profits fortheir sheep hey Yura she I II need thismedicine gee there's none available inthe official government stores but wecan sell you something through the blackmarket here if you can come up with youknow some value for us that sort ofthing so the regime in effect wascreating shortages and then fillingthose shortages in a way that maximizedtheir profits and thus their power nowobviously this is just the tip of theiceberg the total value of these corruptpractices is extremely extremely hard tomeasure for some reason people involvedin corrupt enterprises you know theythey generally don't keep good recordsthat publicize them and report them ontheir income tax and all that kind ofstuff so it's it's very difficult toestablish just how much money was beinggenerated for the regime by all of theseefforts some estimates suggest hundredsof millions of dollars but and otherestimates place the number higher thethe New York Times for example in someof its reporting suggested that billionsof dollars were being raised for theIraqi regime under their control bythese kinds of efforts the funny thingnot funny isn't the right word but theirony is is that this is all going on incentral and southern Iraq again wherethe Iraqi regime because of thisprinciple of sovereignty had insistedthat they control the distribution ofthe final distributionin the northern part of Iraq where theKurds were where the Kurds had sort ofgained a significant degree of autonomyit was it was the UN that distributedthe food or the medicine which meantthat for the most part but there weresome glitches to the north tube to besure but for the most part the food andthe medicine that was attended for theKurdish people guess what got to theKurdish people in the north the negativeimpact of the sanctions was completelycompletely avoided but it wassignificantly reduced the people werefed and largely cared for on the otherhand in those areas where the governmentcontrolled distribution corruption wasthe norm and the people suffered sothat's it right no there were moreproblems with the sanctions regime therewere additional avenues for corruptionif you're not shocked yet I think thisnext one will shock you because it wasthe Iraqi government not the UN that wasable to select who could sellhumanitarian goods to Iraq or who couldbuy Iraqi oil this system wasmanipulated to the advantage of theIraqi regime if you go to overheadnumber three where we're going to usethe example of an oil export contract toillustrate how the regime manipulatedthe system basically this is whathappenedstarted in the upper left-hand corner sounder the oil-for-food program let's saythe government of Iraq is allowed tosell a hundred thousand barrels of oiltoday just I'm just I picked all roundnumbers to make it easier so let's justsay that they are allowed to sell ahundred thousand barrels of oil and forthe sake of argument we'll just say thatthe price of oil at this time is $40 abarrel who gets to buy this contract toobtain this hundred thousand barrels ofoil in other words who is the contractholder going to be what what happenedwas the regime would often allocatethese opportunities these these thesecontracts to political allies or in somecases corrupt foreigners Russians andRussian firms were the beneficiaries ofthe largest percentage of thesecontracts individuals and companies forRed China and France were sort of in thenext tier in fact individuals andcompanies from Russia Red China andFrance received nearly half of all theimport and export contracts well whatwould happen nextalright let's say I'm a Russian and theIraqis say yes we will assign to you acontract to buy a hundred thousandbarrels of oil at $40 a barrel greatI get this contract I am now legallyallowed to buy a hundred thousandbarrels of Iraqi oil but I'm notactually an oil company I'm just a guyI'm a holding company I'm a consultingfirm I'm whatever I don't really want ahundred thousand barrels of oil I haveno artist for it I am nor to refine ityou can't eat it so I guess what I willdo is I will take my hundred thousandbarrels of oil and essentially flip thecontract to some oil company somewherebut I'm gonna have to charge them alittle bit extra I'm going to chargethem forty two dollars a barrel for thisoil which the oil company then pays wellguess what I bought a hundred thousandbarrels of oil at $40 a barrel I havejust impossibly in a matter of hoursresold that contract to an oil companyfor $42 a barrelI just made $2 on each barrel of oil Ijust made $200,000 in like 15 minuteswhat a dealI just made $200,000 all of this waslegal okayall of this was legal we use middlementhese preferential contract holders wereallowed to make a profit now that's avery desirable place to be right it'sit's great to have one of thesepreferential contracts they could beeven betterimagine if the Iraqis were willing tosell me well instead of at $40 that at$35 a barrel that that would increase myprofit even more now I'm making sevendollars a barrel of profit that's greatbut you're wondering gee I could use$100,000 I can use 200,000 I can eat$700,000 how do I get one of theseopportunities to legally buy Iraqi oilahathere is the rub who got those contractsand more importantly what did you haveto do to get those contracts again withrespect to the first question who gotthese contracts as already mentioned thelargest share of them went to excuse meindividuals and firms Russia mainland orRed China and France but there wassomething even more interesting aboutthose preferential contract holders notonly did they come from Russia China andFrance but a lot of those contracts wereoffered to people that were atypical inother words individuals and entities notnormally associated with the buying ofoil contracts on the world market youknow you would think you would thinkthat all companies would be buying thesecontracts and you would be wrong theyweren't be given the opportunity atleast not initially to buy thesecontractsinstead they were going to all sorts ofother entities that didn't normallyparticipate in the global oil market letme just illustrate with some examplesthe it still exists the RussianCommunist Party believe it or not wasallowed to buy some of these contractsthe leader of a right-wing Russiannationalist party was allowed to buysome of these contracts a Frenchpolitician who had previously served asfrance's ambassador to the UN anindividual who had actually negotiatethe original oil-for-food agreement thisindividual received oil contractsinteresting order wonder why that personwas singled out the Congress Party ofIndia which was at the time thegoverning party of India got contractsIndia's foreign minister got contractsand so on and so on and and let's befair Canada was not completely missingfrom the lease there was at least oneprominent Canadian on the list anindividual by the name of Maurice stronghe's deceased now he died 2015 butMaurice strong was an extremelywell-connected individual he'd held anumber of senior posts at the UN and atone point he received a check for nearly1 million dollars from a South Koreanmiddleman who was later convicted ofbeing on the payroll of the Iraqigovernment he was in a sense abeneficiary of one of these contractsthrough this this nebulous South Koreannow later on I've got this yep later onthere was an investigation intoeverything went wrong withthe oil-for-food program and as part ofthis investigation Maurice strong wasquestioned by the investigatorsinvestigators with any wrongdoing againhe's dead the house he can't charge thatpeople with anything but he was askedabout this check for nearly a milliondollars and when he was asked about thischeck for a million dollars he said Idon't know what you're talking about Idon't know what anything about any checkfor million dollars I didn't get anycheck for million dollars at which pointthe investigators took out a photocopyof the check which included a photocopyof Maurice strong endorsement on theback they said are you sure you don'tremember getting a check for a milliondollarsat which point strong said oh no Iremember oh yeah I mean I get so manychecks for a million dollars it's easyto forget the Rebbe I mean don't youthat's the same thing happen to you Imean I know I've last month alone Ican't even tell you how many checks fora million dollars I got it's easy tolose track them all anyways a strongclaim that the check was actually moneyintended for it investments in one ofhis family's businesses and guess whatthe money he all disappeared because thecompany went bankrupt oh what a shameyeah if you believe that I've got abridge in Brooklyn - lets tell youanyway the key here is we have all ofthese sort of strange individuals peoplenot normally associated with the buyingand selling of oil getting thesepreferential contracts but the questionis what did they have to do to be soprivileged how did you get all this likewhy didn't I get one I take a couple I'dhave taken one you know two hundredthousand profit I could certainly usethe money but I didn't get one so thequestion is what was expected of therecipients of these preferentialcontractsit seems highly probable thatsomething-something was expected of themin return especially given the fact thatSaddam Hussein personally approved thelist of who got these contracts onepossibility was that the person whoprofited from this sweetheart dealthat's really what we're talking abouthere might have to kick back a portionof the profits to the Iraqi governmentin other words let's say that I got oneof these cars I get I wish I did butlet's say I got one of the contracts Imake $200,000 profit and then I have tomeet with some guy from the Iraqigovernment in a cafe summer in a hotelsomewhere and I have to give him asuitcase with $100,000 money that willbe spun gold into Iraq to be controlledby the Iraqi regime so I make a profitnot as much as I was hoping but I'mstill making a profit and I have to kickback some of it to the Iraqi governmentagain there's widespread wisely thatthis is what happened for many of thesesweetheart deals but sometimes thesweetheart deal wasn't wasn't given inreturn for an expectation of a financialgate sometimes the person benefiting itwas expected to perform some kind of apolitical task maybe I would be allowedto keep the whole two hundred thousandbut I would use my contacts in thegovernment to pressure to lobby thegovernment to try to end its support forthe sanctions regime something like thatyou know this might explain why so manypolitical parties and politicians andpolitically connected individuals likeMaurice strong receive these Iraqi oilcontracts all right all right are youshocked yet no you're so cynical thatnone of this shock to you well get readyto really be shocked because believe itor notit gets worse one of the individuals whois later discovered to have benefitedeither directly or through familyindirectly from some of thesepreferential contracts was a certaindiplomat from Cyprus a guy by the nameof Ben on 7 yes that Ben on 7 in otherwords the UN official yeah the UNofficial who headed the agency yeah theUN official the head of the agency thatwas charged with monitoring theoil-for-food program on behalf of the UNwas benefiting from preferentialcontracts the guy who was supposed tomake sure that it was all run honestlyand effectively was allegedly and againI have to say allegedly because he'snever been convicted was allegedlyprofiting from the very same program hewas over see the allegation is that 7and his wife made hundreds of thousandsor perhaps even millions of dollars fromiraqi oil contracts will be sweetheartdeals that were awarded to companiesthat were owned by either close friendsor what-have-you are relatives of hiswhat supposedly happened was 7th and aclear this part you can't even deny in aclear conflict of interest would speakto senior Iraqi officials to ensure thathis friends companies received a numberof these oil contracts thesepreferential contracts the sweetheartdeals in fact sevens name and the nameof some of his friends the the oiltraders appear in oil contract recordsthat were seized after Saddam Husseinwas overthrownsome of these documents again includestoday Hussein signature it's not clearwhat was expected of seventh in returnfor the granting of these sweetheartdeals we can't know we can't know whathe was doing we can't know what he wasdoing on behalf of the Iraqi regime tobenefit financially from thesesweetheart deals we can't know becausehe's never admitted to it but what isclear is that whenever his close friendsreceived an Iraqi oil contract optioneither seven or his wife invariablyshortly thereafter made a suspiciouslylarge cash deposit into it into theirbank accounts now again we can onlyassume that this money was intended toinfluence seven in the way that hemonitored the oil-for-food program to dosome things or not do something again wecan't know exactly but what is clear nowis that the oil-for-food program was notrun as efficiently as it could have andpresumably at least part of that isbecause of the actions or inactions ofBernard seven again something was goingon now naturally seven has denied thathe benefited from these contractshe is also denied that he was in aconflict of interest so I have to setthe record that he has denied everythinginstead he claimed that these otherwiseunexplainable cash deposits came from anelderly aunt who would come to theUnited States and visit him from Cyprusbringing him and his wife money that'sso sweet isn't it great that one of yourrelatives is filthy stinking rich itcomes to visit you in New York it bringsyou a big wad of cashI wish I had an aunt that did thatanyways the investigators of coursewanted to speak to this ad do you see ifthat was really the case if that waswhere the money really came from butthey were unable to verify the story ofthis rich aunt because apparently thisrich aunt died from a fall died from afall in an elevator shaft in 2004 yeahyou can't make this stuff up literallyone day 24 hours before the UN was goingto revoke batons sevens diplomaticimmunity he was an official of the UN sohe had diplomatic immunity one daybefore his diplomatic immunity was aboutto be revoked seven fled the UnitedStates and returned to his native Cyprusa country which I'm sure this is just acoincidence does not have an extraditiontreaty with the United States and that'swhere he has remained to this day areyou shocked yet I want to mention onemore individualwas one other individual who againindirectly benefited from thesesweetheart contracts basically thecompany where he worked got thecontracts which resulted in moneyflowing to this individual with acompany where an individual by the nameof Kojo inaud worked that name probablywould sound familiarKojo inaud is the son of the then UNSecretary General Kofi Ananand again in this case it was the firmwhere Kojo inaud worked that allegedlyreceived some of these sweetheart dealsand the insinuation is that some ofthese profits trickle down to the son ofthe secretary-general who presumablywould have been in a position to youknow Lobby or influence his father onbehalf of the Iraqi government now Iwant to be clear here I wanna beabsolutely clear there is no evidencethat the father there is no evidencewhatsoever that the father Kofi Annanknew of his son's connection to theoil-for-food program in fact there isevidence that the son was hiding hisinvolvement that the son had lied to hisfather but that just raises otherquestions if the son lied to his fatherabout his connections to a company thatwas benefited from sweetheart deals whatelse might he be lying about did he infact for example try to influence hisfather right the son and father at leastat this time were very close they usedto speak quite regularly on the phone sothe question is in return for theseprofits from these sweetheart deals wasthe son saying anything to the fatherabout the Iraq sanctions was he tryingto influence was he trying to lobby hisfather when they talked on the phone orwhere they met in person well to wrap itup I don't really have very much more tosay it's true that many of theseactivities were known even at the timethey were occurring to the UN to thecountries of the Security Council andwhat have you so if that's true if a lotnot all of it but if a lot of if a lotof this was known at the timewhy work these why weren't theseproblems fixed one problem and I hatethe sound cynical but like a lot ofother UN programs not all absolutely notall but like some UN programs theoil-for-food program suffer from grossmismanagement stupid they didn't havesomebody in charge you could have pickedoh oh yeahanyways gross mismanagement was part ofthe problem there was corruption we'vealready touched upon this but there wasanother reason why the problems weren'tfixed and this is because the SecurityCouncil could not agree on mechanisms tofix the deficiencies in the oil-for-foodprogram the Security Council was dividedthe permanent members of the SecurityCouncil the veto-wielding members of theSecurity Council were divided generallyspeaking the British and the Americanstried to crack down all these problemstry to fix these problems try to resolvethem but they met with intransigence onthe part of the other members of theSecurity Council the permanent membersBritish and the Americans tried to fixat least some of these problems but theywere blocked by France China and Russiahey wait a bit France China and Russiawhere if I heard your three countriesmentioned in this lecture oh yesFrance China and Russia were the threecountries that were receiving the mostof those the largest share of thosepreferential oil contracts gee-whiz andtheir governments were the ones thatwere trying the most to not fix it sothat these corrupt contracts could belet out what a coincidenceif you believe in such things anywaythat's it for this lecture when we comeback the next time we're gonna start asection a brand new section of adifferent mechanism to manageinternational conflict that beinginternational courts alright well I hopeI haven't depressed you too much withthis last lecture that's it for now I'llbe back soon

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all right welcome back once againtonight we look at international courtsin the role they play in the managementof international conflict we'll start bylooking at their general characteristicswe'll spend a little bit of time lookingat the way courts relate to one anotherwe'll talk about enforcement in otherwords why States comply and we willspend a fair amount of time on theevolution and growth of internationalcourts culminating with two subsequentlectures one on the International Courtof Justice and one on the InternationalCriminal Court before I get any furtherI just want to make a note the syllabuslists this unit as unit two but it'sactually unit 1 so in other words thereare three units in this sectionthey are incorrectly numbered two threeand four they should be one two andthree I must move something around atsome point and not change the number allright let's talk a little bit about thegeneral characteristics of internationalcourts by by reviewing theircharacteristics in the context of threedimensions we'll talk about theirgeographic reach we'll talk about theirfunctional jurisdiction or it's the jobthat they do and we'll talk about theirstructure all right so first geographicreached the geographic reach exercisedby international courts varies variesconsiderably some courts claim universalor near universal geographic restrictionthe International Court of Justice wouldbe one the World Trade Organization isdispute settlement body also has verywide jurisdiction but there are a numberof Internet of course probably fact moreof them that claim only say a regionaljurisdiction so we have the EuropeanCourt of Justice and the oddly namedjudicial body of the organizationera Petroleum Exporting Countries inother words it only deals with disputesamongst the Arab members of OPEC not allOPEC states very specific function allright in terms of their functioninternational courts also vary in termsof their function or if you will the thesubject matter over which they claimjurisdiction the International Court ofJustice exercises perhaps the broadestfunctional jurisdiction of any court inthe world today it is designed to upholdthe values of the United Nations it'sCharter an international law in generalthe ICJ is effectively limited only bythe fact that states and states alone tobring cases before the court notcorporations not individuals notnon-state actors and by the fact that itdoes not try individuals it only triescases between states very widejurisdiction but most internationalcourts on the other hand have a farnarrower functional jurist nationInternational Criminal Court which willalso be spending quite a amount of timeon investigates solely criminalactivities related to things likegenocide and war crimes and whatever itdoesn't handle trade disputes it doesn'thandle border disputes it doesn't handleanything of that nature theaforementioned world trade organizationsdispute settlement body well what doesit handle obviously trade this thejudicial board of the organization ofArab Petroleum Exporting Countries wellguess what disputes related to oilproduction quotas amongst Arab countriesand so on and so onexamples of courts with a very specificnarrow focusin terms of structure most internationalcourts are permanent staff facilitysomewhere they have archives they've allback all that but there are nonpermanent courts and tribunals as wellin fact we will be touching upon brieflytwo of these non permanent tribunals notthe next unit but in the unit after thatwhen we talk about war crimes andefforts to try war crimes and we'regoing to talk about the non permanenttribunals criminal tribunals that werecreated on an ad hoc basis to deal withwar crimes and crimes against humanityand so on and so forth that occurred inone was created to deal with crimescommitted in Rwanda during the genocideand another crimes that were committedin Yugoslavia during that you could seelot of civil war these tribunals had noother purpose or jurisdiction once theycompleted their investigationsonce they're come their criminalproceedings were concluded they weredisbanded both of them the Rwandatribunal wrapped up the operations in2015 you could slap tribunal wrapped upoperations in 2017 so both are doneanyways as I said we will revisit thesead hoc tribunals because they're sort ofstepping stones on the road to thecreation of the International CriminalCourt and we will touch upon those intwo units from now nowhaving very and I do mean very brieflyreview the characteristics of moderninternational courts what I want to talkabout now is the variety of courts inexistence and how they relate to oneanother there are as of 2019 17permanent international courts andtribunals at both the regional andglobal level levelsif you add a number of sort of quasijudicial bodies quite courts but prettyclose that number gets to around 40the vast majorities areIntergovernmental in as much as thehandle disputes between states but thereare spoon that handle private disputesand what-have-you now given this largeand frankly ever growing number ofinternational courts again 40 courts andtribunals roughly in the world today onemight be led to ask how these courtsrelate to one another in the Higginsassigned reading higgins then presidentWright was running in time she waspresident of the ICJ she dresses thisissue head-on in her article about thebabble of judicial voices the firstchallenge that can come up when you havethis many courts and tribunals is thequestion of which laws internationalcourts should apply this is compoundedby a second challenge what to do ifdifferent laws would lead to differentjudicial outcomes and more importantlythere is a third challenge what happenswhen one court applying one set orinterpreting one set of laws in a casecomes to a different conclusion thananother court applying or interpretingthe second set of laws in a similar casethe way you can have two courts and twodifferent outcomes now fortunately todate anyways these sort of clashes havebeen pretty rare but this thing hashappened there are instances of majorinternational courts ruling oneffectively the same issue and coming totwo different conclusions we're going totalk about one of these later on when wetalk about the laws of warthere were two courts the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in aruling in some you know there's at ateach case differed from the ruling ofthe International Court of Justice inthe Nicaragua casenow don't worry about Katich don't workworried about Nicaragua quite yet we'regoing to talk about those much later inthe term but just make a mental note ofit later and the fact that those twocourts on what it was for all intensivepurposes the same issue different casesbut the same issue he came to differentconclusionsfortunately there is some good newsHiggins even talks about this thisproblem of inconsistency it does existit is real but it shouldn't be overstated most courts most of the timefollow the lead of the InternationalCourt of Justice they're not required tothere is not a formal hierarchy amongstinternational courts but most courtsmost of the time follow a lead to theICJ there have been suggestions that theinternational system needs to create aformal judicial higher e hierarchy youknow much like the way Canadian courtsare structured right we have a smallclaims courts or whatever at the watertraffic courts or whatever at the bottomprovincial courts provincial appealcourts federal courts and at the top ofthe whole structure the Supreme Court ofCanada right so maybe the internationalsystem needs a similar formal hierarchybut as higgins notes this isn't likelygoing to happen anytime soon oh therethere really isn't the political willnecessary to create such a hierarchy shealso aren't used that deliberatelycreating such a heart I would representa step backwards would create delays andoverwork at the ICJ and it mightundermine well the work and for thatmatter the legitimacy of other courtsand tribunalsthen there's the issue of enforcement orcompliance as it's sometimes describedthe classic understanding of the lawdefines enforcement as in fact thedefining characteristic of the law inother words without enforcement you haveno law but international courts not eventhe ICJ international courts do not havethe power to enforce their rulings theycommand no armies the command no policeno bailiffs there is no internationalpoliceman as it were so how are thejudgments of international courtsenforced well this takes a variety offorms at the top of the listis voluntary compliance internationalcourts primarily rely on the voluntarycompliance by those affected withrespect to their rulings in other wordsa decision is quote/unquote enforcedwhen the country subject to an adverseruling simply complies with that rulingthis happens frankly all of the timefact most of the time there was a caseback in the 1980s there was disputebetween Canada the United States about amaritime boundary off the east coastbasically of Maine area most of the Gulfof Maine not all that most of it and inthe 1980s Canada and the United Statesdecided to ask the ICJ to rule on thisdispute and in the end the court theInternational Court of Justice came downwith a ruling and either sigh goteverything it wanted but both countriesacquiesced to the decision acquiesced tothe judgment of the courtthey voluntarily agreed to accept thisdecision even though they didn't geteverything they wanted well why would acountry do that why would a countryallow an outsider an outside agency aninternational court determined mattersof high importance maybe even extremelyimportant issues why do that voluntarilywhy not just say hey we didn't get wewant we're not going to accept thisruling but does happen but not veryoften most of the time statesvoluntarily comply with decisions ofinternational courts they do so for anumber of reasons sometimes States findthat observing the ruling of a court isin their self-interest you knowsometimes there's a dispute and it's anagging dispute and it's affectingrelations between the two countries andsometimes those states would rather havea definitive solution to this vaccineproblem in order to obtain a certaindegree of certainty so they can moveforward and maybe an international Courtis the best way for them to find thatcertainty going to court may providestates with a face-saving solution to adilemma in other words instead of sayCanada conceding to the United States inthe Gulf of Maine or the United Statesconceding to Canada in the Gulf of Mainethey turn to a court and what theirruling comes down the bow say well youknow we're not giving in to Canada we'redoing this because the court ruled suchin such a way the face-saving solutionit actually it actually is very similarwe talked about maybe we talked aboutmediation a couple of minutes ago okayand we talked about how mediators cansometimes you know perform a verysimilar role by taking on themselves theburden of pushing the two sides toaccept a ruling or twoaccept a compromise or what have you andit allows the two sides to accept theseconcessions without looking well we'retalking about something very similarhere very similar dynamic and of coursethe other reason why countries mightvoluntarily want to voluntarily acceptruling is that again there there mightbe an issue that has been unresolved fora long period time it's like a like astone in your shoe named botheringpestering impacting the relationship andthe countries you know can't figure outa way to get beyond it and move on toother important issues well turning to acourt and letting a court decidewait break that political logjam removeof the irritant and allow the resumptionor the improvement of their relationshipthere is of course a limit there is alimit to voluntary compliancehence Morgenthau betcha that's the namethat at least some of you will rememberfrom your IR Theory course he's uh he'sthe famous realist scholar he wrote thatit's clear it's clear that the greatmajority the rules of in turn of theinternational system are generallyobserved by all nations without actualcompulsion victors don't need to have aninternational police force there isvoluntary there is voluntary ofacquiescence he says it's they do thisbecause it's generally in the interestof all nations concerned to honor theirobligations under international law atthe same time however he notes that theissue of enforcement becomes acute inthat small minority of important andgenerally spectacular cases and whatMorgenthau is saying is that the he heboil it down he's essentially sayingthere are two kinds of disputes betweenstatesthere are legal disputes and there arepolitical disputes the courts are reallyreally good for resolving legal disputesbut they're not very good for resolvingpolitical disputes now what's an exampleof a legal dispute that might besomething like a trade dispute verytechnical questions and more importantlytrade disputes are almost never mattersof life and death in other words nomatter how the court rules the overallbalance of power will will certainly notbe terminally affected and thus bothsides in the dispute can probably affordto let a Court decide this case on itstechnical legal merits it's not the endof the world if they lose in court butnot all disputes are legal disputesthey're not about the technical meritsof the of the the issue at stake as anexample of a political dispute considersomething like the 1962 Cuban MissileCrisis getting one of the most famousevents of the Cold War strictly speakingthat was not a legal dispute it was apolitical dispute it involved the SovietUnion placing nuclear weapons in Cubaafter it had publicly and privatelyassured the Americans that it would dono such thing but it wasn't equaldispute it wasn't the case of theSoviets broke their word they had averbal contract no that's not what itwas about it was into a politicaldispute that raised existential risks toboth sides it was part of the Cold Warit was part of that global contestbetween the Soviets and their allies andthe Americans and their allies and forGorgons au no great power could everafford to allow a courtto decide such a case you're not gonnago to the court say hey are thesemissiles the or not no neither sighsprepared to risk that the Sovietswouldn't allow that the Americanswouldn't allow that because if a courtruled against them it probably wouldobey the ruling of the court but itwould be like giving a political victoryto the other side a propaganda victoryto the other side all right so that'sthe issue of voluntary compliancerelated to the issue of voluntarycompliance it's a role played bydomestic and international publicopinion and sometimes suggested thatStates comply with the judgments ofinternational courts in order tominimize any adverse cost to theirreputation it's in their interest if youwill to acquiesce to international anddomestic and international publicopinion having a good reputation areputation for obeying the law andobeying the decisions of Courts may bevaluable in future negotiations in otherwords nobody's gonna want to do it do adeal sign a treaty with a nation thathas a reputation for breaking its wordor not following the rules as laid outby the court they would prefer to have areputation as a law-abiding State now ofcourse not every state cares as muchabout its it's international reputationnot every state cares about domestic andinternational political opinion to thesame degree I think in North Korea wecan safely say that domestic andinternational public opinion is a farlower priority than it is for example inthis country but for those that careabout these things you can't get it orwhat you could get good as an example asanyit matters what the public thinks whatyour reputation is finally there is oneother way in which the ruling of anInternational Court can be enforced andthat is not for the course the courtsthemselves to enforce it because theythey can't do that you don't have thepower but sometimes one or more stateswill step in and enforce the rulings ofa court doesn't happen very often but itdoes happen occasionally there'sactually a twenty years ago now butthere is actually a very in case of thisphenomenon back in 1996 theInternational Court of Justice made aruling that inter alia amongst otherthings said that Serbia had failed tobring to justice certain perpetrators ofthe genocide in Bosnia so the court saidSerbia wasn't upholding the law itwasn't bringing people to justice theythese people were known there wasnowhere to find them they should havebeen arrested they should have beenturned over for trial what-have-you andthe court said that Serbia was not doingthat of course the ICJ had no way tomake Serbia arrest these individuals andturn them over but the European Unionhad power a few years later Serbia wastrying to join the European Union andwanted to begin the process of applyingfor membership in the European Unionsaid great Serbia we would love to enterinto these negotiations with you we willdo that it's awesomely we're glad thatyou want to join our club and we willbegin the process immediatelyimmediately after you arrestand turn over those individuals to betried for their war crimes and that'sexactly what happened within weeks theindividuals in question I've been foundthey weren't too hard to find they hadbeen arrested and shortly thereafterthey were turned over for prosecutionnow there are obvious limits to thistype of enforcement mechanism first ofall the International Committee will nothold such effective levers in everyinstant the event they do the partiesusing these levers to enforce therulings of an international court mightnot be in fact frequently are notdisinterested parties in other wordssometimes those states using their powerto enforce the ruling of aninternational court are not so muchinterested in justice but they'reinterested in pursuing their own agendasand of course the other problem withusing any kind of pressure and kind ofpower or for that matter force is thepower in all of its forms is subjectvagaries of the international politicalsystem in other words some entities likethe European Union like the great powershave the will the ability to pressureweaker states to comply with judicialdecisions but I don't think for examplethat Bolivia has the power to makeGermany obey a court decision or theUnited States or China or anything likethat and in other words there areproblems of unequal enforcement and Imentioned the use of force to you knowmilitary power to enforce thejudiciary's decisions again power isunequally distributed not just economicpower not just political power not justcultural power but military power andusing force military force to enforcethe decisions of an internationaltribunal frankly settles nothing but thequestion of who is stronger there's afamous line that encapsulateencapsulates this whole ideas fromfacilities the history of thePeloponnesian War again an early exampleof a realist scholar you may have comeacross that name in your intro to ourcourse I know I always covered thesecities actually covered Machiavelli isheard that baek-mae Morgenthau is wellwhatever I teach the course anyways inthe in somebody known as the Malayandialogue facilities that's one of theEdina insane the strong do what they canand the weak suffer what they must it'sit's again a famous slide and it verymuch encapsulates this dilemma you knowpower isn't equal the strong do whatthey can and the weak suffer what theymust but of course it even gets worsethan thatsince the end of World War twousing force military forceto enforce a Court decision is strictlyspeaking illegal in most cases the useof force war in particular has beenoutlawed in virtually all circumstanceswe're going to talk about that in acouple of not the next section I thinkit's a section after that where thereare only a very limited set ofcircumstances and allow states to usemilitary force and generally speakingunless the Security Council steps ingenerally speaking enforcing the rulingsof the ICJ or the ICC or any othertribunal is not one of those contextsall right to finish it off in the endhow effective is international lawespecially compared to its national ordomestic counterparts most of the timewhen people think about theeffectiveness of international law ifyou think about it at all they findinternational law to be lacking becausemany violations of international law gounpunishedpowerful nations are not subject to thesame limits that weak nations are infact as we just saw only when sovereignstates decide on their own volition toparticipate and acquiesce to thedecisions of the court does the courteven come close to matching theeffectiveness of domestic criminalcourts for exampleand it should come as no surprise thatat the international level againjudicial decisions and the reaction ofstates is shaped by their interests inother words it's highly highlypoliticized but to be completely cynicalto completely reject the ability ofcourts to resolve problems to bringjustice would be a little unfair takethe issue of effectiveness domestic lawlike the system of international law isfar far from effective in allcircumstances domestic laws don't anddomestic courts don't result in justiceall of the time not all violations evenmake it to court at the domestic leveljust like at the international level Imean look at the crime statistics now Ihave some crime statistics from Canadanot from Canada from the United Statesrather the vast majority of propertycrimes go unpunished a majority ofcrimes of a violent naturearmed robbery rape and things of thatnature a majority failed to result inthe arrest let alone the conviction of asuspect and even in the case of murderyou know about as serious of cases youcan get it's true that a majority ofmurder cases do result in an arrest anda conviction I got all of them one-thirdof all murders in the United States gocompletely unpunished only about one innine burglaries or vehicle theft resultsin an arrest only one in five arsonsever results in an arrest and convictionthe bottom line is if you're gonnacriticize international law for notresolving every crime well then it's nobetter not necessarily any worse there'sa situation for domestic crimes theother thing you need to do when you'retalking about international law and itseffectiveness it's not focus only onthose highly dramatic cases where thecourt fails to resolve the situation ifyou look at international law in totalif you look at all international law andall international courts not just thoseones with a high visibility you'll findthat there are areas of internationallaw that actually do have high successrate in resolving issues you know interms of civil law disputesadministrative law and and so on and soforth so you know things like contractsyou know uh the World Bank'sinternational center for the settlementof investment disputes has a highsuccess rate when it comes toregulations you know there's theInternational Whaling Commission thereis the Northwest Northwest Atlanticfisheries organization there's a wholeseries of you know quasi-judicial or insome cases judicial bodies that havehigh success rate in resolving issuesbrought before them as for the issue ofpoliticization yeah it's true theinternational political internationallegal system is politicized but beperfectly honest so too our domesticlegal systems so whileit's probably true that domestic legaltraditions are more fully establishedthan the international legal systemone shouldn't completely ignore theeffectiveness or the possible thepossibilities of international tribunalsto bring resolution to bring settlementto bring justice to internationaldisputes anyway that's enough on thehistory and evolution of internationalcourts next time we're going to talkabout the International Court of Justicethat's it for now

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welcome back once again let's continueour discussion of international courtsand their role in the management ofinternational conflict this is the firstof two related lectures in this lecturewe're going to look at the process theevolutionary process that led to thecreation of the International Court ofJustice and next time we are going todiscuss the International Criminal Courtall right now the idea of internationaljudicial bodies the idea of aninternational court resolving disputesbetween states this is a relatively newphenomena and it actually took aconsiderable period of time to evolveinto its present form so in one of thefirst here is trace that is evolutionaryprocess that leads to the InternationalCourt of Justice one of the very veryvery first steps leading to the eventualcreation of an International Court wasthe product of a 1794 treaty between theUnited States and Britain was known asJay's treaty after John J who's theChief Justice of the US Supreme Courtwho negotiated the treaty on behalf ofthe United States anyway Jay's treatyled to the establishment of a wholeseries of bilateral tribunals comprisedof British and American representativesnot true courts but they are bilateraltribunals came into existence beginningat the very end of the 18th century andthese proto ditional tribunals and I'llexplain why they are proto judicial nottruly judicial bodies these protoditional bodies were designed to helpthe Americans the British resolve someissues thatmarek negotiations had failed to resolveone of the first settled the settled adispute over where the border should bein the area of Maine and on the one sidein Quebec and New Brunswick on the otherthe two sides couldn't agree where thatborder ran and so they created this bodyto look into the question and it set thebot the border where it is one of thelatter ones one of the last of these wassomething known as the alack the AlaskaBoundary Commission which if you knowany Canadian history has a notoriousplace in game history it settled adispute as to where the boundary betweenAlaska and British Columbia the Yukon isand you know in Canadian lore this is agreat injustice done to Canada etc etc agreat story but one that I don't havetime to tell here all right thesebilateral tribunals again performed aquasi-judicial role that cannot beconsidered to be true internationalcourts courts pristine and this isbecause these bodies were comprised ofan equal number of American and Britishrepresentatives the same number thisgave each side an effective veto overany decision they weren't giving anysovereignty up they both or least theirrepresentatives could block any decisionbut this was about to change in 1860sthe Americans go through a civil war andin the aftermath of the u.s. Civil Warsomething something significant happensa new kind of tribunal is created thefirst of these is known as the AlabamaClaims Tribunal here are the facts ofthe case during the u.s Civil WarBritain was officially neutralofficialy anyways some segments of thegovernment in the British public favorthe north some favored the South whathave you in any events dream the CivilWar a ship it comes to eventually beknown as the Alabama a ship wasconstructed by a British ship builderwho was more than willing in this casedid he business with the Confederacythat's that's the south now the Alabamawas not a warship it was not constructedwith weapons to do so would haveviolated British law the British Britishshipyards at this time were allowed tobuild ships for anyone who wanted to buythem including groups that were at warbut they weren't allowed to buildwarships so this ship builder built theAlabama an unarmed ship it was howeverconstructed in such a way that it couldbe rapidly converted into a warship justgive you one example the deck of theship was specially reinforced and whywould you need an extra reinforced deckwell if you had several tons of cannonssitting on that deck you would need thatdeck to be reinforced so that's exactlywhat happened this ship builder built aship that didn't have any cannons uponit but with a relatively fewmodifications could be converted into awarship again all of this was legal inBritain at the time so the ship is builtit's sailed to the Azores that's thoseIslands sort of south west of Spain andPortugal and while it's in the Azores isan important the Azores and it's aconvert converted into a commerce Raiderby the Confederacy they put cannons onit they equip it with you know munitionsand kind of powder and all the thingsyou would need to go to war and afterit's converted again it really need allthat much because it was pretty muchready to go and it sets sail and itsinks or captures a whole whack ofnorthern ships fact it has a verysuccessful career sinking Confederateships or capturing Confederate ships andit does this for for for some period oftime until it is itself sunk in a battlewith a u.s. warship off the coast ofFrance but the Confederacy definitelygot its money's worth out of this shipalright after the u.s. Civil War endswith the victory of the north of theUnion there's some hard feelings aboutthisAlabama ship in the United Statesthere's some you know debate about youknow was it's really the right thing todo for the British to build a ship thatwas it wasn't a warship sure but it waspretty close to a warship and it wasused against our interests and so theissue of the Alabama remained a bone intension in u.s. British relations theytried to negotiate it we tried to settleit diplomatically but they were unableto so the two sides signed a treatyknown as the Treaty of Washington and in1871 this Treaty of Washington createdwhat comes to be known as the AlabamaClaims Tribunal and the job of theAlabama Claims Tribunal is to decide thelegal question of whether or not Britaindid the right thing in allowing thisship builder to build this ship thatcould be easily converted into a warshipand thus be used to attack Unionshipping again remember the British wereneutral during the war early supposehere's the new thing here's the wrinklealthough the Alabama Claims Tribunal ina sense builds on those tribunals thatwere the product of Jay's treaty thisone is different it's different in twoways first it has an odd number ofmembers so there aren't gonna be anyties even more significantly though inthe case of the Alabama Claims Tribunala majority of the members of thetribunal or citizens of neither the u.s.nor Britain or there are five peoplethat heard this case five yes there wasone American there was one Brit butthere was also one Italian one Brazilianand one Swiss three of the five werethird parties or from countries thatwere third property's not part of thedispute a foreign majority existed onthe Alabama claims tribunal and thisrepresented a pretty significant albeitvoluntary and reversible but never lefta significant reduction in thesovereignty of both the United Statesand Britain both the British and theAmericans were saying that yes we areallowed to turn our fate over to theseother countries we're going to have somesay in this we're gonna have somebody inthere in the room that's part of thecourt proceedings but we are willing togive give up a little bit of oursovereignty to resolve this issue in theend the tribunal accepted much not allbut much of the u.s. claim and itawarded the u.s. damages which theBritish promptly paid and that was theend of the issue at least as far as theAlabama is concernedbut it wasn't the end of tribunals ofthis naturethe Alabama Claims Tribunal thearbitration was followed by the creationof a whole series of similar tribunalsaround the world in fact this practicecontinues to the to today all right wellthis leads us to the next step thecreation of the permanent Court ofArbitration again the Alabama ClaimsTribunal was so successful many of thosethat followed were also successful infact they were so successful that manymany treaties between nations insertedclauses to the effect that if there's adispute about the wording if there is adispute about the provision that will beresolved if not by negotiation by theparties themselves and by an arbitrationpanel similar to that of the AlabamaClaims Tribunal which put right intotreatieswe're gonna follow the model of the inAlabama Claims Tribunal and this becomesextremely widespread in fact it becomesso widespread but there are proposals tocreate a permanent institution a trueinternational court to handle thesesorts of arbitrations the time howeveris not yet ripe and these proposals cometo naught instead there is anintermediate proposal the gamesacceptance and that is something knownas a permanent Court of Arbitration in1899 the permanent Court of Arbitrationis created again it's building on thosetribunals the ones like the Alabamaclaims tribunal it's building on theproto judicial tribunals that existedearlier andand it comes down to the permanent Courtof Arbitration the first thing I knowabout the permanent Court of Arbitrationis that its name is a little bitmisleading despite its name permanentCourt of Arbitration it's not actually apermanent court per se it is a permanentorganization but it is it is designed tohelp countries create temporaryarbitration tribunals in other wordsit's set standardized rules andprocedures keeps track of decisions youknow record-keeping all of that sort ofthing another thing to note about thepermanent Court of Arbitration is thatstill continues to existtoday and over the years since it wascreated just over a century ago it hasmanaged to decide more than a hundreddisputes today it originally was it wasoriginally created just to handledisputes arbitrations between states buttoday it will handle an arbitrationbetween any combination of states orinternational organizations or privateparties so nation is in a dispute with acountry it potentially could be go tothe PCA if it's state with privateparties you know whatever now over theyears the PCA has been involved in anumber of very famous and some prettyimportant rulings but we don't reallyhave time to go into too many of them Ithink you want to touch on one fairlyrecent one pretty dramatic one somethingknown as the South China Sea arbitrationthat's the one listed in the firstoverheadall right the permanent Court ofArbitration case the South China Seaarbitration from 2016 involved a cork orthan in this case a temporary tribunalestablished under the auspices of thePCA to consider the question of thelegal status of certain waters andislands in an area known as the SouthChina Sea the case was brought by thePhilippines and the respondent was thePeople's Republic of China CommunistChina Red China I find this caseinteresting I find it actually veryinteresting and it's an example of acourt being asked to at least give someguidance on issues that are prettyserious with a pretty serious potentialfor conflict so what are we what itwould exactly are we can we're talkingagain talking about this area known asthe South China Sea if you go to thesecond overhead this is a map China Seayou can see the Philippines on theright-hand side get em on the Left Chinais mostly up to the left and so on andso forth and the maritime area right inthe center of all of these countries isis known as the South China Sea buthere's the problem the waters and someof the little well call them islands issome cases a little bit generous butwe'll call them islands in this area aresubject to complex overlapping claims ifyou again you can take a closer look atthis at your convenience if you want tostop the recording for a moment or twothe the claims are sort of color-codedyou can see different parts are claimedby different countries and they arecolored to those various countriesVietnam has a claimas a claim the Philippines has a claimfor Niyaz a claim taiwan has a claim thePeople's Republic of China has a claimall of these different entities havehave claims in the area oh I forgotabout Indonesia now at the bottomanyways it's a complex and andchallenging issue and the complex natureof this issue has been complicated inparticular by a communist China's claimsto the virtual entirety of the areaChina has claimed that most of thewaters of the South China Sea are partof its territorial sea at other timesit's return referred to its exclusiveeconomic zone and it's also said thatthese waters have historic statusbecause they are enclosed by somethingknown as the nine - linebasically the nine dash line is what theChinese say showed up on maps back inthe day and MacLean they said theChinese claim that because these ninedash linings incorporated the SouthChina Sea for a long period of time thismeans these waters are historicallyChinese and nobody else's well thedispute is also controversial not justbecause there is overlapping claims notjust because this China has sort of in asense claim a share much larger than anyof the other nations but it's alsocontroversy because Communist China thePeople's Republic that now they're notthe only ones to do this but they areamongst the most aggressive in terms oftrying to bolster their claims by usinga series of small uninhabited rocks andislets as elements of their claim theyhavefurthermore try to bolster their claimsagain they're not the only ones butthey're the most aggressive by creatingartificial islands in the area andperhaps the most dramatically it'scontroversial because of the degree towhich the People's Republic hasmilitarized this dispute at varioustimes the People's Republic has hasclashed violently with the Vietnameseand with the Philippines in one instancethere was a clash that killed nearly 70Vietnamese sailors and so it's over it'salso sucked in the Americans there havebeen over the years a series ofincidents where American shipstransiting the region ships and aircraftfor that matter have been shadowed andsome cases harassed by by Chinesemilitary forces in fact in 2001 anAmerican plane was being shadowed andharassed by a a an aircraft from thePeople's Republic and the pilot of theof the Chinese jet got a little tooclose the planes touched both planesalmost crashed the Chinese one did crashresulting in the death of a pilotanyways I included I include some somesome images of some of the islands thatthe Chinese have been constructing inthe area again it's totally fascinatingto me they are in many cases creatingmilitary bases in the South China Sea tosort of put their foot down put theirstamp on this on this area to againbolster their their claims so again takea moment whatever you want you can seewhat in some cases were coral reefs youknow in some cases you know submergedareas and what the Chinese are doing isusing dredging ships to scoop up sandoff the seabed and pile it on thesecoraland you know in order to create againsee the artificial islands again I findit totally fascinating that they woulddo such things and then they pave it apaver runway and military installationsand what-have-youanyway getting back to our store againyou can look at those those overheadsthat your convenience in 2006 thePhilippines took their case againstChina to the permanent Court ofArbitration and amongst other thingsthey challenged they challenged China'sclaim that these were historic watersthey challenged China's claim that thiswas part of their territorial sea theychallenged China's claim that theseartificial islands created legal rightsin the adjacent waters again I don't gettoo far off track here or too technicalbut there is an international treatythat both the Philippines and China andmany many many many other countries havesigned and it says that you know youcan't create artificial islands and thenclaim that the adjacent waters are yoursyou just it just you could do this yetthis is what China was doing and so thiswent to the permanent Court ofArbitration and in the end most likealmost all of China's actions weredeemed to violate international law inother words the Philippines won now thathasn't resolved the issue China hasrejected the ruling of the permanentCourt of Arbitration in the chat in thecase of the South China Sea Arbitrationso it hasn't resolved the issue but itcertainly represents a majorlegal victory for the Philippines andfor that matter other cut othercountries with claims over the SouthChina Sea all right this brings us toour next step the first true permanentinternational court follows on thesuccess of the PCA and the PCA stillexists but you know shortly after thecreation of the PCA a for the first trueInternational Court is created and thisis known as the permanent Court ofinternational justice it beginsoperations it exists between the twoworld wars begins operations in thenineteen twenty two and it lasts untilwell at least as far as its operationsare concerned until nineteen forty WorldWar two breaks out and it basicallybecomes dormant until it is replaced bythe International Court of Justice afterthe Second World Waranyway the PC I J the permanent Court ofinternational justice is again a trueinternational court and in many ways itserves as a template for the currentInternational Court of Justice it has agoverning statute in fact many sectionsfrom the governing statute of thepermanent Court of international justiceit's almost like cut and paste cut andpasted into the new International Courtof Justice it had a staff it had judgesin her cases and it also offered whatare known as advisory opinions on aCanadian law course or you followCanadian judicial issues an advisoryopinion is the equivalent of a referencein other words you know here in Canadathe the government can the federalgovernment can ask the supreme court ahypothetical question say you knowhypothetically if we were to pass thisbill would it be legal or not would itbe constitutional or not would itviolate the powers of a different levelof government the provinceor you know if we haven't passed thislaw yet but hey we're thinking about itso hypothetically if we do what with thelegal significance be well that's what areference here is in Canadian law wellthat's the same with an advisory opinionthe court is asked a hypotheticalquestion hypothetically if a disputewere to be about this issue how wouldyou resolve it there doesn't have to bean actual case they're just being askedto resolve a hypothetical questionanyway um the court wasn't around forvery long as I said 1922 - really 1940artwork that those representants activeyears but it did you know in that briefexistence it did issue a number ofrulings or you know more than two dozencases that it resolved or more than twodozen advisory opinions so you know itwas pretty active it was probablygenerating two or three opinions eithercases or advisory opinions every yearand you know there were some that havehad some pretty important significanceif you look at overhead number six I'vementioned two cases the easternGreenland case and something known asthe monastery st. no advisory opinionwhat is a case what is advisory opinionand if you read the little descriptionof my head of about these two cases theeastern Greenland one is about you knowclaiming territory what do you need todo to solidify a claim for territory doyou have to actually occupy it or canyou control it by you know regulating itthrough rules and administrative meanswhatever anyway the court made a rulingon that and said that no you don'tactually have to occupy it with peopleyou can take possession for territorythrough administration the other casewas a dispute between Albania and YukosSlavia and it had to do with theinterpretation of a phrase JessicaFrench up until there was a treaty andbetween Albania and Yugoslavia and itmarked the border and at one point itsaid the border shall run bla bla blaup - excuse me up until this monasterybut the two sides couldn't agree did itmean up to and including the monasterywhich would admit that monastery was nobane Ian or didn't mean up to andstopping just short of the monasterywhich would have meant that themonastery was part of Yugoslavia anywaysin the end the court ruled in favor ofAlbania on this now sure I can feel it Ican just feel it somebody you'rethinking the hell does this have to dowith anything well ironically both theeastern Greenland case and the monasteryof st. no advisory opinion thosejudgments set important precedents thatcould play a significant role in theresolution of to Canadian territorialdisputes in the far north it's beyondthe scope of this lecture to go into itbut there are a couple of Canadiandisputes one with with Denmark and onewith the United States that could fallon the basis of these two cases andtheir rulings you're you're really supergeeky and interested in send me an emailor Ike well it's a long conversationarrange a meeting and we'll talk aboutit so it is I think it's a great storybut if you're interested let me know allrightthat's the permanent Court ofinternational justice why don't we takea quick break and when we come backwe're going to talk about theInternational Court of Justice itselfthe culmination if you will ofthis evolutionary process

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all right we're back talk now about theInternational Court of Justice theInternational Court of Justice wascreated in the aftermath of the SecondWorld Warit's an ancillary institution associatedwith the United Nations and it was verymuch intended to revive and replace thepermanent Court of international justicewhich had failed in a sense becomemoribund with the outbreak of of the waras mentioned earlier in the previousunit the geographic reach of the ICJ isyou know amongst the broadest of anycourt as the authority here casesinvolving any UN member state when youjoin the UN as a full member you areautomatically a party to the ICJ itshould be noted however there the theeffective reach of the court does tendto be a bit more limited than thatin fact sometimes considerably morelimited than that by this I mean thatalthough the court can hear cases fromalmost literally anywhere in the worldas long as it's two states the court canonly hear cases if the parties agree toaccept the jurisdiction of the court ifthey do not the court cannot act nowwhen the statute for the ICJ was beingdeveloped back in the mid 1940s at thesame time with the UN Charter is beingcreated there was discussion that theICJ have compulsory jurisdiction butthat proposal was rejectedbut there's one more twist before weleave the jurisdiction of the court itsreach I want to talk a little bit of uslet me known as the optional clause oneof the articles of the statute of theICJ is a clause again that's much longername but it's generally referred to asthe optional clause and under the termsof the optional clause states can agreethat they will accept the compulsoryjurisdiction of the court in all casesinvolving another state that hasaccepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court in other words if they bothagree to play by these rules either canrequire the other to go before the courtnormally that's not the case now atpresent there are 73 countries includingCanada that have accepted the compulsoryjurisdiction of the court now most of the countries that have accepted thecourts compulsory jurisdiction are thesmaller states or the middle powers orwhat have you there are some second-tierand regional powers that have acceptedits jurisdiction you know such as theBritish but a lot of other you know sortof regional powers France Turkey whathave you have not her gray has acceptedthe compulsory jurisdiction so it's aLatin American country but Argentina andBrazil have not Nigeria has accepted itbut not South Africa India has acceptedbut not Indonesia and then finally theUnited States Russia and China have notaccepted the optional clause so again ittends to be the smaller powers that sortof the further down the food chain youknow maybe more likely a state is tohave signed the the optional Clause donot France not turkey not Brazil notArgentina and not South Africanot Indonesia not the US Russia or Chinacountries like that although those arecountries towards some cases at the topof the power structure now on thesurface the option cause looks like asubstantial step towards accepting thejurisdiction of the court but that's alittle bit misleading countries thathave accepted the optional clause inother words they say if if our neighborwho is accepted the option Clause wantsto take us to court we have to go andthat's true but that's only as true asyou remain a signatory to the optionalclause countries have in the pastwithdrawn from the optional laws somehave withdrawn after losing court casessuch as France they were taken to courtby Australia and New Zealand but theywere challenging france's program ofatmospheric nuclear weapons testing in the early 1970s so France withdrew fromthe optional clause and other countrieshave actually withdrawn their consentafter taken to court even even beforethe court issued a ruling one of themost famous cases was the u.s. you hasactually had accepted the optionalclause but in the aftermath of somethingknown as the Nicaragua case againtouching on that one and say it's hugelyimportant case with respect to the lawsof war the United States withdrew afterit lost for the most part the ruling in the case of the ICJ really in the caseof the Nicaragua disputein short the optional clause is a bitlike a straightjacket that you put onyourself in other words if you can putit on you can take it off you know thereyou can claim to be bound by theoptional clause unless you no longerwant to be bound by the option clausethe other thing that states do is whenthey sign the optional clause countrieshave been known to insert reservationsalong with their signature the termreservation refers to a a you know mightbe a sentence or a couple cents could belonger where country says yes we aresigning this treaty yes we are agreeingin this case to the optional clausehowever there are some exceptions orthere are some interpretations or aresome other modifications that we want tomake in fact that's what Canada has doneCanada has actually Canada has twicesigned the optional clause they did itinitially and then they added areservationthey said that we accept the compulsoryjurisdiction of the court in all caseswithout exception except for thesecertain cases and then Canada wouldthrough that reservation and then theysigned up for it again and they said yeswe accept this optional clause withoutreservation except in this one case bothboth both both preservations one ofwhich no longer is in place and theother which is in place had to do withthe jurisdiction of the court in acertain maritime disputes that the mostreason one was Fisheries off the EastCoast and basically Canada said yes weaccept the optional clause we will allowthe International Court of Justice toresolve any dispute between Canada andanother signatory to the optional clauseunless it has to do with East Coastfisheriesterms of the function of the court Italked about this earlier it's designedoh do uphold the values of the UnitedNations UN Charter and international lawin general and it's it can hear any caseinvolving two states two or more statesall these states can bring cases so itwill only hear cases involving Statesthere is however it should be noted arole for a certain number ofinternational organizations nowinternational organizations cannot bringcases before the ICJ but there are aseries of international organizationsthat can ask the court to give advisoryopinions the Security Council can dothis the General Assembly can do thisall of the UN's15 specialised agencies UNESCO the WorldHealth Organization of the World Bankthe worldthe IMF all of them except for one forsome rupees in the InternationalInternational the Universal Postal Unionis not allowed to ask advisory opinionsit's the only one of the UN'sspecialized agencies that's exempt butanyways the Security Council the GeneralAssembly 14 out of the 15 UN specializedagencies and and and there's a handfulof other international organizations of the International Atomic Energy Agencyour ass are allowed to ask advisoryopinions they can't bring cases beforethe court but they are allowed to askthose advisory questions you knowremember those theoretical questionsthat the court is asked all right termsof the structure pretty straightforward it’s a permanent court it's located in the hague a city in the netherlands thecourt has 15 judges they are elected forrenewable line year terms and kind oflike us and in elections the judges areelected onstaggered basis so every three yearsfive of them are elected for a nine-yearterm then three years later another fiveare elected then three years lateranother five and so on and so on and soonjudges are nominated by the permanentCourt of Arbitration and are confirmedby a vote in the General Assembly andthe Security Council both have to agreesimple majorities no vetoes and theSecurity Council in terms of the makeupof the judiciary of the judicial body of the ICJ it by convention is is designedto reflect the makeup of the SecurityCouncil and by that I mean there is onejudge from each of the five permanentmembers of the Security Council thatmeans there's always an American judgealways a Russian judge always a Chinesejudge always a British and always aFrench judge beyond that the judges areselected to reflect the regions of theglobe so Western Europe and other thatthat includes places like Canada in theUS Western Europe and other have fivejudges those three permanent ones the USBritain and France plus two othersEastern Europe gets to one of which isRussia Africa gets three Asia gets threeincluding China and then Latin Americaand the Caribbean get the other two sothat's how the 15 judges of the ICJ areselected but it's actually possible forthe court to have more than 15 judgeslet's say hypothetically there is a casebetween Canada and the US because theu.s. is a p5 country it automaticallyhappens a judge it always has a judgeserving on the courtCanada has sometimes had judges butlet's say Canada doesn't currently havea judge sitting on the ICJ if that's thecase if Canada is is arguing a casebefore the court it is allowed toappointone ad-hoc judge to hear that particularcase so it is possible for the number ofjudges at any given time to be higherthan fifteen if countries that don'thave a judge are taking the court theidea is to try to make it fair right itwould be unfair if the US had one judgesitting on the court in Canada did notso this is sort of even it up but theCanadian judge in this hypothetical casewould only hear in this particular caseand then once that was done thatperson's term would be over the courtalso has a bureaucracy a permanent staffyou know HR and all that kind of stuffit's known as the registry and thedecisions of the court are final thereis no appeal process but althoughthere's no formal appeal process statesare allowed to resubmit cases within tenyears of a ruling if there is newinformation finally in terms of thestructure the court is also empowered todecide a case on the basis of the latinphrases exactly Oh a Bonowhich more or less trains translates onthe basis of what is fair and just orwhatever in other words the two partiescan go and say you know don't worry toomuch about the law what would be thefair thing to do in this situationthe other thing to note about decisionsof the court not only can it rule onthis basis but an interesting thing isthat the decisions of the court arestrictly speaking not formal precedentsthey are in other words only binding onthe two parties before the court at anygiven time the court however doesendeavor to remain consistent over timeso even though it's previous decisionsare not formally precedents the courttends to follow the direction of its ownrulings of course over the year thecourt has heard a number of verysignificant cases and and issued anumber of significant advisory opinionssome of the ones that we are going totalk about are listed on overhead seventhe core food channel case the veryfirst actual ruling of the ICJ we'regoing to talk about it because of itsrelevance with regard to the use offorce under international law Imentioned the gulf of maine case in thelecture we're going to talk about thatNicaragua case hugely hugely hugelyhugely important and then there's themand then there are there been a wholeseries of other ones but those are justthe ones that we are going to touch uponthis term anyway that's it for the ICJwhen we come back the next time we'regonna talk about another InternationalCourt tries to help the world manageinternational conflict that being theInternational Criminal Court all rightthat's it for now I'll be back well I'mgonna record that one shortly and we'llbe back whenever you're back

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welcome back once again today wecomplete our discussion of internationalcourts by looking at the InternationalCriminal Court as we did with the ICJwe'll start by looking at the historyand evolution of the courtwe'll discuss its generalcharacteristics we'll then take a littlebreak and when we come back from thebreak we will look at some of thereasons why a variety of countries haverefused to participate in the activitiesof the court all right let's start withthe origins the idea that there shouldbe a court to prosecute war crimescrimes against commit humanity and thatsort the idea is not newalthough the ICC itself is relativelynew there were for example efforts totry war criminals at the end of theFirst World War but these early ad hocefforts really produced very limitedresults only a relatively small numberof mostly middle ranking individualswere ever successfully tried andconvicted for their crimes after WorldWar Two there was another effort again aseries of ad hoc both international andnational tribunals were convened to tryaxis war criminals the main axis warcriminals were tried at Nuremberg inGermany and Tokyo in Japan with lessercriminals tried at various nationaltribunals in places like France andPoland and elsewhere now unlike thosefirst world war tribunals the tribunalscreated in the aftermath of the SecondWorld War proved to be more successfulthey successfully prosecuted many moreindividuals including individuals at thehighest ranks despite their overallsuccess and they do have to be viewed asa success despite their overall successhowever the Nuremberg and Tokyotribunals and to a lesser degree in theNational tribunals do come in for acertain degree of criticismand some of it is at least reasonableamongst other thingscritics claim that sometimes not alwayscertainly certainly certainly not alwaysbut sometimes the trials amounted toVictor's justice you know some of thetrials engaged if you will in a doublestandard by trying access defendants foractions that were to say the least verysimilar to those engaged in by Alliedpersonnel that was one criticism inaddition the main tribunals theNurburgring on particular saw theparticipation of sole judges judges whoin many cases were connected to the showtrials of Stalin in his Great Purge inother words these judges participatingin the neural and Emin straited theirwillingness to engage in what wereclearly illegitimate and illegal andhighly political prosecutions and nowthey're at Nuremberg passing judgmentthere as well so that again at leastquestions at least in part thelegitimacy of the process of course theperfect is the enemy of the good as theexpression goes so you know we shouldn'tbe too harsh while it's true that theTokyo Nuremberg tribunals were notperfect but despite their imperfectionsthey were a relative success and as aresult this led to efforts in the 1940sand 50s to create permanent or crimescourt but these efforts floundered theyfounded for two reasons one was atechnical disagreement over how thecourt would be structured what itsjurisdiction would be and so on so forthsort of technical issuesbut the main reason why a permanentCourt was not created at this time wasbecause of the divisions of the Cold Warfrankly the international communitycould not agree to create such a Courtand it's only as the Cold War is windingdown in the late 1980s that this ideathis idea of creating a a permanenttribunal to try war criminals re-emergesand to that end the international lawcommission is asked by the GeneralAssembly to undertake some preliminarywork on the issue basically theinternational law committee is a is is ais a body and one of the things that itoften does is do effectively researchinto new areas of international law sofor example before some of the majortreaties that have been signed in recentyears were were actually negotiated someof the sort of groundwork the prep workthe foundational work was done by theInternational Law Commission and that'sexactly what they were done here in thecase of the treaty that ultimatelycreated the ICC actually known as theRome Statute the ILC did some of theplumeria work wasn't the final versionthere were still negotiations to getinto place but they sort of sketched outthe key parameters of what a treaty onthis topic might look like in any casethat was the preliminary work is beingdone and then something else happens tospur the process further along andthat's the creation of ad hoc tribunalsagain not a permanent court but ad hoctribunals to investigate and prosecuteoffenders for atrocities committed inRwanda and Yugoslavia in the early tomid 1990s again as I mentioned in theprevious lecture not the last one butthe one before both the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia and the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda have nowwrapped up their operations again thoughthe relative success of the Rwandaand you Kozlov ad hoc tribunals thechanging international environment thegroundwork of the ILC and all of thiscomes together in the late 1990s tocreate an opportunity for action andeventually in the internationalcommunity supported by a number ofcountries like Canada did not play theleading role by any stretch of theimagination but Canada did play animportant role contributory role in thisprocess that led to a series ofnegotiations that ultimately resulted inJuly of 1998 with the signing of atreaty again the aforementioned RomeStatute that created the ICC the treatyis completed and signed in July of 1998and four years later on July 1st 2002yesCanada they just coincidentally the ICCgoes into operation now in terms of thecharacteristics of the court one of thethings I want to touch on very quicklyis its relationship to the UnitedNations the ICC is independent of andseparate from the UN but it does have anagreement effectively a treaty with theUN whereby the two sides agreeing to work closely together they agree tocooperate with one another so they'reseparate they have agreed to work withone another furthermore the GeneralAssembly is authorized to fund theInternational Court if if a case isreferred to the ICC by the SecurityCouncil in terms of the courtsmembership the first thing to note isthat only states can join the ICC but atthe same time this concept of state hashas broadened in recent years and thathas opened the door to new membershipspecifically in 2015 the PalestinianAuthority was allowed to join the ICC tosign the Rome Statute this was actuallythe second time the PalestinianAuthority had tried to join the you seeback in 2009 they had asked the court toprosecute a case against Israel but thecourt rejected the application becauseat the time as far as the United Nationswas concerned the Palestine thePalestinian Authority was a quoteobserver entity that's how they weredefined in the UN an observer entityanyway the ICC said well no you're onlyStates can enjoin you're an observerentity therefore you're not eligible tojoin by 2012 however the Palestinianshad been upgraded at the GeneralAssembly to the status of quotenon-member observer state the word stateappeared in their description and as aresult the ICC's Prosecutor's Officeannounced that that made thePalestinians eligible for membership sowhat does that mean well it means thatat present there are now 123 countriesquote-unquote including the Palestinianswho are part of the Rome Statute whosigned and ratify the agreement aremembers of the ICC overall that meansthat roughly not quite but almosttwo-thirds of the countries in the worldbelong to the ICC however because somany sort of major powers with largepopulations have tended to stay outsideof the ICC have not signed and ratifiedthe Rome Statute because there's so muchopposition amongst to the ICC amongst alarger more populous nations a littlemore than half of the world's populationactually lives in a country that is nota member so more countries a majority of the world's countries have have signedtheir own staturethe ICC but more than half of theworld's population lives in a countrythat is not a member the ICC hasconsiderable support in Europe and in the Western Hemisphereespecially South America the largestpercentage of not everybody but thelargest number of countries are largevast majority of countries in Europe andthe Western Hemisphere have signed onthere are some exceptions when I talkbut the u.s. is one of them but for themost part if you're in Europe or in theWestern Hemisphere you are almostcertainly a member of the ICC otherregions of the world though are notquite as an emirate of the ISIS amajority of African countries 33 out of54 have signed on but that still leavesa significant number that have notagreed to participatethe situation is even bleaker in Asiawhere only 18 of 48 countries in Asiaare members and probably mostdramatically only 3 of 21 members of theArab League have signed and ratified theagreement just to note there's someoverlap between these groups for examplethere are some Arab League members thatare part of the Africa in a geographicsense but you get the idea in a generalsense of where the most support or theleast work for that matter the ICC is umin most parts of the world other thanEurope and you know Central SouthAmerica it is mostly the small andmiddle powers named and ratified theRome Statute not so much true in mostregions with respect to either regionalpowers or emerging great powers andcertainly the current and former superpowers have not agreed to sign andratify at the Rome Statute I'm gonnatalk about why after the break it's alsoimportant to know that it is entirelypossible and the fact it has alreadyhappened that a state can withdraw fromthe ICC in recent years one state hasactually withdrawn from the Rome Statutea second is in the process ofwithdrawing its membership and two otherstatesannounced that they were withdrawingonly to later effectively rescind theirdecision and retain their membership inspecific terms in 2017 Burundibecame the first state to actuallywithdraw from the ICC they withdrewtheir signature from the Rome Statutethey did so after the ICC opened aninvestigation into crimes committed inBurundi similarly the government of thePhilippines has announced that it waswithdrawing from the ICC after the ICCopened a preliminary investigation intoalleged and extra beauty excuse me intoalleged extrajudicial killingsauthorized by the Philippines presidentrodrigo duterte now the Philippinesituation is a little bit complicated umlast roughly a year agoDuterte announced that his governmentwasI'm from the Rome Statute effectiveimmediately however under the terms of the treaty you can't withdraw effectiveimmediately you have to give 12 monthsnotice and therefore technically thePhilippines hasn't quite yet withdrawnofficially but it may have virtually anyday now we'll have to check in fact itmay it may change in the time betweenthe recording of this lecture and thetime you are you are playing it as forthe two countries that said they weregoing to quit and then didn't those werethe Gambia and South Africa they hadboth announced that they were leaving atthe same time that Burundi was leavingso that was three African countries allat once but both countriesunlike Burundi have since rescindedtheir withdrawal so the Gambia and SouthAfrica are currently members of goodstanding in the Rome Statute members of the ICC all right so what is the jerkthe geographic reach of the ICC wherecan it take action where does it havejurisdictionwell the ICC can take action number oneif the state in which the alleged actiontook place is a signatory so for exampleCanada has signed the Rome Statute so ifa war crime is committed here in Canadathe ICC may it's not required to but itmay take action number two if theaccused if the person accused of the warcrime is a citizen of a signatory statethe ICC may take actionso again if a Canadian commits a warcrime the ICC may take action becauseCanada has signed the Rome Statuteanyways if neither of thosecircumstances are in effect in otherwords if it's not on the territory of amember of the Rome Statuteif it's not a citizen of a country thathas signed the Rome Statute there is athird possibility if those first twocircumstances do not apply the SecurityCouncil subject to the veto of coursemay request that the ICC take action sothat means in theory in theory any warcrime committed anywhere in the worldcould theoretically be under thejurisdiction of the ICC in theory now itdoesn't work that way in practice but itdoes in theory in terms ofinvestigations and possible prosecutionsthese come before the AC in one of threeways sometimes the ICC itself launchesan investigation they have a staff theyinvestigate cases and and whatever andthey can decide for themselves to do tolaunch an actual criminal prosecutionsecondly a country that is a party tothe Rome Statute so any country that hassigned the Rome Statute may request theydon't get the order but may request thatthe ICC investigate a case and thenfinally as I just mentioned a moment agothe Security Council also can requestthe ICC be investigate a possible crimethat's it the ICC itself a government amember state or the Security Councilnobody else private individuals no NGOsno international organizations otherthan the Security Council no now thatdoesn't mean that individuals or NGOs orwhatever they can submit evidence to theICC but they can't ask they cannot getthe court to sort of in undertake aformal investigation as to whether ornot to go forward sothe bets that they can do is contributeinformation now having said all of thisyou know just because the jurisdictionis theoretically anywhere it doesn'tmean that the ICC will automaticallytake up a case in these circumstancesthe the resources of the court arelimited and one of the things it does isprioritize cases it prefers to targetlarge-scale crimes this is exactly whathappened oh gee almost a decade ago nowthere was an incident involving Israeland what had happened was some groupssupporting the Palestinians try toeffectively run a blockade the shipswere intercepted and in one case therewere individuals killed when Israelimilitary personnel stopped one of theships this is if you want to look upmore on this is something known as theGaza flotilla incident anyway in 2014the ICC's Prosecutor's Office announcedthat there was at least a reasonablebase basis to conclude that a crimemight have been committed in other wordsthey didn't say that you know the peoplewere guilty but they said you know intheory we could go ahead there was areasonable basis to conclude that acrime might have been committed when theIsraeli commandos boarded a shipregistered to the Comoros an action thatresulted in nine people died but the ICCsaid that it would not pursue the casegiven the limited scale of the allegedcrime in other words the court said itjust wasn't serious enough for the courtto get involved there's only it only hasso much money there's only so much timethere's only so many judges they theyneed to focus their attention on thelarge-scale criminal or alleged criminalactivitiesthe other limit to the actions of thecork is that the ICC under the RomeStatute is limited to only acting ininstances where national courts areeither unable or unwilling to do the jobthemselves they're either unable orunwilling to prosecute the offendersor the alleged offenders in other wordsin they won't step inunless say for example a country isemerging from Civil War and its courtsare in shambles all right they areunable to prosecute and so the ICC mightstep in in that circumstance the othersituation in terms of unwilling is ofcourse in some countries the courts areunder the some of the politicalleadership and they will be told not topursue certain criminal activities andif that is true if a court is unwillingto prosecute an offender because it'sbeen told by its political mastersexcuse me not to do so and then againthe ICC may step in in terms of thescope of its activities its functionaljurisdiction if you will in terms of thespecific crimes first the court cannotcannot prosecute anything that happenedprior to July 1st 2002 in other words itcan't retroactively lis prosecute anycrime that occurred prior to thecreation of the court right July 1stCanada Day 2002 that's when the courtbegins operations that's the start ofits mandate so if you are accused of awar crime from a conflict back in the1970s the ICC at least can't take actionbut if it does what kinds of crimes fallunder its jurisdiction well broadlyspeakingit seeks to prosecute war crimes thecrime of genocide and crimes againsthumanity if you look at the firstoverhead there is sort of a breakdown ofnot all but some of the specific crimesthat fall under the category of warcrimes genocide and crimes againsthumanity and you know everything fromtaking of hostages mass murdererapartheid stare although that doesn'texist anymore deporting populationsdeliberately attacking peacekeepers rapeand other forms of sexual assaultobviously on a large scale as adeliberate or crime use of childsoldiers aim is all sorts you can reviewthose at your convenience now inaddition to war crimes genocide andcrimes against humanity two other excuseme three other things were consideredfor addition to the jurisdiction of theICC one of these was the crime ofaggression the crime of aggression andbasically attacking your neighbor if youwill going to war against your neighborwas considered for inclusion and it mayone day be included in the Rome Statutebut there was no acceptable definitionthey the international communitycommunity could not agree on whataggression means so it was left out of the initial Rome Statute there has beenan effort over the last 10 years to tryand work together and work up adefinition of aggression and it mayhappen there is a proposal on the tablebut to date to date it is far far fartoo few countries have agreed on thisnew definition for could go ahead so atthe moment there is no agreed-upondefinitionof aggression and therefore aggressionis not part of the Rome Statute nottoday may one day change but it hasn'tyet two other things were considered andultimately dropped from the jurisdictionof the ICC the ICC is currently notauthorized to protect you prosecuteeither acts of terrorism or large-scaledrug trafficking you know drug lords notwhat you and your roommates do on theweekenddrug trafficking allegedly kind of thingterrorists I shouldn't even joke aboutthat terror was terrorism was admittedbecause the international community hasrepeatedly failed to agree on adefinition of terrorism much like theyfail to agree on a definition ofaggression they fail to agree on adefinition of terrorism right you knowthe old saying right one person'sfreedom fighter is another person'sterrorist that kind of thing however itwould be possible for specific acts ofterrorism to be tried by the court ifthe court if the act was serious enoughto for example constitute a crimeagainst humanity so in other words itwouldn't be the fact that it's terrorismthat would bring it before the court butif it was say you know murder on amassive scale or something like thatin theory the ICC could step in as fordrug trafficking this is a really sadcommentary on the world the reason itwas admitted committed omitted from theICC's Rome Statute is because theproblem of international drugtrafficking this is an ideal topic foran international court to deal with butthe problem is so widespread it wasfeared that efforts to involve the courtin the prosecution of drug lords wouldquickly overwhelm the resources of thecourt in other words they would be sobusy trying international drug lordsthat they would be able to try warcriminals it wouldn't have the resourcesI know shocking sad commentary on ourlifestylein any case in terms of the structure of the court it is much like the ICC apermanent court much like the ICClocated in The Hague in the country of the Netherlands it does have a governingbody known as the Assembly of StatesParties it's kind of like they theirversion of the General Assemblyanyone who signed the Rome Statute ispart of this Assembly of States Partiesand it sort of gives overall guidance tothe court other states who have signedbut not ratified the Rome Statute maysit as observers but they don't get avoteanyways basically one country one voteand no vetoes all right in terms of itsbasic operations the court is assistantit has a bureaucratic and administrativestaff you know secretaries researcherscleaners security personnelwhat-have-you and these operations aswell as the operations of the court arepaid for by an annual budget that runand somewhere in the range currentlyabout 230 million Canadian so but a notquite a quarter of billion dollars ayear where does the money come from duesevery country that assigned the RomeStatute is a member of the court paysinto a fund to cover the costs of theICC the formula is similar albeit notidentical to that used to determine yourUN dues basically the way it works it isthe bigger and richer you are the moreyou pay the smaller and Tory are theless you pay in addition the court doesoccasionally get money from the GeneralAssembly if a case has been referred bythe Security Councilas for the judicial structure of thecourt itself there are 18 judges andthey are elected on a regional basis butonly from amongst countries that haveratified the Rome Statute and what thatmeans is because currently so manyEuropean and Latin American states haveratified the Rome Statute nearly 2/3 of the judges currently are from Europe andother other includes Canada and LatinAmerica 11 of the 18 judges 8 fromEurope another 3 from Latin America therest of the judges 4 from are assignedfrom Africa and only 3 from Asia some of the judges hear cases some hear appealsand in addition one of the 18 judgesserves a three-year term as thepresident and two others serve terms asvice president these judges are electedfor a nine-year term but they arenon-renewable terms you only get toserve four for one term on the ICCthat's different than a number of otherinternational courts but just like theIPCC or excuse me just like the ICJthese elections are on are on astaggered basis in other words not allthe judges come up every every yearevery three years one-third of thejudges are replacedalthough the judges do are allowed to gobeyond the end of their mandate if theyare in the middle of a trial for examplebut other than that nine years and thenyou're done at present there's actuallya Canadian one Canadian justice Kimberlyprocced who is serving on the court andwas elected as a trial judge last yearin 2018 in addition a different Canadianjudge was the first judge to be electedpresidentat the court but that was some time agonow we come to the tricky issue ofenforcement again we talked about thistwo units ago how are the actions of thecourse implemented how are they enforcedwell any state that signs the RomeStatute is and this is the actual wordobliged quote unquote states parties tothe Rome Statute are obliged to fullycooperate with the court you know theypromise to do so they are obliged tocooperate with its investigations theyare obliged to cooperate with itsprosecutions but there is of course noformal mechanism there is no means toForce to compel States to cooperate withthe ICC and as a result sometimes statesdon't cooperate with the ICC in 2014 theICC was investigating the president ofKenya who had been accused of organizingethnic violence in the aftermath of somedisputed elections the ICC wasinvestigating the president of Kenya butKenya surprise surpriseeven though it was quote/unquote obligedto cooperate with the court refused tocooperate and what's not giving thecourt he documents access to thewitnesses and whatever and as a resultthe court had to drop the case againstthis individual in the announcement thecourt said yeah we didn't getcooperation they also said thatwitnesses had to be either bribed orintimidated and so and so forth so thecase against the president there wereothers as well the vice-president orexcuse me the deputy president they callhim deputy president the deputypresident of Kenya was also hisalso suspended two years later now thecourt may at some point in the futurerevisit these cases if the circumstanceswarrant but at the moment they have beenunable to move forward because Kenya isnot cooperating even more dramaticallywas the case in 2015 which will whichtouch on briefly even later on whereSouth Africa refused to enforce anarrest warrant against the now deposedPresident of Sudan Omar al-bashir who iswanted for ordering a genocide in theDarfur region of Western studentaccording to you know the Rome Statutethe South Africans should have enforcedthe arrest or the arrest work but theyrefused refused to do soand at least for the moment al Bashirwas able to escape justice again he hasrecently been deposed from office he'sno longer in power we'll have to seewhat happens to him going forward in anycase why don't we take a quick breakhere and when we come back we're goingto talk about why it is that there isopposition to the ICC in variousquarters which countries oppose it andwhy

15

welcome back once again today wecomplete our discussion of internationalcourts by looking at the InternationalCriminal Court as we did with the ICJwe'll start by looking at the historyand evolution of the courtwe'll discuss its generalcharacteristics we'll then take a littlebreak and when we come back from thebreak we will look at some of thereasons why a variety of countries haverefused to participate in the activitiesof the court all right let's start withthe origins the idea that there shouldbe a court to prosecute war crimescrimes against commit humanity and thatsort the idea is not newalthough the ICC itself is relativelynew there were for example efforts totry war criminals at the end of theFirst World War but these early ad hocefforts really produced very limitedresults only a relatively small numberof mostly middle ranking individualswere ever successfully tried andconvicted for their crimes after WorldWar Two there was another effort again aseries of ad hoc both international andnational tribunals were convened to tryaxis war criminals the main axis warcriminals were tried at Nuremberg inGermany and Tokyo in Japan with lessercriminals tried at various nationaltribunals in places like France andPoland and elsewhere now unlike thosefirst world war tribunals the tribunalscreated in the aftermath of the SecondWorld War proved to be more successfulthey successfully prosecuted many moreindividuals including individuals at thehighest ranks despite their overallsuccess and they do have to be viewed asa success despite their overall successhowever the Nuremberg and Tokyotribunals and to a lesser degree in theNational tribunals do come in for acertain degree of criticismand some of it is at least reasonableamongst other thingscritics claim that sometimes not alwayscertainly certainly certainly not alwaysbut sometimes the trials amounted toVictor's justice you know some of thetrials engaged if you will in a doublestandard by trying access defendants foractions that were to say the least verysimilar to those engaged in by Alliedpersonnel that was one criticism inaddition the main tribunals theNurburgring on particular saw theparticipation of sole judges judges whoin many cases were connected to the showtrials of Stalin in his Great Purge inother words these judges participatingin the neural and Emin straited theirwillingness to engage in what wereclearly illegitimate and illegal andhighly political prosecutions and nowthey're at Nuremberg passing judgmentthere as well so that again at leastquestions at least in part thelegitimacy of the process of course theperfect is the enemy of the good as theexpression goes so you know we shouldn'tbe too harsh while it's true that theTokyo Nuremberg tribunals were notperfect but despite their imperfectionsthey were a relative success and as aresult this led to efforts in the 1940sand 50s to create permanent or crimescourt but these efforts floundered theyfounded for two reasons one was atechnical disagreement over how thecourt would be structured what itsjurisdiction would be and so on so forthsort of technical issuesbut the main reason why a permanentCourt was not created at this time wasbecause of the divisions of the Cold Warfrankly the international communitycould not agree to create such a Courtand it's only as the Cold War is windingdown in the late 1980s that this ideathis idea of creating a a permanenttribunal to try war criminals re-emergesand to that end the international lawcommission is asked by the GeneralAssembly to undertake some preliminarywork on the issue basically theinternational law committee is a is is ais a body and one of the things that itoften does is do effectively researchinto new areas of international law sofor example before some of the majortreaties that have been signed in recentyears were were actually negotiated someof the sort of groundwork the prep workthe foundational work was done by theInternational Law Commission and that'sexactly what they were done here in thecase of the treaty that ultimatelycreated the ICC actually known as theRome Statute the ILC did some of theplumeria work wasn't the final versionthere were still negotiations to getinto place but they sort of sketched outthe key parameters of what a treaty onthis topic might look like in any casethat was the preliminary work is beingdone and then something else happens tospur the process further along andthat's the creation of ad hoc tribunalsagain not a permanent court but ad hoctribunals to investigate and prosecuteoffenders for atrocities committed inRwanda and Yugoslavia in the early tomid 1990s again as I mentioned in theprevious lecture not the last one butthe one before both the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia and the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda have nowwrapped up their operations again thoughthe relative success of the Rwandaand you Kozlov ad hoc tribunals thechanging international environment thegroundwork of the ILC and all of thiscomes together in the late 1990s tocreate an opportunity for action andeventually in the internationalcommunity supported by a number ofcountries like Canada did not play theleading role by any stretch of theimagination but Canada did play animportant role contributory role in thisprocess that led to a series ofnegotiations that ultimately resulted inJuly of 1998 with the signing of atreaty again the aforementioned RomeStatute that created the ICC the treatyis completed and signed in July of 1998and four years later on July 1st 2002yesCanada they just coincidentally the ICCgoes into operation now in terms of thecharacteristics of the court one of thethings I want to touch on very quicklyis its relationship to the UnitedNations the ICC is independent of andseparate from the UN but it does have anagreement effectively a treaty with theUN whereby the two sides agreeing to work closely together they agree tocooperate with one another so they'reseparate they have agreed to work withone another furthermore the GeneralAssembly is authorized to fund theInternational Court if if a case isreferred to the ICC by the SecurityCouncil in terms of the courtsmembership the first thing to note isthat only states can join the ICC but atthe same time this concept of state hashas broadened in recent years and thathas opened the door to new membershipspecifically in 2015 the PalestinianAuthority was allowed to join the ICC tosign the Rome Statute this was actuallythe second time the PalestinianAuthority had tried to join the you seeback in 2009 they had asked the court toprosecute a case against Israel but thecourt rejected the application becauseat the time as far as the United Nationswas concerned the Palestine thePalestinian Authority was a quoteobserver entity that's how they weredefined in the UN an observer entityanyway the ICC said well no you're onlyStates can enjoin you're an observerentity therefore you're not eligible tojoin by 2012 however the Palestinianshad been upgraded at the GeneralAssembly to the status of quotenon-member observer state the word stateappeared in their description and as aresult the ICC's Prosecutor's Officeannounced that that made thePalestinians eligible for membership sowhat does that mean well it means thatat present there are now 123 countriesquote-unquote including the Palestinianswho are part of the Rome Statute whosigned and ratify the agreement aremembers of the ICC overall that meansthat roughly not quite but almosttwo-thirds of the countries in the worldbelong to the ICC however because somany sort of major powers with largepopulations have tended to stay outsideof the ICC have not signed and ratifiedthe Rome Statute because there's so muchopposition amongst to the ICC amongst alarger more populous nations a littlemore than half of the world's populationactually lives in a country that is nota member so more countries a majority of the world's countries have have signedtheir own staturethe ICC but more than half of theworld's population lives in a countrythat is not a member the ICC hasconsiderable support in Europe and in the Western Hemisphereespecially South America the largestpercentage of not everybody but thelargest number of countries are largevast majority of countries in Europe andthe Western Hemisphere have signed onthere are some exceptions when I talkbut the u.s. is one of them but for themost part if you're in Europe or in theWestern Hemisphere you are almostcertainly a member of the ICC otherregions of the world though are notquite as an emirate of the ISIS amajority of African countries 33 out of54 have signed on but that still leavesa significant number that have notagreed to participatethe situation is even bleaker in Asiawhere only 18 of 48 countries in Asiaare members and probably mostdramatically only 3 of 21 members of theArab League have signed and ratified theagreement just to note there's someoverlap between these groups for examplethere are some Arab League members thatare part of the Africa in a geographicsense but you get the idea in a generalsense of where the most support or theleast work for that matter the ICC is umin most parts of the world other thanEurope and you know Central SouthAmerica it is mostly the small andmiddle powers named and ratified theRome Statute not so much true in mostregions with respect to either regionalpowers or emerging great powers andcertainly the current and former superpowers have not agreed to sign andratify at the Rome Statute I'm gonnatalk about why after the break it's alsoimportant to know that it is entirelypossible and the fact it has alreadyhappened that a state can withdraw fromthe ICC in recent years one state hasactually withdrawn from the Rome Statutea second is in the process ofwithdrawing its membership and two otherstatesannounced that they were withdrawingonly to later effectively rescind theirdecision and retain their membership inspecific terms in 2017 Burundibecame the first state to actuallywithdraw from the ICC they withdrewtheir signature from the Rome Statutethey did so after the ICC opened aninvestigation into crimes committed inBurundi similarly the government of thePhilippines has announced that it waswithdrawing from the ICC after the ICCopened a preliminary investigation intoalleged and extra beauty excuse me intoalleged extrajudicial killingsauthorized by the Philippines presidentrodrigo duterte now the Philippinesituation is a little bit complicated umlast roughly a year agoDuterte announced that his governmentwasI'm from the Rome Statute effectiveimmediately however under the terms of the treaty you can't withdraw effectiveimmediately you have to give 12 monthsnotice and therefore technically thePhilippines hasn't quite yet withdrawnofficially but it may have virtually anyday now we'll have to check in fact itmay it may change in the time betweenthe recording of this lecture and thetime you are you are playing it as forthe two countries that said they weregoing to quit and then didn't those werethe Gambia and South Africa they hadboth announced that they were leaving atthe same time that Burundi was leavingso that was three African countries allat once but both countriesunlike Burundi have since rescindedtheir withdrawal so the Gambia and SouthAfrica are currently members of goodstanding in the Rome Statute members of the ICC all right so what is the jerkthe geographic reach of the ICC wherecan it take action where does it havejurisdictionwell the ICC can take action number oneif the state in which the alleged actiontook place is a signatory so for exampleCanada has signed the Rome Statute so ifa war crime is committed here in Canadathe ICC may it's not required to but itmay take action number two if theaccused if the person accused of the warcrime is a citizen of a signatory statethe ICC may take actionso again if a Canadian commits a warcrime the ICC may take action becauseCanada has signed the Rome Statuteanyways if neither of thosecircumstances are in effect in otherwords if it's not on the territory of amember of the Rome Statuteif it's not a citizen of a country thathas signed the Rome Statute there is athird possibility if those first twocircumstances do not apply the SecurityCouncil subject to the veto of coursemay request that the ICC take action sothat means in theory in theory any warcrime committed anywhere in the worldcould theoretically be under thejurisdiction of the ICC in theory now itdoesn't work that way in practice but itdoes in theory in terms ofinvestigations and possible prosecutionsthese come before the AC in one of threeways sometimes the ICC itself launchesan investigation they have a staff theyinvestigate cases and and whatever andthey can decide for themselves to do tolaunch an actual criminal prosecutionsecondly a country that is a party tothe Rome Statute so any country that hassigned the Rome Statute may request theydon't get the order but may request thatthe ICC investigate a case and thenfinally as I just mentioned a moment agothe Security Council also can requestthe ICC be investigate a possible crimethat's it the ICC itself a government amember state or the Security Councilnobody else private individuals no NGOsno international organizations otherthan the Security Council no now thatdoesn't mean that individuals or NGOs orwhatever they can submit evidence to theICC but they can't ask they cannot getthe court to sort of in undertake aformal investigation as to whether ornot to go forward sothe bets that they can do is contributeinformation now having said all of thisyou know just because the jurisdictionis theoretically anywhere it doesn'tmean that the ICC will automaticallytake up a case in these circumstancesthe the resources of the court arelimited and one of the things it does isprioritize cases it prefers to targetlarge-scale crimes this is exactly whathappened oh gee almost a decade ago nowthere was an incident involving Israeland what had happened was some groupssupporting the Palestinians try toeffectively run a blockade the shipswere intercepted and in one case therewere individuals killed when Israelimilitary personnel stopped one of theships this is if you want to look upmore on this is something known as theGaza flotilla incident anyway in 2014the ICC's Prosecutor's Office announcedthat there was at least a reasonablebase basis to conclude that a crimemight have been committed in other wordsthey didn't say that you know the peoplewere guilty but they said you know intheory we could go ahead there was areasonable basis to conclude that acrime might have been committed when theIsraeli commandos boarded a shipregistered to the Comoros an action thatresulted in nine people died but the ICCsaid that it would not pursue the casegiven the limited scale of the allegedcrime in other words the court said itjust wasn't serious enough for the courtto get involved there's only it only hasso much money there's only so much timethere's only so many judges they theyneed to focus their attention on thelarge-scale criminal or alleged criminalactivitiesthe other limit to the actions of thecork is that the ICC under the RomeStatute is limited to only acting ininstances where national courts areeither unable or unwilling to do the jobthemselves they're either unable orunwilling to prosecute the offendersor the alleged offenders in other wordsin they won't step inunless say for example a country isemerging from Civil War and its courtsare in shambles all right they areunable to prosecute and so the ICC mightstep in in that circumstance the othersituation in terms of unwilling is ofcourse in some countries the courts areunder the some of the politicalleadership and they will be told not topursue certain criminal activities andif that is true if a court is unwillingto prosecute an offender because it'sbeen told by its political mastersexcuse me not to do so and then againthe ICC may step in in terms of thescope of its activities its functionaljurisdiction if you will in terms of thespecific crimes first the court cannotcannot prosecute anything that happenedprior to July 1st 2002 in other words itcan't retroactively lis prosecute anycrime that occurred prior to thecreation of the court right July 1stCanada Day 2002 that's when the courtbegins operations that's the start ofits mandate so if you are accused of awar crime from a conflict back in the1970s the ICC at least can't take actionbut if it does what kinds of crimes fallunder its jurisdiction well broadlyspeakingit seeks to prosecute war crimes thecrime of genocide and crimes againsthumanity if you look at the firstoverhead there is sort of a breakdown ofnot all but some of the specific crimesthat fall under the category of warcrimes genocide and crimes againsthumanity and you know everything fromtaking of hostages mass murdererapartheid stare although that doesn'texist anymore deporting populationsdeliberately attacking peacekeepers rapeand other forms of sexual assaultobviously on a large scale as adeliberate or crime use of childsoldiers aim is all sorts you can reviewthose at your convenience now inaddition to war crimes genocide andcrimes against humanity two other excuseme three other things were consideredfor addition to the jurisdiction of theICC one of these was the crime ofaggression the crime of aggression andbasically attacking your neighbor if youwill going to war against your neighborwas considered for inclusion and it mayone day be included in the Rome Statutebut there was no acceptable definitionthey the international communitycommunity could not agree on whataggression means so it was left out of the initial Rome Statute there has beenan effort over the last 10 years to tryand work together and work up adefinition of aggression and it mayhappen there is a proposal on the tablebut to date to date it is far far fartoo few countries have agreed on thisnew definition for could go ahead so atthe moment there is no agreed-upondefinitionof aggression and therefore aggressionis not part of the Rome Statute nottoday may one day change but it hasn'tyet two other things were considered andultimately dropped from the jurisdictionof the ICC the ICC is currently notauthorized to protect you prosecuteeither acts of terrorism or large-scaledrug trafficking you know drug lords notwhat you and your roommates do on theweekenddrug trafficking allegedly kind of thingterrorists I shouldn't even joke aboutthat terror was terrorism was admittedbecause the international community hasrepeatedly failed to agree on adefinition of terrorism much like theyfail to agree on a definition ofaggression they fail to agree on adefinition of terrorism right you knowthe old saying right one person'sfreedom fighter is another person'sterrorist that kind of thing however itwould be possible for specific acts ofterrorism to be tried by the court ifthe court if the act was serious enoughto for example constitute a crimeagainst humanity so in other words itwouldn't be the fact that it's terrorismthat would bring it before the court butif it was say you know murder on amassive scale or something like thatin theory the ICC could step in as fordrug trafficking this is a really sadcommentary on the world the reason itwas admitted committed omitted from theICC's Rome Statute is because theproblem of international drugtrafficking this is an ideal topic foran international court to deal with butthe problem is so widespread it wasfeared that efforts to involve the courtin the prosecution of drug lords wouldquickly overwhelm the resources of thecourt in other words they would be sobusy trying international drug lordsthat they would be able to try warcriminals it wouldn't have the resourcesI know shocking sad commentary on ourlifestylein any case in terms of the structure of the court it is much like the ICC apermanent court much like the ICClocated in The Hague in the country of the Netherlands it does have a governingbody known as the Assembly of StatesParties it's kind of like they theirversion of the General Assemblyanyone who signed the Rome Statute ispart of this Assembly of States Partiesand it sort of gives overall guidance tothe court other states who have signedbut not ratified the Rome Statute maysit as observers but they don't get avoteanyways basically one country one voteand no vetoes all right in terms of itsbasic operations the court is assistantit has a bureaucratic and administrativestaff you know secretaries researcherscleaners security personnelwhat-have-you and these operations aswell as the operations of the court arepaid for by an annual budget that runand somewhere in the range currentlyabout 230 million Canadian so but a notquite a quarter of billion dollars ayear where does the money come from duesevery country that assigned the RomeStatute is a member of the court paysinto a fund to cover the costs of theICC the formula is similar albeit notidentical to that used to determine yourUN dues basically the way it works it isthe bigger and richer you are the moreyou pay the smaller and Tory are theless you pay in addition the court doesoccasionally get money from the GeneralAssembly if a case has been referred bythe Security Councilas for the judicial structure of thecourt itself there are 18 judges andthey are elected on a regional basis butonly from amongst countries that haveratified the Rome Statute and what thatmeans is because currently so manyEuropean and Latin American states haveratified the Rome Statute nearly 2/3 of the judges currently are from Europe andother other includes Canada and LatinAmerica 11 of the 18 judges 8 fromEurope another 3 from Latin America therest of the judges 4 from are assignedfrom Africa and only 3 from Asia some of the judges hear cases some hear appealsand in addition one of the 18 judgesserves a three-year term as thepresident and two others serve terms asvice president these judges are electedfor a nine-year term but they arenon-renewable terms you only get toserve four for one term on the ICCthat's different than a number of otherinternational courts but just like theIPCC or excuse me just like the ICJthese elections are on are on astaggered basis in other words not allthe judges come up every every yearevery three years one-third of thejudges are replacedalthough the judges do are allowed to gobeyond the end of their mandate if theyare in the middle of a trial for examplebut other than that nine years and thenyou're done at present there's actuallya Canadian one Canadian justice Kimberlyprocced who is serving on the court andwas elected as a trial judge last yearin 2018 in addition a different Canadianjudge was the first judge to be electedpresidentat the court but that was some time agonow we come to the tricky issue ofenforcement again we talked about thistwo units ago how are the actions of thecourse implemented how are they enforcedwell any state that signs the RomeStatute is and this is the actual wordobliged quote unquote states parties tothe Rome Statute are obliged to fullycooperate with the court you know theypromise to do so they are obliged tocooperate with its investigations theyare obliged to cooperate with itsprosecutions but there is of course noformal mechanism there is no means toForce to compel States to cooperate withthe ICC and as a result sometimes statesdon't cooperate with the ICC in 2014 theICC was investigating the president ofKenya who had been accused of organizingethnic violence in the aftermath of somedisputed elections the ICC wasinvestigating the president of Kenya butKenya surprise surpriseeven though it was quote/unquote obligedto cooperate with the court refused tocooperate and what's not giving thecourt he documents access to thewitnesses and whatever and as a resultthe court had to drop the case againstthis individual in the announcement thecourt said yeah we didn't getcooperation they also said thatwitnesses had to be either bribed orintimidated and so and so forth so thecase against the president there wereothers as well the vice-president orexcuse me the deputy president they callhim deputy president the deputypresident of Kenya was also hisalso suspended two years later now thecourt may at some point in the futurerevisit these cases if the circumstanceswarrant but at the moment they have beenunable to move forward because Kenya isnot cooperating even more dramaticallywas the case in 2015 which will whichtouch on briefly even later on whereSouth Africa refused to enforce anarrest warrant against the now deposedPresident of Sudan Omar al-bashir who iswanted for ordering a genocide in theDarfur region of Western studentaccording to you know the Rome Statutethe South Africans should have enforcedthe arrest or the arrest work but theyrefused refused to do soand at least for the moment al Bashirwas able to escape justice again he hasrecently been deposed from office he'sno longer in power we'll have to seewhat happens to him going forward in anycase why don't we take a quick breakhere and when we come back we're goingto talk about why it is that there isopposition to the ICC in variousquarters which countries oppose it andwhy


Jasmin Krofchick